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Abstract 
Thesis Title: God and Time: A Neo-Bergsonian Perspective 
Name: Matyáš Moravec 
 
The thesis uses key insights from the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) to propose a 
new model of God’s relation to time.  
 Chapter 1 is an introduction to Bergson’s philosophy against the background of 
Russell’s “The Philosophy of Bergson.” It provides an exposition of two key themes from 
Bergson central to my argument: the relation between time and space (Chapters 2-4) and the 
relation between free will and determinism (Chapter 5).  
 Chapter 2 has a twofold task. First, it provides a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s 
argument for the unreality of time. Second, it uses the underlying metaphysics of McTaggart’s 
argument to demonstrate that two distinct temporal realms can be extracted from Bergson’s 
philosophy: (i) la durée and (ii) a mathematical time-ordering generally classified by analytic 
philosophy as the B-series.  
 Chapter 3 relates this double-tier framework to temporal ontologies in analytic 
philosophy. I argue that such a framework supports an “ontological idealism about time.” 
I argue for relativizing temporal existence to distinct points or sets of points of spacetime that 
leads to a radical mind-dependence of temporal extension of objects.  
 Chapter 4 explores how the durée-based ontology argued for in Chapter 3 impacts the 
relation between God and time. I argue that analytic philosophy has failed to capture key 
ontological facets of the God-time relation and that a return to divine “causal knowledge” is 
required. I demonstrate that the existence of temporal objects comes from two sources: (i) their 
mind-dependent temporal aspect and (ii) timeless divinely-created esse.  
 Chapter 5 applies this framework to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human 
free will. I demonstrate that although Bergson’s theory can defend the existence of human 
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 1  
Introduction 
On 11th March 1912, Bertrand Russell presented a paper entitled “The Philosophy of Bergson” 
to The Heretics Society in Cambridge.1 In a later published version of his talk, he made the 
following claim: 
One of the bad effects of an anti-intellectual philosophy, such as that of Bergson, 
is that it thrives upon the errors and confusions of the intellect. Hence it is led to 
prefer bad thinking to good, to declare every momentary difficulty insoluble, and 
to regard every foolish mistake as revealing the bankruptcy of intellect and the 
triumph of intuition.2 
Over a hundred years later, Frédéric Worms came to Cambridge to give a paper3 at a conference 
aiming to bring together scholars from analytic philosophy and Bergsonian studies, thereby 
undoing the rejection of Bergson by the early analytic philosophers.  In the course of his paper, 
Worms joked that “Henri Bergson invented ‘analytic philosophy’ — but only to criticise it.” 
The division of knowledge into that attainable by particular immediate experience (“intuition”), 
and that accessible by general abstract reasoning (“analysis”), represents two ways of thinking 
about reality — the first path is Bergson’s own, the second was opted for by Russell and 
analytic philosophy. 
 One of the aims of this study is to bring those two paths together again. Recent years 
have seen a surprising renewal of interest in Bergson from analytic philosophers in many 
different areas — philosophy of memory, philosophy of biology, or philosophy of physics, to 
give just a few examples. However, no large-scale project of applying his thought about time 
to analytic philosophy of religion has yet been undertaken. This essay does just that.  
 Specifically, I return to classical questions regarding free will, God, and time: What is 
the relation between time and the human mind? Is time an illusion? Are we free? Can we be 
free if God is omniscient? Does the future exist and if so, does God know it? I propose a 
Bergsonian model of God’s relation to time which gives a new response to these quandaries. 
Methodologically, this study takes the route of what could be called a “creative synthesis:”4 it 
 
1 Russell and Carr, The Philosophy of Bergson. By the Hon. Bertrand Russell; with a Reply by Mr. H. Wildon 
Carr and a Rejoinder by Mr. Russell. 
2 Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 337. 
3 Worms, ‘Thinking in Bergson’s Philosophy’. 
4 I am grateful to Natalja Deng for this observation. 
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brings together six pieces of the puzzle independently defended, to resolve the freedom and 
foreknowledge problem:  
(i) Bergson’s account of free will 
(ii) Bergson’s account of the qualitative nature of consciousness 
(iii) Bergson’s critique of “spatialised time”  
(iv) the mind-dependence of time  
(v) observer-relativisation of existence  
(vi) the dependence of all esse on God 
This synthesis also explains why the perspective that I wish to defend is termed “Neo-
Bergsonian.” While I do engage in a historical exegesis of Bergson’s philosophy, this essay 
works with something that could be called a “toy Bergson.” What Bergson thought plays as 
much of a role as what I think he should have thought, and the vast majority of my arguments 
would have proceeded in more or less the same way even if (or perhaps especially if) Bergson 
had not written much else apart from Time and Free Will (1889). This project is close to 
Jonathan Bennett’s approach of a “rational reconstruction” of a historical thinker:5 I aim for a 
careful reading of Bergson, but the primary motivation of this project is the desire to bring him 
into new dialogues with contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. 
 The reason why I base my model on Bergson rather than anyone else is that his early 
thought contains, in a bundle, four of the six main components that I need. It also opens the 
way for bringing in discussions about analytic temporal ontologies, although there my 
engagement with the special theory of relativity diverges radically from Bergson’s own. Some 
(or maybe all) of the six components from above are contentious, but I am not cherry-picking. 
I  show that each of them, independently of the others, is a valid observation about reality and 
that when they are brought together, they can resolve the freedom and foreknowledge problem. 
 Theologically, the God that I work with has fairly minimal contours — I do not appeal 
to the vast majority of attributes postulated by classical theism, such as divine 
omnibenevolence, or the key tenets of trinitarian theology. I do, however, stipulatively posit 
the following hypotheses, each of which will be clarified in the course of this study: 
 
5 Bennett uses this phrase to describe his methodology in Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. 
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Hypothesis 1: God is timeless. 
Hypothesis 2: God is omniscient. 
Hypothesis 3: God is the source of being. 
Despite the recent move by analytic philosophers away from Hypothesis 1 and the benefits this 
move might offer,6 I believe that divine timelessness need not be rejected. Ryan Mullins has 
lately argued that “there are no successful Christian research programs that promote divine 
timelessness because divine timelessness is not compatible with any existent theory of time.”7 
The first half of this essay gives existence to a new theory of time compatible with timelessness, 
opening the possibility of further successful research programmes incorporating it. 
 There is one further stipulation: 
Hypothesis 4: There are irreducibly mental facts. 
By that I mean merely that mental and physical facts fall into separate categories and that not 
all facts in the first category are reducible to or supervenient on those in the second. 
 The final thing that this essay will not engage with is process theology. Although 
Bergson has frequently been classified together with process philosophers,8 the model that 
I propose need not necessarily reject some of the traditional claims about God usually rejected 
by process theology. Creatio ex nihilo or divine omnipotence are examples of such claims. 
 This essay proceeds in five steps. The first chapter is an introduction to Bergson’s 
philosophy against the background of Russell’s critique. It provides an exposition of two key 
themes from Bergson central to my argument: the relation between time and space (Chapters 
2-4) and the relation between free will and determinism (Chapter 5). The second chapter 
provides a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time and uses 
the underlying metaphysics of McTaggart’s argument to demonstrate that two temporal realms 
can be extracted from Bergson’s philosophy: (i) la durée and (ii) a mathematical time-ordering 
generally classified by analytic philosophy as the B-series. The third chapter relates the double-
tier framework from the second chapter to temporal ontologies in analytic philosophy. The 
fourth chapter explores how the durée-based ontology argued for in Chapter 3 impacts the 
relation between God and time. I argue that analytic philosophy has failed to capture key 
 
6 I argue for some of these benefits in Jeffrey, Lancaster-Thomas, and Moravec, ‘Fluctuating Maximal God’. 
7 Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 12. 
8 For example Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology. An Introductory Exposition, 7. 
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ontological facets of the God-time relation and that a return to divine “causal knowledge” is 
required. I demonstrate that the existence of temporal objects comes from two sources: (i) their 
mind-dependent temporal extension and (ii) timeless divinely-created being. The final chapter 
applies this framework to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. 
I demonstrate that although Bergson’s theory can safeguard human freedom, his thought needs 
to be supplanted with divine “causal knowledge” to guarantee divine omniscience. 
 The picture that results is one of an intimate connection between the qualitative nature 
of consciousness, time, the presence of divine creation, and human freedom. 
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1. Bergson, Russell, and Free Will 
This chapter provides a preliminary exposition of Bergson’s thought on time, space, and free 
will that will form the heart of this study. The introduction is not merely expository but already 
responds to mistaken presumptions made famous by Bertrand Russell’s well-known critique 
of Bergsonian philosophy. Responding to this critique anew is necessary as it has for a long 
time been the only engaged critique of Bergsonian thought in analytic circles and its effects on 
analytic philosophy still linger. Dealing with its misunderstandings, which prevented a fruitful 
interaction between Bergsonian thought on time and analytic philosophy, is therefore required 
before the presentation of a new analytic “update” on Bergsonian thought that I am intending 
to offer in the following chapters. 
 The first part offers a presentation of Russell’s assessment of Bergson. Then, an 
exposition of Bergson’s thought on time and space is provided, followed by a re-evaluation of 
Russell’s critique. Finally, I give an account of Bergson’s thought on free will against the 
backdrop of the main views concerning free will in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
1.1. Russell on Bergson 
A crucial moment for the reception of Bergsonian thought within analytic thought was the 
publication of Bertrand Russell’s “The Philosophy of Bergson” in The Monist in 19129 
followed by a response from Karin Stephen (née Costelloe)10 and later published together with 
a reply by Wildon Carr.11 This article set the tone for the majority of later receptions of 
Bergson’s thought in analytic philosophy.12 The timing of this article was not coincidental as 
the year precedent to its publication saw the first English translation of Creative Evolution, 
which had not only been Bergson’s most famous book but had also led to his attaining the 
status of an international philosophical celebrity. Once we have distilled Russell’s argument 
from an ironising mockery of Bergsonian thought, it becomes clear that Russell’s critique can 
be classified under two primary headings: The first has to do with what Russell calls an “anti-
 
9 Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 321–47; see also Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 756–65. 
10 Costelloe, ‘An Answer to Mr Bertrand Russell’s Article on the Philosophy of Bergson’, 145–55. 
11 Russell and Carr, The Philosophy of Bergson. By the Hon. Bertrand Russell; with a Reply by Mr. H. Wildon 
Carr and a Rejoinder by Mr. Russell. 
12 For a detailed study, see Salmon, ‘L’apogée de la réception de Bergson en Angleterre’, 78–138; Petrov, 
‘Bertrand Russell’s Criticism of Bergson’s Views About Continuity and Discreteness’; Vrahimis, ‘Russell’s 
Critique of Bergson and the Divide Between “Analytic” and “Continental” Philosophy’. 
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intellectualist philosophy.” The second concerns Bergson’s writing on number,13 which is 
inextricably tied to his writings on space. 
 Firstly, Russell accuses Bergson’s philosophical methodology of being an anti-
intellectualist “ philosophy of feeling.”14 This accusation is reinforced by the centrality of the 
concept of “vital impulse” for Bergson’s conception of the creative evolution, which is severely 
criticised by Russell for its empirical unverifiability, and which further confirms his allegation 
that Bergson’s philosophy receives its force from poetic imagery, and not from sound 
philosophical argument.15 Apart from giving a rather inaccurate reading of the terms “instinct” 
and “intellect,”16 and a purposefully obscure presentation of Bergson’s key concept of la 
durée,17 Russell attacks Bergson for what he takes to be a disdain for geometrical and 
mathematical ways of seeing reality. “Incapacity for mathematics,” Russell takes Bergson to 
say, “is therefore a sign of grace — fortunately a very common one.”18 Furthermore, Russell 
also considers Bergson’s philosophical style to excessively rely on metaphorical imagery.19 
Secondly, Russell’s most severe objection, and one which most explicitly betrays his 
miscomprehension of Bergson, is directed at the latter’s alleged misunderstanding of the 
concept of “number,” specifically a confusion between number itself and its visual 
representation. Russell argues that Bergson “does not know what number is, and has himself 
no clear idea of it,”20 and blames his inaccurate knowledge of mathematics and a tendency to 
reduce mathematical objects to their visualisations for his “confusing a particular collection 
with the number of its terms, and this again with number in general.”21 In more specific terms, 
Russell argues that Bergson’s insistence on the intrinsic connection between numbers and 
space relies on the following confusion: 
 
13 Soulez and Worms, Bergson. Biographie, 119–31. Russell also raises a third critical point regarding Bergson’s 
theory of perception and his theory of “images” from MM (Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 343–45.). 
Chapter 3 will circumvent the critique by quarantining off this stage of Bergson’s philosophy. 
14 Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 322. 
15 Russell, 346. 
16 The opposition between two fundamental tendencies of the human mind — “instinct” and “intuition” — 
appears, in different modifications, through the entirety of the Bergsonian corpus. The earliest trace of this 
opposition can be observed in TFW from 1889. In TFW Bergson opposes a “conscience réfléchie,” which operates 
on the external world, to a “conscience immédiate,” whose mode of being is temporality, la durée itself 
(Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 205, note 23.). 
17 Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 327–28. 
18 Russell, 326. 
19 Russell, 332. 
20 Russell, 334. 
21 Russell, 335. 
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There are three entirely different things which are confused by Bergson  … , 
namely: (1) number, the general concept applicable to the various particular 
numbers; (2) the various particular numbers; (3) the various collections to which 
the various particular numbers are applicable. It is this last that is defined by 
Bergson when he says that number is a collection of units. The twelve apostles, 
the twelve tribes of Israel, the twelve months, the twelve signs of the zodiac, are 
all collections of units, yet no one of them is the number 12, still less is it number 
in general, … . Hence when, following Bergson’s advice, we “have recourse to 
an extended image” … , we have still not obtained a picture of the number 12. 
The number 12, in fact, is something more abstract than any picture.22 
Before Russell’s objection may be addressed, it is necessary to examine what Bergson has to 
say on time and space, as what he says about them is vital to his understanding of numbers, 
which, in turn, are instrumental to his understanding of time. 
1.2. Bergson on Time and Space23 
At the root of Bergson’s thought on time (that runs from TFW to TS) is a critique of what he 
refers to as “spatialized time.” Bergson argues that philosophy has not paid enough attention 
to the differences between the nature of space and the nature of time: 
[T]ime and space have been placed on the same level and treated as things of a 
kind; the procedure has been to study space, to determine its nature and function, 
and then to apply to time the conclusions thus reached. ... To pass from one to the 
other one had only to change a single word: “juxtaposition” was replaced by 
“succession.”24 
A good illustration of this, Bergson claims, is Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where space 
and time are both taken to be homogeneous25 and therefore devoid of any quality.26 However, 
Bergson asks, if on the one hand time and space are both characterised as homogeneous and if, 
on the other hand, homogeneity is understood as the absence of any quality, what exactly is it 
 
22 Russell, 335. 
23 An earlier version of this section appears in Moravec, ‘A Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal 
Duration’, 200–208. 
24 CM 4/5. 
25 By a “homogeneous medium,” Bergson means “a medium that may be divided into units identical in size.” 
26 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19-49/B33-73; Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be 
Able to Present Itself as Science, [4:321-322]. 
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that makes time different from space?27 Of course, as far as their function is concerned, Kant 
still says that whereas space is the a priori condition of outer sense, time is the condition of 
both outer and inner sense.28 However, the features that he ascribes to each are more or less 
identical. Bergson thinks that symptomatic of this confusion is Kant’s frequent appeal to the 
analogy of a line29 as a helpful tool to schematise the progression of mental states: 
we set [our states of consciousness] side by side in such a way as to perceive them 
simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, 
we project time into space, we express duration [la durée] in terms of extensity, 
and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of 
which touch without penetrating one another.30 
Specifically, if we think of the mental states as forming a succession, we presume that some of 
them come “before” others. However, Bergson argues that for us to think of two of our mental 
states as related by a “before and after” relation, they both have to be given to consciousness 
at once, in the same mental act, similarly to the way that objects coexist in space:31 “… [T]o 
conceive of things as taking place in terms of a succession of positioning (‘before,’ ‘after,’ etc.) 
is to presuppose a faculty of space.”32 Bergson argues that the fact that such a confusion is 
taking place in Kant (whose thought he identifies as its main perpetuator),33 is illustrated by the 
connection that Kant draws between “time” (as one of the two pure forms of sensible intuition) 
and “number” (a transcendental schema) through the concept of “counting.”34 Bergson claims 
that the mind’s ability to “count” requires a prior assimilation of the representation of space, 
not, as Kant thinks,35 of time.36 
 Now, one might object that space is not essential to counting. After all, when asking, 
for example, how many days there are left until the end of the month, we can count “one, two 
 
27 TFW 98/73. 
28 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A34/B51. 
29 Kant, A33/B50. 
30 TFW 101/75. 
31 TFW 101/76; DS 33/45-6. This is analogous to an objection against presentism, which asserts that for two 
events in time to stand in any relation (e.g., “before and after”), they must both exist (see Oaklander, The Ontology 
of Time, 83–100.). 
32 Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Bergson and the Time of Life, 28. 
33 EPL 317, 338. 
34 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A142-143/B182. 
35 Kant, A142-143/B182; A241/B300; Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to 
Present Itself as Science, [4:283]. 
36 Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 94. 
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three, four…” without appealing to any spatial representation whatsoever.37 Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that Bergson primarily talks about the “faculty of space” in the Kantian 
sense, that is, the ability of the human mind to think in spatial terms, not about numbers in a 
theory of arithmetic. Furthermore, although spatiality may no longer play any role in the habit 
of enunciating numbers in succession, the mental faculty of conceiving spatially must have 
been part of the process whereby we learnt how to count. The fact that our ability to count 
presupposes space becomes obvious in situations requiring more complicated ways of counting 
than the simple enunciation of numbers: we appeal to the fingers on our hand or an abacus. 
Time is still required for counting — but Bergson’s claim is not that counting is exclusively 
based on space, rather that Kant should have observed a closer affinity between number and 
space than between number and time.  
 A good elucidation of this is provided by Bergson’s own example. Imagine counting 
sheep in a flock.38 We can do so in two ways — with smaller numbers, we immediately appeal 
to their position in space, much in the way that we can immediately tell how many points are 
presented to us based on the pattern they are arranged in. Or we can try to count the sheep in 
time by going through them one by one and retaining the image of the previous sheep. Now, 
Bergson asks, where is the image of the previous sheep retained? Our consciousness passes 
from one to the other — the only way the previous one can be connected to the present act of 
counting is by being juxtaposed next to it in a homogeneous medium. Now, a homogeneous 
medium where things may be placed next to each other — as opposed to their changing over 
“time” — is necessarily space: 
For if we picture to ourselves each of the sheep in the flock in succession and 
separately, we shall never have to do with more than a single sheep. In order that 
the number should go on increasing in proportion as we advance, we must retain 
the successive images and set them along each of the new units which we picture 
to ourselves: now, it is in space that such a juxtaposition takes place and not in 
pure duration.39 
The “time” that we appeal to in counting is a primary example of what Bergson calls 
“spatialized time.” Time, understood as representable by a line progressing in space,40 and 
 
37 I am grateful to Hugh Mellor for raising this objection. 
38 TFW 76-7/57-8. 
39 TFW 77/57-8. 
40 Other formulations that betray our inherently “spatial” way of talking about time involve phrases like “time 
spinning,” “empty time,” or “cyclical time” (Klein, ‘Who Is Entitled to Talk About Time?’). Geach: “Time is 
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potentially homogeneous (i.e., divisible into intervals equal in length) is a concept whose 
primary purpose is practical utility.41 For instance, our calendars are based on the possibility of 
representing successive appointments “coexisting together” on a single page of our journal, 
arranged in two-dimensional space. Bergson says that the notion of abstract homogeneous 
space enabling effective practical action on external objects is precisely what differentiates 
geometrically-informed humans from animals: Animals may perhaps have a notion of 
extension or extensity,42 but not of space as a homogeneous medium devoid of qualities.43 
 Of course, one might protest that the journal example merely illustrates a difference 
between an object and its representation: one might still refer to a colour by the word “green” 
without necessarily committing oneself to the claim that such a reference turns green into 
“colour verbalised.” The objection about conflating time and representation of time will be 
treated in sections 3.2 and 4.5, but for the time being, it should be stressed that Bergson’s point 
here is not that time cannot be represented, but rather that when we do so by using a spatial 
object as a representation, we end up importing features of the representation into the object 
itself. 
 It is worth already noting here that Bergson would consider the difference between the 
A- and B-series from McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time44 (discussed in the 
following chapter) as severely contaminated by this spatialisation. Both the A- and B-series 
presume events which our consciousness presents to itself “all at once.” We then go on to 
decide whether these events are related to each other in virtue of one being earlier than another 
or of one being present, past or future.45 In some cases, the spatialisation goes so far as to 
suggest that space and time are “at right angles to each other.”46 
 So, in view of Kantian time being “space-infected,” where can we find time proper? 
Bergson argues that the notion of spatial homogeneity is simply a “reaction against that 
 
often represented by a straight line. Such spatial pictures are very dangerous, because we may suppose that the 
case of drawing a diagram corresponds to a right to conceive some temporal analogue — to think, e.g., of time 
running backwards or looping the loop.” (Geach, ‘The Future’, 212–13.) 
41 For a list of all the characteristic features that Bergson ascribes to space, see Heidsieck, Henri Bergson et la 
notion d’espace, 44–50. 
42 TFW 96-7/71-2. For Bergson’s contemporary sources discussing the orientation of animals in space, see 
Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 227, note 32. 
43 For a more recent treatment of the difference between “lived” space and the homogeneous time of physics, see 
Moss, ‘Brain, Body and World Image and the Psychology of the Body’, 74–76. 
44 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’. 
45 For a treatment that investigates the A and B opposition on Bergsonian grounds, see Williams, ‘The 
Metaphysics of A- and B-Time’; Williams, ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’. 
46 Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 457. 
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heterogeneity which is the very ground of our experience”47 — this heterogeneity consists of 
Bergson’s key concept of la durée, which will now be examined. 
 
Bergson does not simply assert that all temporality is reducible to or infected by spatiality. 
Quite the contrary, Bergson argues that the representation of all temporal phenomena requires 
la durée. This notion emerges for the first time in TFW48 and reappears in all of Bergson’s 
major works. It is a notion notoriously difficult succinctly to describe, not least due to its 
opposition to ordinary conceptual ways of thinking implicated by language. Nevertheless, it is 
not an obscure notion, and language can successfully point us to what the term itself refers to. 
For the time being — and bearing in mind that the picture will become much more complicated 
in the following chapters — in TFW la durée is coextensive with the stream of mental states. 
To get started, Bergson characterizes la durée in the following ways: 
It is … [an] indivisible and indestructible continuity of a melody where the past 
enters into the present and forms with it an undivided whole which remains 
undivided and even indivisible in spite of what is added at every instant, … [A]s 
soon as we seek an intellectual representation of it we line up, one after another, 
states which have become distinct like the beads of a necklace … .49 
It is a succession of states each one of which announces what follows and contains 
what precedes. Strictly speaking they do not constitute multiple states until I have 
got beyond them and turned around to observe their trail.50 
[It is a] qualitative multiplicity, with no likeness to number; an organic evolution 
which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure heterogeneity within which there 
are no distinct qualities. In a word, the moments of inner duration are not external 
to one another.51 
In la durée, the preceding states of consciousness qualitatively influence the ones that follow. 
For example, whenever we read a new book, our attitude and aesthetic feeling derived from 
the act of reading it contain the series of mental states (emotions, memories) we had before we 
started reading. Similarly, whenever we read the same book again, the memories of past 
 
47 TFW 97/72. 
48 TFW 73/54. 
49 CM 55/76. 
50 CM 137/183. 
51 TFW 226/170. 
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instances of its reading are “included” in the act of reading it at present. “Included” not in the 
sense of containment, but in that the present reading of the book would have been different 
without the past reading. This is what Bergson means when he asserts that “the past enters into 
the present” and it is for this reason that the state of la durée is unrepeatably different at every 
point of its development: it is a “pure heterogeneity.” The notion of “qualitative multiplicity” 
that Bergson uses to describe la durée requires a qualification: 
The notion of “qualitative plurality” might seem a contradictory one, since to 
speak of a “plurality” at all is to envisage the particulars which compose it as 
being in some sense juxtaposed, or collected together. Bergson however is 
compelled to use whatever resources language offers him, in order to describe 
duration; to grasp the notion of “pure duration,” one must conceive of a 
succession, which is not separated into a series of discrete states; it is a series of 
qualitative transformations which flow into each other … .52 
Furthermore, this ever-changing development of consciousness is gradual and continuous. 
Take the example of falling in love with someone: we can never clearly identify the precise 
moment at which our feeling of mild affection “turned” into love — the transition from one to 
the other is similar to the development of colours in the colour spectrum, which Bergson uses 
as a frequent metaphor for la durée.53  
 This metaphor also illustrates that la durée (i) is indivisible, (ii) proceeds in succession, 
and that (iii) it is a multiplicity. (i) The colour spectrum consists of a gradual change from one 
colour to another54 — all divisions of the spectrum into distinct colours (“green,” “dark blue,” 
“yellow”), are imprecise. They result from the casting of a “spatial” net over the heterogeneous 
continuity of the spectrum in order to extract distinct elements from it. (ii) Nevertheless, the 
fact that the elements composing the spectrum cannot be divided does not exclude their 
succession, the change that happens as we go from one side of the spectrum to another; thus 
there is, paradoxically, a succession (continuous change) with no distinct elements that succeed 
(since in our immediate phenomenological perception of change, as opposed to its stratified 
representation, there are no distinct elements). (iii) Even though the spectrum is indivisible, it 
is nevertheless a multiplicity, otherwise it would simply be one, consisting of a single colour. 
 
52 Pilkington, Bergson and His Influence. A Reassessment, 3–4. 
53 See for example TFW 58-9/42-3; IT 129. 
54 The metaphor obviously fails to grasp the causal influence of one mental state on another, which is present in 
la durée. 
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 The colour spectrum can also be used to emphasise another paramount aspect of 
la durée, that of what Vladimir Jankélévitch refers to as “the retrospective illusion.”55 Consider 
the experience of looking at an LED lamp that gradually goes through the entire colour 
spectrum. What is the most accurate description of the way the change of the lamp is presented 
in our consciousness? When we look at it, we perceive an indivisible shift of one quality to 
another — we can only distinguish distinct colours by “jumping back” a few seconds and 
identifying that the colour, say, green has just turned into blue. Furthermore, we can lay out all 
of our memories of the colours in the past and turn them into the colour spectrum itself which 
is spread out in two-dimensional or three-dimensional space. It is only on this spectrum itself 
that we may impose divisions and establish relations of before and after. This is what Bergson 
has in mind when he says that “Strictly speaking [states of consciousness] do not constitute 
multiple states until I have got beyond them and turned around to observe their trail.” “When 
we think we are dividing [la durée], we are dividing its spatial transcription … .”56 In the 
moment of looking at the lamp, we cannot differentiate the individual colours. The relation 
between the LED lamp and the spatially represented colour spectrum it goes through is 
analogous to that between la durée and the image it has left of itself in the past: 
The duration wherein we see ourselves acting, and in which it is useful that we 
should see ourselves, is a duration whose elements are dissociated and 
juxtaposed. The duration wherein we act is a duration wherein our states melt into 
each other.57 
 Finally, since language consists of words that designate individual objects external to 
one another and since, as has been shown above, la durée does not consist of individual units, 
language cannot fully represent it.58 We can still use metaphorical language to talk about it (as 
has been done in the previous paragraphs), but all of these characterisations must, by definition, 
inevitably fall short of durée’s full description.59 
 Now, one might point out that here we see a prime example of an incompatibility 
between the analytic method and Bergson’s philosophy. Am I not simply making an unjustified 
 
55 Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson, 11–17; see also Zaslawsky, ‘Bergson, le finalisme et la philosophie analytique’, 
340–41. 
56 “Quand on croit la diviser, on divise [sa] transcription spatiale … .” (Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal 
ou La raison et le temps, 55, my translation.) 
57 MM 186/207. 
58 Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 90–91. 
59 See Pariente, Le Langage et l’individuel, 11–30. 
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ontological claim, positing a chimeric notion that language and logic cannot grasp? The 
ontology of la durée will be treated at length in Chapter 3, but for the time being it is merely 
being argued that our consciousness is durée-like. For example, our feeling of nostalgia, with 
all its nuances developing over time, cannot be captured by, say, conceptual analysis, but can 
be very well captured by Proust’s In Search of Lost Time. Our emotions and feelings are real 
and we can try to describe them using metaphors, similes, poetry, or music. Bergson’s key 
point is that something invaluable is lost when we try to grasp our consciousness through 
conceptual forms inappropriate to it. This does not mean that the conceptual, geometrical and 
spatial apparatus should be banished altogether, but rather that it should simply be carefully 
understood in its appropriate domain.60 
 
Bergson replaces the Kantian division between homogeneous space and homogeneous time 
with a distinction between two different types of multiplicities. On the one hand, there is space, 
characterised by juxtaposition, division and susceptibility to counting, a numerical multiplicity 
devoid of any quality.61 On the other hand, there is la durée which is developing and indivisible 
— it is a non-numerical qualitative multiplicity.62 In TFW, these two multiplicities correspond 
to the relation between the external world of objects and the internal world of consciousness: 
… there are two kinds of multiplicity: that of material objects, to which the 
conception of number is immediately applicable; and the multiplicity of states of 
consciousness, which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some 
symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is space.63 
 
60 Bergson does not claim that once we have attained durée by introspection, we cannot use language to talk about 
it (see IT 18, 82-5.). As Léonard Constant stressed in one of the first reviews of Bergson’s courses at the Collège 
de France: “However, in order that we do not fall into arbitrariness, we must not lose all contact with conceptual 
thought; and the results at which we arrive [by the introspective observation of la durée] must always, as much 
as possible, be translatable into concepts.” (“Cependant, afin de ne pas tomber dans l’arbitraire, il ne faut pas 
perdre tout point de contact avec la pensée conceptuelle ; et les résultats auxquels on arrivera devront toujours, 
autant que possible, être traduisibles en concepts.” (Léonard Constant, ‘L’idée de temps. Collège de France. - 
Cours de M. Bergson’, Revue de philosophie 2, no. 6 (1902): 832, my translation, my italics.) 
61 See Worms, ‘Bergson entre Russell et Husserl: Un troisième terme?’, 86. 
62 This distinction which plays a crucial role in Deleuze’s Bergsonism from 1966 is based on a development of 
Riemann’s differentiation of “discrete” and “continuous” multiplicities presented in his Habilitationsschrift 
from 1854 (see Riemann, ‘On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Foundations of Geometry’, 4A/4-4A/20.). Bergson 
would have been reading this thesis in Dedekind’s translation from 1867. For a discussion of the relation between 
Riemann’s and Bergson’s multiplicities see Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Bergson 
and the Time of Life, 15–16; Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, 29–44. 
63 TFW 87/65. 
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These two multiplicities are also distinguished by a condition of divisibility. Whereas matter 
can be repeatedly divided without changing in kind (e.g., half a litre of water is the same type 
of matter as a litre of water), this cannot be done with la durée, “… which divide[s] only by 
changing in kind.”64 An emotion lasting only half the number of days we have experienced it 
would have been a completely different emotion. Neither does it make sense to speak of “half 
an emotion.”65 
 Similarly to Kant, Bergson argues — at least in TFW — that matter does not endure 
without the synthesis effected on it by la durée.66 Kołakowski comments: 
If we could imagine a world without a conscious observer … this would be 
perfectly identical with itself at every moment, but there would be no transition 
from one moment to another. Only the memory and thus consciousness maintains 
the continuity of the world.67 
The two multiplicities are thus in an obverse relation: “within our ego, there is succession 
without mutual externality; outside the ego, in pure space, mutual externality without 
succession: … .”68 To clarify, Bergson does not claim that tense (i.e., the distinction between 
past, present, and future) is merely dependent on our consciousness, that it does not form a part 
of reality and that while it should not be “banished altogether, [it should be] merely replaced 
where it belongs: namely, in our heads.”69  Neither does he say that “becoming is mind-
dependent, because it is not an attribute of physical events per se but requires the occurrence 
of states of conceptualised awareness.”70 Bergson’s point is different. On his view, we would 
be unable to talk about time at all without taking the role of our consciousness, which connects 
the successive states of pure spatiality, into consideration; this is precisely what differentiates 
 
64 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 40. 
65 Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson, 8. 
66 “Although Bergson sharply distinguished his conception of duration from Kant’s treatment of time in TFW, he 
nevertheless considers it to be a feature of a synthesising consciousness; outside of us there is only space and 
simultaneity.” (Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Bergson and the Time of Life, 35.) 
67 Kołakowski, Bergson, 16–17. 
68 TFW 108/81. 
69 Mellor, ‘The Unreality of Tense’, 51. 
70 Grünbaum, ‘The Status of Temporal Becoming’, 375. While Bergson does not merely say that consciousness 
is required for becoming, he does base the possibility of temporal becoming on the presence of consciousness, not 
on the indeterminacy of events in the external world. Grünbaum is thus mistaken to put him in a group with 
“A. S. Eddington, …, H. Reichenbach, H. Bondi and G. J. Whitrow” (Grünbaum, 389.), and take him as saying 
that “the indeterminacy of the laws of physics is both a sufficient and necessary condition of becoming.” 
(Grünbaum, 389.) Bergson does not base temporal becoming on aspects of the external world but on the existence 
of becoming in la durée. 
 
 16  
space from time. La durée is “fundamental time,”71 because without it there would be no 
representation of time — spatialised or not — in the first place. In this respect, despite their 
different philosophical backgrounds and separation by half a century of philosophical 
development, Bergson’s position on this particular issue is identical to that of J. R. Lucas, who 
insists that 
… not only is time a necessary concomitant of my existing as a conscious being, 
but some relation to my existence as a conscious being is a necessary condition 
of time’s being time. This is one of the most fundamental ways in which time 
differs from space. We could conceive of a space … that was totally unrelated to 
us … . But we cannot similarly divorce ourselves from time, or abstract time from 
all connexion with ourselves. … [I]t is one of the most fundamental ways in 
which time differs from space, and it gives time a unity deeper than anything we 
can establish for space.72 
 Apart from stipulating the realm of la durée and that of numerical multiplicity, which 
intrudes into the pure heterogeneity of our mental states as a “ghost of space haunting the 
reflexive consciousness,”73 Bergson also diagnoses how this happens. He argues that the 
phenomenon of movement is one where space and la durée come dangerously close; 
dangerously so, because they inter-mix; once durée has been tarnished by space, it takes an 
“unusual effort”74 for it to clear itself of it. Frédéric Worms observes that the process of our 
consciousness grasping movement takes place in a twofold manner. On the one hand, there is 
what he calls “temporalisation of space” (temporalisation de l’espace75) — the moving body is 
grasped by our durée; it is only thanks to the synthesising consciousness that movement can 
be perceived in the external world in the first place. Imagine watching the movement of a clock 
pendulum from left to right: 
Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single position of the hand and 
the pendulum, for nothing is left of the past positions. Within myself a process of 
organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, which constitutes 
true duration [la durée]. It is because I endure in this way that I picture to myself 
what I call the past oscillations of the pendulum at the same time as I perceive the 
 
71 DS 30/42. 
72 Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §7. 
73 TFW 99/74. 
74 MM 187/209. 
75 Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 93. 
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present oscillation. Now, let us withdraw for a moment the ego which thinks these 
so-called successive oscillations: there will never be more than a single 
oscillation, and indeed only a single position, of the pendulum, and hence no 
duration.76 
On the other hand, this process also causes the “spatialisation of la durée” (spatialisation de la 
durée77). Bergson claims that movements of objects are given to consciousness as undivided 
singular qualities.78 By shifting our attention from the indivisible qualitative impression of the 
moving object (which can best be observed in the example of quickly moving objects, e.g., of 
a falling star79) to the trajectory in space traversed by that movement, we inevitably come to 
identify it with the trajectory itself. Furthermore, since the retrospectively-identified moments 
of our durée are connectible with positions of space where the object was at different points of 
the trajectory and since this trajectory (qua a curve or a line in space) is geometrically divisible, 
we come to think that this divisibility applies to la durée synthesising the movement too.80 We 
thereby make two mistakes: first, we fail to see that all movement is first given to us as pure 
quality. Second, we import all the categories pertaining to the completed trajectory of the 
moving object (homogeneity, divisibility, juxtaposition etc.) to la durée.81 This point is 
succinctly summed up by Costelloe in her defence of Bergson against Russell: 
It is claimed [by Russell] that if we try to describe change we have always to 
regard it as change completed and not in process of changing. But change 
completed is something unchanging. We can therefore only describe what is 
unchanging, never change itself.82 
 
76 TFW 108/80-81. 
77 Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 93. 
78 MM 188-193/209-15 
79 DS 35/49; IT 38; Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 124. 
80 See DS 30-47/41-67; CM 118-121/157-62. 
81 This methodological clarification of the relation between qualitative movement and quantitative trajectory of 
the movement lies at the root of Bergson’s solution to Zeno’s paradoxes. These paradoxes appear in various forms 
in almost every one of Bergson’s works (TFW 112-15/84-6; CM 120-21/160-61; MM 191-3/213-15; IT 33-6). 
The literature on Bergson’s solution is quite vast but see especially Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal ou La 
raison et le temps, 40–61 for a discussion of the relation between the solution proposed by Bergson and the one 
provided by infinitesimal calculus and criticised by François Évellin, one of Bergson’s close friends (Évellin, 
Infini et quantité. Étude sur le concept de l’infini en philosophie et dans les sciences.). Briefly, Bergson resolves 
them by appealing to (at least) the following principles: (i) all movement is indivisible, (ii) there are no instants 
underlying temporal progress, (iii) although the trajectory of movement, being spatial, may be divided infinitely, 
the same cannot be done with the movement itself. 
82 Costelloe, ‘An Answer to Mr Bertrand Russell’s Article on the Philosophy of Bergson’, 148. 
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For all these reasons, Bergson argues that la durée is metaphysically inaccessible to 
mathematical treatment, especially to mechanics. In measuring speed, for example, we focus 
on simultaneities between the positions of moving objects to establish relations between them, 
but temporality (based on la durée) which constituted the movement in the first place does not 
appear in the equations.83 Once the movement is over, we note the position of the body at point 
A and then at point B and then compare these with the positions of, say, the hands of a clock; 
the movement itself which happens “between the extremes”84 disappears. “Velocity is therefore 
only a measurement of immobilities in comparison, it indicates the extremities of movement, 
not the interval.”85 Mechanics always operate with acts accomplished, never with acts being 
accomplished86 and since the fait accompli refers merely to the trace of la durée in the past and 
not to la durée itself, la durée cannot appear in mechanical equations.87  
 This is also why Bergson refers to measurable homogeneous time as a “concept 
bâtard,”88 a “spurious concept.”89 It is an “adulterated time.”90 Bergson contends that the 
process whereby science “measures time” is perfectly legitimate for practical purposes (e.g., 
synchronisations of schedules with clocks or predictions of future natural phenomena), but 
leads to the metaphysical illusion of measuring time itself — the “time” (t) which appears in 
mathematics and mechanics is not la durée, it is a compromise between fundamental 
temporality (la durée) and space (e.g., the trajectory). Bergson will develop this point later in 
DS, but already in TFW, he identifies the notion of “simultaneity” as the key ingredient in this 
“concept bâtard:” simultaneity is the “point of contact between our internal durée … and 
external time”91 such that a moment in the trace of our durée can be retrospectively identified 
 
83 DS 40/57. 
84 Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, 15. 
85 Mullarkey, 16. 
86 TFW 119-20/89. 
87 For an extensive treatment of Bergson’s engagement with mathematics and mechanics during his teaching in 
Clermont-Ferrand and Paris, see Soulez and Worms, Bergson. Biographie, 49–94. 
88 Bouaniche: “The notion of a ‘spurious concept’ has without doubt been taken from Plato’s Timaeus. … In the 
Timaeus, Plato in fact describes the creation of the world situated in an intermediate zone where the sensible and 
the intelligible, two pure elements, intermix. Similarly, the notion of homogeneous time is presented as a mixture 
of two pure terms, space and la durée.”  (“La notion de ‘concept bâtard’ est sans doute reprise du Timée de Platon. 
… Dans le Timée, Platon expose en effet une genèse du monde située dans une zone intermédiaire où se mélangent 
ces deux éléments purs que sont le sensible et l’intelligible. De même ici, la notion de temps homogène se présente 
comme une mixte des deux termes purs d’espace et de durée.” (Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 228, note 37, my 
translation.) 
89 TFW 98/73. 
90 Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson, 39. 
91 “La simultanéité est donc le trait d’union, le point de contact, entre la durée interne, qui est la durée réelle, et le 
temps extérieur … . ” (Bergson, ‘Compte Rendu de “La Genèse de l’idée de Temps de J.-M. Guyau”’.) 
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as having been simultaneous with a distinct point of spatialized time in the external world. This 
leads us to presume that la durée itself is identical with measurable time.92 
 It is important to bear in mind that Bergson’s accusation against the mathematical 
description of time is not that it is logically inconsistent, but that it fails to grasp the 
fundamental experience of change.93 This is not dissimilar from the relation between Bergson’s 
solution to Zeno’s paradoxes and the solution offered by mathematics: Bergson does not doubt 
that calculus has offered the way to deal with these, but according to him it is sufficient for us 
to “return to the immediate data of consciousness and to affirm that movement in its reality is 
not space, but time.”94 Similarly, in his later interaction with Einstein, Bergson will not contest 
the mathematical and physical conclusions of the special theory of relativity. He will simply 
point out that “real time” (la durée), which escapes the physicists’ equations, is necessary to 
establish them in the first place.95 The time of relativity and la durée are two different things 
(see footnote 210). 
 Or to put it differently — it is not that mathematics and physics are wrong in their 
treatment of what they refer to by the variable “t.” Rather, there is more to time and temporality 
than what physics and mathematics will ever be able to tell us. And, as we shall see later, this 
“more” will turn out to be of paramount importance in considering questions of human free 
will and determinism. 
1.3. Russell Reconsidered 
It is now a suitable time to return to Russell’s objections. Some of these have been briefly dealt 
with by other scholars,96 but in this context, they will serve as a useful framework to further 
clarify key claims of Bergson’s philosophical method. 
 First, as regards the charge of anti-intellectualism and obscurity directed at Bergson, it 
is interesting to note that CM, which can be seen as a self-reflexive bookend on the Bergsonian 
 
92 Similar views are expressed by P. Lynds in his hotly-debated article from 2003: “ … [I]t is the human observer 
who subjectively projects, imposes and assigns a precise instant in time upon a physical process, for example, in 
order to gain a meaningful subjective picture or ‘mental snapshot’ of the relative position of a body in relative 
motion. … [I]t is then due to nature’s very exclusion of time as a fundamental physical quantity, that time as it is 
measured in physics … , motion and physical continuity are indeed possible.” (Lynds, ‘Time and Classical and 
Quantum Mechanics: Indeterminacy vs. Discontinuity’, 343.) The eerie affinity between his argument and 
Bergson’s philosophy is observed by Olma, ‘Physical Bergsonism and the Worldliness of Time’. 
93 Costelloe, ‘An Answer to Mr Bertrand Russell’s Article on the Philosophy of Bergson’, 148. 
94 “Il suffit de recourir aux données immédiates de l’expérience, et de constater que le mouvement dans sa réalité 
même n’est pas de l’espace, mais du temps.” (Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 231, my translation, italics original.) 
95 DS 104/150. 
96 Soulez and Worms, Bergson. Biographie, 119–31. 
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corpus, opens with the claim that “[w]hat philosophy has lacked most of all is precision.”97 This 
remark is brilliantly elucidated by F. C. T. Moore, who opposes this Bergsonian “precision” to 
the (Cartesian) view of method as formal, analytic, and largely independent of the subject 
matter. The precision that Bergson speaks about has to do with appropriately approaching the 
contingency and particularity of reality, as opposed to studying mere symbols or 
representations of that reality. “Philosophical positions, claims Bergson, tend to lack precision 
because, in trying to be abstract, they tend to remain indifferent to or unaffected by facts, … .”98 
Here, Moore means specific or particular facts. However, this in no way implies that Bergson 
does not have a positive role for abstract ways of reasoning; his primary objective is 
appropriately to separate domains whose inaccurate mutual misapplication creates false 
problems: 
[My aim was] to constitute a metaphysics having a common frontier with science 
and therefore being able to lend itself to verification on a great many points … . 
I have asked science simply to remain scientific and not take on an unconscious 
metaphysics which then presents itself to the ignorant or the half-educated under 
the mask of science.99 
This intention is attested not only by Bergson’s detailed engagement with science (with 
mathematics and psychophysics in TFW, with psychology in MM, with biology in CE, and 
with physics in DS) but also by his repeated insistence on the significance of empirical 
research100 and by a positive role for those categories of thought pertaining to space, as long as 
they remain in their appropriate domains of application.101 In such a context, Russell’s remarks 
about the alleged Bergsonian disregard for scientific facts and mathematics, as well as the 
sneery claims that Bergson takes the intellect to be most visible and most functional in 
dreams,102 perspicuously betray what Riggio takes to be a “superficial skimming of the Bergson 
 
97 CM 1/1. 
98 Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 16. 
99 CM 51/71. See also HTM 26. 
100 Riggio praises Bergson — at least in MM — as someone “that we would today consider a model of the 
scientifically-informed philosopher.” (Riggio, ‘Lessons for the Relationship of Philosophy and Science From the 
Legacy of Henri Bergson’, 215.) 
101 As Worms notes, Bergson emphasises that it is precisely the nature of space as a homogeneous medium empty 
of all content that makes science possible (Worms, ‘Présentation’, 10.). For interpretations of Bergsonian 
philosophy that attempt to rescue him from the “anti-intellectualist” charge, see Husson, L’intellectualisme de 
Bergson : genèse et développement de la notion bergsonienne d’intuition; Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal 
ou La raison et le temps. 
102 Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 326. 
 
 21  
corpus at best.”103 The fact that such a superficiality plagues Russell’s reading can also be 
detected in his insistence that most of Bergson’s philosophy is driven by his being a 
“visualiser,” by being “always conducted by means of visual images,”104 which is clearly 
refuted by the Bergsonian corpus: auditory images that Russell fails to locate in Bergson can 
be found in numerous places,105 and the same goes for tactile sensations106 and smells.107 As will 
hopefully become apparent from the chapters that follow, it is precisely the attention to the 
relationship between method and subject-matter that allow Bergson’s philosophy to lend itself 
to interpretations bearing direct import on some of the key themes in analytic thought on time 
and free will, and, by extension, on the consideration of these matters in philosophy of religion. 
 Secondly, as regards the objection regarding number, we must observe what role 
Bergson’s discussion of number plays in the context of TFW. Bergson, who intentionally 
defines number as a collection of identical units,108 is not primarily concerned with finding an 
internal contradiction in a theory of arithmetic, but with showing that on Kant’s own definition, 
number must necessarily be connected not with time but with space. More importantly, as 
Soulez argues, “Bergson is less concerned with knowing if distinguishing separate units 
logically implies the position in a space than with knowing if we can represent separate units 
without space.”109 It is not a question of logical entailment, but one of which concepts are 
needed to grasp other concepts. The close connection between spatiality and number concerns 
the tendency to represent la durée spatially. As Soulez summarises Russell’s argument: “The 
Bergsonian critique applies to all modes of thinking by the means of symbols. Every system 
which defines a group of symbols and determines the rules for their manipulation … falls under 
his critique. Russell’s argument, therefore, misses the point from the start.”110 Bergson is 
concerned not with a theory of arithmetic, but with the role numbers play in representing 
la durée. 
 
103 Riggio, ‘Lessons for the Relationship of Philosophy and Science From the Legacy of Henri Bergson’, 222. 
104 Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 330, 336. 
105 TFW 100-101/75. 
106 See for example the experiment of pricking one’s hand with a needle (TFW 42-3/31-2) or of tracing one’s hand 
across a sheet of paper in DS 34/48. 
107 TFW 161-2/121-2. 
108 TFW 75/56. This definition is not Bergson’s own, but can be found in Cournot, Essai sur les fondements de 
nos connaissances, 390 and Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A142-143/B182. 
109 “Il s’agit moins de savoir pour Bergson si la distinction d’unités séparées implique logiquement la position 
d’un espace, que de savoir si nous pouvons nous représenter des unités séparées sans un espace.” (Soulez and 
Worms, Bergson. Biographie, 127, my translation.) 
110 “La critique bergsonienne concerne tout mode de pensée par symboles. Tout système qui définit un ensemble 
de symboles et détermine les règles de leur manipulation … tomberait sous sa critique. La polémique de Russell 
est donc mal engagée dès le départ.” (Soulez and Worms, 126, my translation.) 
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 There is a further reason why the presumed incompatibility between Bergsonian and 
analytic philosophy does not stand. As Jankélévitch points out, Bergson’s philosophy itself 
resembles one of its key notions — that of la durée:111 pivotal concepts appear and disappear 
in an organic development similarly to motifs disappearing and reappearing in a symphony. 
Some themes are abandoned, some are re-introduced and applied differently, some that were 
latently connected to others are newly emphasised. Thus, although it would be misleading to 
posit a complete separation between Bergson’s later and earlier works, F. C. T. Moore is 
correct to acknowledge a significant shift in interest and methodology taking place in 
Bergson’s essay Introduction to Metaphysics from 1903 (later published in CM), where 
intuition, as a form of direct access to reality contrasted with analysis, receives an 
unprecedently central role.112 Frédéric Worms also recognizes that there is a shift in emphasis 
between the conceptual analysis, scientific rigour, and empiricism of TFW and MM, and the 
predominantly metaphysical concerns of CE, despite the fact that he argues against a separation 
as radical as that offered by F. C. T. Moore.113 Worms argues that beginning to read Bergson’s 
books from CE runs the risk of seriously misinterpreting his earlier works. 114 Such a move is 
clearly committed not only by Russell but unfortunately also by Costelloe, who attempts to 
defend Bergson against Russell by elaborating, amongst other concepts, on the notion of 
“creation,”115 which becomes crucial after TFW and MM. The fact that it is important to 
appreciate this shift and not prioritise CE in creating dialogues between Bergsonian philosophy 
and analytic thought is also confirmed by the fact that F. C. T. Moore, who focuses almost 
exclusively on Bergson’s early works, succeeds not only in showing that interaction between 
Bergson’s philosophy and analytic questions is possible,116 but also in demonstrating specific 
ways by which a possible relevance of Bergson’s thought to empirical psychology could be 
established.117 He concludes his study by asserting that “if certain of Bergson’s arguments are 
accepted, some problems considered fundamental or deep in the analytic tradition of 
 
111 Jankélévitch: “Bergson’s philosophy is one of the rare philosophies in which the investigation’s theory blends 
with the investigation itself.” (Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson, 3.) 
112 Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 8. 
113 Worms, ‘Bergson entre Russell et Husserl: Un troisième terme?’, 93. Milet goes as far as to argue that one 
cannot fully understand Bergson’s thought on duration without CM (Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal ou 
La raison et le temps, 33.). 
114 Worms, ‘Bergson entre Russell et Husserl: Un troisième terme?’, 93. 
115 Costelloe, ‘An Answer to Mr Bertrand Russell’s Article on the Philosophy of Bergson’, 149–50. 
116 See his application of Bergsonian thought to the Sorites paradox, Buridan’s Ass and The Weakness of the Will 
problem in Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 97–104. 
117 Moore, 51–52. 
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philosophy will now appear as relatively shallow.”118 This study will show a similar point with 
regards to philosophy of religion. 
 The methodological emphasis on Bergson’s earlier works, especially TFW, is 
paramount for the successful interaction between analytic philosophy and Bergsonian thought 
that runs throughout this entire study. The motivation for this also rests primarily on the 
irrelevance of some of Bergson’s later observations to the issue of free will, observations 
regarding the “élan vital,” the centrality of his concept of “immersing ourselves” into the 
movement of things through intuition (which have already been extensively examined in a 
theological context anyway119), and his move towards much more speculative metaphysics, 
which indeed form the target of Russell’s critique. As a result, Bergson’s thought on religion 
and morality in TS, the role he accords to the vital impulse and teleology play little role here. 
It is not that these later concepts are uninteresting; rather, they are too vulnerable to the 
Russellian critique and risk being regarded as “nonsense” by most of the analytic philosophers 
this study engages with. 
1.4. The Framework of Free Will Debates 
The fact that Russell’s complaint about Bergson’s philosophy not being “analytic enough” is 
misplaced will also become apparent when we look at Bergson’s writings on free will. The 
remainder of this chapter will demonstrate that Bergson’s thought on freedom and 
determinism, directly connected to his philosophy of time described earlier, has insights highly 
relevant to analytic accounts of these topics. Even though the critique below by no means 
captures the entirety of the debate concerning free will in analytic philosophy, it certainly 
captures those tenets of these debates that are transferred over into analytic philosophy of 
religion. Or in other words, although there are further ways of conceptualising the problem of 
free will in analytic philosophy simpliciter than those presented here, this study is only 
concerned with conceptualisations utilised by analytic philosophers for articulating the 
relationship between free will and divine foreknowledge that will be examined in the final 
chapter. My claim is that while arguments proceeding within the accepted methodological 
framework may be valid, the cornerstones that this framework is built on are, themselves, 
mistaken. I identify these cornerstones as the following four postulates: 
 
118 Moore, 140. 
119 See especially Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism; Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens commun: la 
philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques. 
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Postulate 1: Free will and determinism are absolute. This means that one might reduce 
the vast majority of views on the problem of free will to one of the following four options: 
(i) free will is true and determinism is false, (ii) free will is true and determinism is true, 
(iii) free will is false and determinism is true, (iii) free will is false and determinism is 
false. Free will and determinism are thereby thought of as “all-or-nothing” problems. 
Postulate 2: The compatibility of free will and determinism is a general problem. This 
means that it is possible to provide free will arguments in general without necessarily 
focusing on the particularity of individual acts and that since free will is a problem 
pertaining to reality as a whole, “study cases” can come from anywhere. The question is 
not “is this particular act free,” but rather “is there free will” or “is it possible for any act 
to be free”? 
Postulate 3: The principle of alternative possibilities. This means that free will requires 
the ability to do otherwise, or in other words, when a particular decision-making process 
is taking place, there is more than one future possible.120 
Postulate 4: Laws of nature apply to mental states. This means that mental states are 
considered as facts that can be subsumed under causal relationships.  
Before going further, it would be helpful to provide a short typology of the variety of views 
regarding free will in analytic philosophy. The following should be considered merely as a 
selection of running “themes” that figure in analytic treatments of free will: the traditional 
subdivision into compatibilism and incompatibilism (primarily driven by responses to the 
question of whether we “can do otherwise”121 (Postulate 3) and whether free will is compatible 
with determinism or not) no longer exhausts all the primary subdivisions. For example, 
compatibilism can be construed — instead of being able to do otherwise — as “being the 
sources of our own actions.”122 The traditional positions have also themselves been adjusted 
and refined in recent literature to include “hybrid” views (such as Fischer’s 
 
120 I understand Postulate 3 to be the claim that “free will requires the ability to do otherwise,” not the connected 
claim “moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise,” on which rests Frankfurt’s canonical argument 
in Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. While there are different ways of understanding 
free will in analytic philosophy (e.g., “agent-causation,” “ultimate source compatibilism,” or Frankfurt-inspired 
hierarchical models (see Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person’.)), the “ability to do otherwise” 
has come to dominate the picture of free will in analytic philosophy of religion.  
121 Fischer et al., Four Views on Free Will, 1–2. 
122 Fischer et al., 1–2. 
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semicompatibilism123) as well as Platonic-inspired theories regarding our free will as acting 
towards “the good.”124 The typology below merely aims to highlight the key analytic responses 
to problems of free will which end up being carried over into philosophy of religion, 
specifically the problem of divine foreknowledge.125 
 Incompatibilism is the claim that free will is not compatible with determinism.126 This 
position can then, further, be divided into libertarianism (the belief that determinism is false 
and free will is true) and hard determinism (the belief that determinism is true and free will is 
false127). Rota defines libertarians as believing that “H is free in the libertarian sense iff at least 
sometimes, (i) there are multiple alternatives for H’s action, and (ii) it is up to H which 
alternative gets realized.”128 Within the contemporary landscape, Kane identifies three 
significant incompatibilist libertarian views: (i) “agent causation,” where it is the “agent” or 
the agent’s “self” (as opposed to events leading up to the moment of taking a particular 
decision) that causes the action.129 (ii) “non/causalist or simple determinism,” which Kane 
identifies as revolving around the claim that “free choices or actions are uncaused events which 
are nonetheless explicable in terms of an agent’s reasons or purposes”130 and (iii) event-causal, 
where “agents cause their free actions via [their] reasons for doing so, but 
indeterministically.”131 
 Compatibilism is the claim that free will is compatible with determinism.132  Here, the 
particular definition of free will can take on many different forms: from the “ability to do 
otherwise” to a particular aligning of our willing with specific motives or with the type of 
character we are/have. Historically, one can isolate at least three distinct positions. First, there 
 
123 Fischer, ‘Compatibilism’. 
124 Wolf, Freedom Within Reason. 
125 A useful “flow-chart” framework is offered by Shanley: If we accept determinism (1), there are two options: 
(1a) We identify as “determinists” and claim that free will is an illusion or (1b) We identify as “compatibilists” 
and argue that causal determination is compatible with human freedom. If we reject determinism (2), there are 
two options: (2a) We identify as “incompatibilists” and emphasise the claim about the connection between 
determinism and lack of free will or (2b) We identify as libertarians and emphasise the claim about freedom 
existing (Shanley, ‘Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom’, 70.). 
126 For the time being, I leave it open whether this determinism is physical, biological, logical, theological, or 
otherwise. 
127 See Pereboom, ‘Hard Incompatibilism’. 
128 Rota, ‘The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge’, 165; see also 
Leftow, Time and Eternity, 301; for a detailed discussion, see Pereboom, ‘Hard Incompatibilism’. 
129 See Kane, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates’, 20. 
130 Kane, 20. 
131 Kane, 20. 
132 For a detailed account, see Kane, 12–18. 
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is “classical compatibilism,”133 mostly associated with Hobbes and Hume,134 who claim that our 
freedom consists of the ability to do what we “will” if we were not prevented from doing so by 
any obstacles. Second, following the shortcomings of the definition of free will entailed by 
“classical compatibilism” when faced with problems like compulsions or addictions, the 
“hierarchical theories”135 of free will were born. These were strongly based on Frankfurt’s 
seminal paper “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.”136 Frankfurt claims that we 
are free when our second-order desires align with our first-order ones in a particular way. Third, 
one might isolate what Kane refers to as “reasons-response compatibilist views” which he 
defines as follows: “Such views require that for agents to be free and responsible, they must be 
‘responsive to reasons,’ in the sense that they must be able to recognize and evaluate reasons 
for action, and be able to act in some manner that is sensitive to a suitable range of reasons.”137 
 Note that none of these positions endorses all of the four Postulates from above. For 
example, Postulate 1 is not endorsed by free will theories which consider indeterminacy to be 
an element in the process of decision-making. For instance, Kane states that we should 
think, instead, of the indeterminism involved in free choice as an ingredient in a 
larger goal-directed or teleological process or activity, in which the 
indeterminism functions as a hindrance or obstacle to the attainment of the goal.138  
Similarly, Postulate 2 is not endorsed by Frankfurt-type theories of free will; some acts may be 
free, whereas others might not, depending on how the different hierarchical levels of our wills 
align in a particular act. By parity, Postulate 3 is not required for certain versions of 
compatibilism (i.e., those that do not require free will to be defined in terms of the “ability to 
do otherwise”), while Postulate 4 does not seem explicitly to feature in any of the positions 
outlined above. What is decisive, however, is that each of the major views regarding free will 
in analytic philosophy of religion ends up endorsing at least one of them. This will become 
obvious in the next section, where Bergson’s critique will be applied to each one of the 
Postulates against the background of one of the philosophical positions on free will from above. 
If every view on free will in analytic philosophy of religion requires at least one of the 
Postulates and Bergson can show that each of the Postulates is false, then every view on free 
 
133 Kane, 12. 
134 See for example Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VIII.23. 
135 Kane, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates’, 14. 
136 Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person’. 
137 Kane, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates’, 15. 
138 Kane, ‘Libertarianism’, 45. 
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will in analytic philosophy of religion is either deficient, standing on shaky grounds, or just 
outright false. 
1.5. Bergson and Free Will in Analytic Philosophy 
Bergson believes that the opposition between determinism and free will is illusory139 and — 
similarly to the diagnosis provided by Kant,140 who is his implicit interlocutor throughout TFW 
— regards it as something that could be termed an “antinomy.” In the closing paragraph of 
TFW, he diagnoses the root of the problem as follows: 
All the difficulties of the problem and the problem itself, arise from the desire to 
endow duration [la durée] with the same attributes as extensity, to interpret a 
succession by simultaneity, and to express the idea of freedom in a language into 
which it is obviously untranslatable.141 
Bergson attempts to show that re-establishing the appropriate boundaries between la durée and 
its spatial representation dissolves the problem.142 He starts by observing that the law of 
causality states that the same causes always produce the same effects (although most 
philosophers would now argue that the same causes always assign the same probability to 
future effects). However, he goes on to point out that this clearly cannot apply to la durée since 
every retrospectively identified moment of la durée is unrepeatable and unique.143 In other 
words, while the determinists144 argue that the same cause always produces the same effect and 
the libertarians presume that the same cause can produce different effects, they are both wrong 
in assuming that the same cause will “appear a second time on the stage of consciousness.”145 
This reappearance on the stage of consciousness is central to Postulate 4, which we will return 
to in the final chapter. 
 
139 For a historical background on the debates between libertarians and determinists, see Bouaniche, ‘Dossier 
Critique’, 233–34, note 1. Bergson’s key points of reference are Fouillé, La Liberté et Déterminisme and 
Boutroux, De la contingence des lois de la nature. 
140 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A532-558/B560-586. 
141 TFW 221/166. 
142 Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 218–19, note 76. 
143 TFW 201/151. 
144 When Bergson talks about “determinists,” he means those who argue that at every given point in time, there is 
only one possible future. He only occasionally mentions probabilistic causation in his later works.  
145 TFW 199/150. 
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 At the core of Bergson’s thought on free will is a distinction between the “parasitic” 
and the “fundamental” self.146 “The mind exists in two layers,” Bergson says, “one facing 
towards and formed after the external, public realm, the other remaining behind in ‘profound’ 
seclusion: unfortunately, it is the former ‘superficial self’ that is [usually] gaining 
ground … .”147 The deepest level of the fundamental self is (at least in TFW) identical to la 
durée.148 The parasitic self, by contrast, is inextricably permeated by the realm of homogeneous 
space. Its individual mental states are separated and distinctly labelled by language for purposes 
of social interaction.149 For example, the varying shades of feelings comprising our affection 
for someone become “solidified”150 and designated by a single word “love.” Bergson argues 
that each one of us has our own way of loving and hating, but all of these individual nuances 
are designated by general terms: 
But if he [= the psychologist focusing merely on the parasitic self] sees in these 
various states no more than is expressed in their name, if he retains only their 
impersonal aspect, he may set them side by side for ever without getting anything 
but a phantom self, the shadow of the ego projecting itself into space.151 
It is precisely these individual states, regarded as constant and “solidified,” that can be 
subsumed under causal relations. At the level of the fundamental self, the states are always 
different and thus escape the laws of causality — but in the parasitic self, which is the 
 
146 TFW 163-7/123-7. 
147 Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, 20. 
148 Bergson’s TFW has frequently been criticised for locating free will in la durée. For example, G. Belot points 
out in a Freudian tone: “On the contrary, the ‘fundamental self’ is relatively fragmented; the more we delve into 
it, the more we find a plurality of consciences instead of a unity of conscience. It is there that we encounter, instead 
of free will, automatism; instead of desire, blind impulses; instead of harmony and consensus, incoherencies; 
contradictions, obscure battles of internal life.” (“Le ‘moi profond’ est au contraire relativement fragmentaire; 
plus loin on le pénètre, et plus on trouve une pluralité de consciences à la place de l’unité de conscience. C’est là 
qu’on rencontre, au lieu de la liberté, l’automatisme; au lieu du vouloir, les impulsions aveugles ; au lieu de 
l’harmonie et du consensus, les incohérences, les contradictions, les obscures batailles de la vie intérieure.” (Belot, 
‘Une Théorie Nouvelle de La Liberté’, my translation.)) Bergson responds to this objection in MM 185-8/206-9. 
149 As D. H. Mellor has suggested in conversation, the difference between mental states of the fundamental and 
parasitic self could be conceptualised using the type-token distinction. At the level of the parasitic self, the states 
(e.g., “hearing the kettle boil at t1” and “hearing the kettle boil at t2”) are sufficiently similar to constitute tokens 
of the same type and can easily enter into general causal relationships. However, once we approach the 
fundamental side of the spectrum, it is a mistake to consider, for instance, “being in love at t1 [with my first wife]” 
and “being in love at t2 [with my second wife],” as tokens of the same type, since the two mental states are radically 
different — we are tricked by language into thinking they are tokens of the same type simply because we apply 
the word “love” to both. We will return to the token-type distinction when we discuss Bergson’s critique of 
Postulate 4 at the beginning of Chapter 5. 
150 TFW 130/97. 
151 TFW 165/124. 
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fundamental self projected into the spatial multiplicity, individual states are repeatable and 
distinct, and can thus partake of standard causal relations. As far as the parasitic self is 
concerned, Bergson says, we are “conscious automatons.”152 “Here will be found, within the 
fundamental self, a parasitic self which continually encroaches upon the other. Many live this 
kind of life, and die without having known true freedom.”153 The parasitic self is useful for the 
mesh of social interactions and habits of practical life, a mesh that Bergson refers to as a “veil” 
(le voile154), the totality of habits requiring spatial ways of thought which enable us to function 
efficiently.155 
 This is precisely why the Bergsonian must reject Postulate 1. For Bergson there is a 
continuum between free and determined acts in the proportion to which they are related to the 
parasitic and the fundamental selves — freedom and determinism are not absolute, they admit 
of degrees.156 Each act is placed somewhere on a continuum between freedom and determinism. 
A single indivisible act is “both” free and determined in much the way that a single pint of 
thoroughly mixed shandy is “both” beer and lemonade: the extent to which it approaches either 
depends on the proportions between the two liquids. Of course, the “proportion” between 
determinism and free will cannot be quantified, since la durée is unquantifiable. 
 What’s more, Bergson says that most people, most of the time, merely operate on the 
level of the parasitic self — free acts are extremely exceptional.157 However, there are moments 
when we are free, especially in moments of difficult decisions, moments when we can act from 
our fundamental self, when we can fully express who we are by delving into our fundamental 
self and letting our decision spring from there. “[B]ut the moments at which we thus grasp 
ourselves are rare, and that is just why we are rarely free.”158 It is only at the deepest level of 
the fundamental self that la durée, the basis of our freedom, is located: “Without doubt, then 
at the surface of the ego, there is discontinuity. But as we delve deeper into ourselves, we arrive 
at continuity, fluidity, at interior durée.”159 Appealing to William James’ observation that 
 
152 TFW 168/126. This phrase, although not referenced by Bergson in TFW, is used by Huxley in Huxley, ‘On 
the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History’, 365. 
153 TFW 166/125. 
154 See for example IT 77. 
155 Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 233, note 59. 
156 TFW 166/125. 
157 TFW 167/126. 
158 TFW 231/174. 
159 “Sans doute donc, à la surface de notre moi, il y a du discontinue. Mais à mesure que nous nous 
approfondissons, nous arrivons au continu, au fluide, à la durée intérieure.” (IT 49, my translation.) 
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consciousness is absent in acts where it is not particularly useful, Alfred Mele provides a 
helpful example: 
If James is right, by the time drivers have developed the habit of signalling for 
turns they are about to make, they no longer consciously form intentions to signal 
for turns (in normal circumstances) and no longer are conscious of being about to 
signal or even of signalling (in normal circumstances).160 
Simple actions and automatic reactions (for instance, those involved in Libet experiments161) 
cannot simply be subsumed under the same metaphysical description as deciding whether to 
marry someone or not, or how to string English words together to write Hamlet. The following 
critique which Bergson directs at his neo-Kantian contemporaries applies equally well to the 
vast majority of analyses of doing, acting, and deciding (whether to have tea or coffee, whether 
to mow one’s lawn or not etc.) in contemporary free will debates: 
As they look at only the commonest aspect of our conscious life, they perceive 
clearly marked states, which can recur in time like physical phenomena, and to 
which the law of causal determination applies, if we wish, in the same sense as it 
does to nature.162 
 Bergson’s approach of positing a continuum between the extent to which an act is free 
and the extent to which it is determined — parallel to the continuum between the parasitic and 
the fundamental self — may be contrasted with the hierarchy of first and second-order volitions 
posited by Frankfurt.163 Although Frankfurt’s account may superficially resemble that of 
Bergson (in that our true personality consists in an appropriate alignment of our first and 
second-order desires), Bergson’s account is radically different; not merely because Bergson 
does not speak about volitions or intentions (but about the agent as a whole), but mainly because 
for him actions are always placed on a continuum: there are no two (or three) hierarchically-
arranged levels of the self. Bergson’s approach should equally be contrasted with the general 
approach assumed by agent-causal164 accounts of free will, which regard the agent as a single 
indivisible unit. For Bergson, the “agent” constantly changes; both in terms of the “content” of 
 
160 Mele, Effective Intentions. The Power of Conscious Will, 37. 
161 Libet, ‘The Timing of a Subjective Experience’; Libet, ‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of 
Conscious Will in Voluntary Action’. 
162 TFW 238/178-9. 
163 See Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person’. 
164 For the classical formulation, see Chisholm, ‘Human Freedom and the Self’. 
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their durée and in terms of the proportion between the participation of the parasitic self and 
that of the fundamental self in a particular act. 
 Far from stipulating these two selves as distinct (akin to the noumenal and the 
phenomenal self in Kant165), Bergson maintains that movement from one to the other is gradual. 
Contrary to spiritualism,166 he does not argue for absolute freedom.167 Completely free acts, 
springing from the most profound emotions, are rare. Most of the time we fly on autopilot. An 
act is free to the extent in which it is the fundamental self which partakes of it (e.g., showing 
our true character by saving someone from a burning house) and determined to the extent that 
it is referred to the parasitic self (e.g., stopping our car whenever we see a red light): 
Bergson’s position on the issue of free will and determinism is best characterised 
as a peculiar twist on compatibilism. … Libertarians and determinists build their 
ideas equally on the axiom of their mutual incompatibility. … Bergson, on the 
contrary, believes they are compatible because the characteristic that both 
constitutes durée and differentiates it from determinate homogeneity appears in 
different degrees at different moments of our conscious existence.168 
Nevertheless, the claim about Bergson’s position being a “peculiar twist on compatibilism” 
must be taken with a pinch of salt. He does indeed assert that free will and determinism are 
compatible; but they are compatible not in terms of “coexisting” side by side, but in terms of 
being intimately and uniquely intertwined in each individual act. 
 Furthermore, regardless of how “encrusted” we are by the automated habits of our 
parasitic self, the fundamental self can always unexpectedly rise to the surface. Once a free act 
has happened, we can retrospectively connect it with various causal chains. In the case of 
Kant’s famous “malicious lie”169 example, it does not particularly matter whether the person 
did or did not say the lie in the end, as we can always retrospectively identify a causal chain 
leading to either of the outcomes: 
… if the event can always be explained afterwards by an arbitrary choice of 
antecedent event, a completely different event could have been equally well 
explained in the same circumstances by another choice of antecedent — nay, by 
 
165 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A538-558/B567-586. 
166 Bergson argues mainly against Fouillé’s La liberté et déterminisme and also against Lachelier’s Du fondement 
de l’induction (1871). 
167 TFW 166/125. 
168 Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, 26, my italics. 
169 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A554-555/B582-585. 
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the same antecedents otherwise cut out, otherwise distributed, otherwise 
perceived, — in short, by our retrospective attention.170 
The following analogy will serve as a good conclusion to the foregoing discussions. Take the 
famous observation by Quételet that the number of deaths, crimes, marriages etc. in Paris 
remains fairly constant from year to year.171 Now, consider a particular man deciding whether 
to marry or not. As Bergson argues, completely free acts are rare, since most people behave 
like conscious automata, gliding on the surface of the parasitic self where individual habits are 
connected by causal laws (e.g., the feeling of “love” is connected with the notion of “marriage,” 
so that when the person falls in love with someone, they follow the habit instilled into their 
parasitic self to marry the person they fell in love with). This explains why the number is pretty 
much constant. Nevertheless, there is no reason why the person in question could not escape 
the habits of the parasitic self and run away from the altar, as happens in many cases. 
Retrospectively, each one of his actions can be plotted onto a branching tree of possibilities 
and connected by an arbitrary set of antecedents. This does not mean that running away from 
the altar is required for freedom; what is required is a full introspective and self-reflective 
awareness of why we are getting married in the first place and certainty that we are not merely 
doing so out of habits we have unreflectively observed in other people. 
 The importance of observing that particular instances of relations between the agent’s 
self (being in a deep state of deliberation as opposed to driving on autopilot) and the particular 
act (deliberating whether to sacrifice one’s son to Yahweh as opposed to deciding whether to 
have coffee or tea) lie on a continuum further leads to a repudiation of Postulate 2. Specifically, 
questions of the form “Are we free or not?” should instead be reformulated as “(To what extent) 
was an act a performed by agent S free and (to what extent) was it determined?” Bergson thinks 
of a free act more as an “event” that “happens” rather than in terms of actions, intentions, 
decisions, possibilities, connections between causes and effects etc.172 There is no free will “in 
general.”173 This is why Bergson never aims to create a definition of free will, but rather provide 
its “characterisation.”174  Bouaniche comments on Bergson’s indexication of freedom to 
individual “events” or “acts” as follows: 
 
170 CM 84/114. 
171 See Quételet, Physique sociale ou Essai sur le développement des facultés de l’homme. 
172 Čapek, ‘Les apories de la liberté bergsonienne’, 254. 
173 EPL 334. 
174 EPL 65-7; Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 247, note 77. 
 
 33  
We can never find freedom in an act. ... For Bergson, moments of crisis or of 
decision reveal the effectivity of a continuous process, which is their non-
perceived ground.175 
For Bergson, there is something essentially “artistic” about a truly free act: 
[W]e are free when our acts spring from our whole personality, when they express 
it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds 
between the artist and his work.176 
 The spatial representation of deciding (usually as a branching tree), a “refraction” of 
our durée into geometry, also commits both libertarians and determinists to the retrospective 
illusion: they look at the decision once it has been taken and then retrospectively identify 
motives and possibilities within it. 
 What exacerbates the retrospective illusion is the facility with which we think of free 
acts as a hesitation between several competing possible futures. We imagine branching trees 
of possibilities or “gardens of forking paths”177 where our process of deciding becomes 
represented as an arrival at a crossroads followed by taking one of two already established 
directions.178 This leads us directly to Postulate 3, a typical instance of which may be found in 
David Basinger: 
[T]o say that a person (P) is free to perform an action (A), …, is to say that P has 
it within her power to choose to perform A or choose not to perform A. Both A 
and not A could actually occur; which will actually occur has not yet been 
determined.179 
The setting up of the framework is fairly straightforward; at time t, an agent reaches a point at 
which there are two possible futures at t+1. Postulate 3 also covers accounts of free will 
analysed in terms of counterfactuals (“Had such and such been the case, then agent S would 
 
175 “[O]n ne trouvera jamais la liberté dans un acte. ... Pour Bergson, les moments de crise et de décision ne font 
que révéler l’effectivité d’un processus continu qui en est le fondement inaperçu.” (Bouaniche, 248, note from 
p. 180 of the original, my translation.) 
176 TFW 172/129. In a recent conference paper, Mark Sinclair referred to Bergson’s account of free will as 
“expressivist.” (Sinclair, ‘Express Yourself! Bergson on Freedom’.) 
177 See Borges, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’. 
178 See Bergson’s famous discussion of the MOXY curve in TFW 175-8/133-5. 
179 Basinger, ‘Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought’, 416, my italics. 
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have acted otherwise”), since in such a case the possible future is simply indexed to a different 
t in a different possible-world time-sequence.180 
 Bergson regards the idea of there being two possible futures between which an agent 
freely chooses — should they have free will — metaphysically suspect.181 Apart from simple 
every-day decisions (deciding whether to have a coffee or not), there are rarely two future 
options solidified before us as determinate objects of choice. Most real difficult decisions 
consist of a continual oscillation between several tendencies of our self, which grows every 
moment by passing from one to the other.182 Seeing free will as consisting of deciding between 
two or more options hides the reality of pure becoming; it results from a practical static 
representation of the inherently dynamic evolution of the decision-making process itself. To 
suppose that a spatial tree of branching possibilities could accurately represent the decision-
making process is to think of this process as a “sort of stopping of time.”183 
 It might be objected that Bergson confuses us not knowing what the possibilities and 
actualities are with there being no possibilities or actualities. Although we will examine this 
objection in later chapters, at this stage we are limiting la durée to the human mind: the gap 
between the ontological and the epistemological, therefore, does not exist. Our qualitative 
progression of mental states is what it is known to be (by us) — and together with them the 
retrospectively identified actualities and potentialities which, nevertheless, are not there as la 
durée is developing. This observation must be connected with Bergson’s insistence on focusing 
the applicability of “free will” to specific acts. We are tricked into believing that freedom 
consists in deciding between several possibles by focusing on simple acts (choosing between 
having a coffee or not) and then using them as a model for all others. But in some more 
profound cases of human freedom, this seems outright absurd. For instance, Bergson asks: 
“When a musician composes a symphony was his work possible before being real?”184 By 
 
180 For a short summary of these discussions, see Johnson, ‘God, Fatalism, and Temporal Ontology’, 448–49. 
181 Bergson’s position on this changes in his later works. For example, in EPL, he says the following: “If our 
freedom is real, it is necessary that there are, at certain moments of our existence, possibilities of choices, points 
of bifurcation, where we have a choice between two or several different points of direction, independently of what 
is given.” (“Si notre liberté est réelle, il faut qu’il y ait à certains moments au moins de notre existence des 
possibilités absolues de choisir, des points de bifurcation où nous avons le choix entre deux ou plusieurs 
aiguillages différents et cela indépendamment de quoi ce soit de donné.” (EPL 336-7, my translation; see also 
Čapek, ‘Les apories de la liberté bergsonienne’, 251.)) 
182 TFW 180-81/135-6. 
183 “L’hésitation entre elles se présente comme une sorte d’arrêt du temps.” (Čapek, ‘Les apories de la liberté 
bergsonienne’, 252.) 
184 CM 10/13. 
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applying the same method of tracing back effects to their causes in the past, we think that this 
can be done, ontologically, also when it comes to the future, if only we knew a little bit more: 
[T]here is especially the idea that the possible is less than the real, and that, for 
this reason, the possibility of things precedes their existence. They would thus be 
capable of representation beforehand; they could be thought of before being 
realised. But it is the reverse that is true. … [T]he possible is only the real with 
the addition of an act of mind which throws its image back into the past, once it 
has been enacted.185 
As reality is created as something unforeseeable and new, its image is reflected 
behind it into the indefinite past; ... The possible is therefore the mirage of the 
present in the past; and as we know the future will finally constitute a present and 
the mirage effect is continually being produced, we are convinced that the image 
of tomorrow is already contained in our actual present.186 
Bergson provides an anecdote to drive his point home. He recalls how a journalist once asked 
him what he thought the next great work of literature was going to be. Bergson comments: 
“I saw distinctly that [the journalist] conceived the future work as being already stored up in 
some cupboard reserved for possibles … .”187 
Hamlet was doubtless possible before being realised, if that means there was no 
insurmountable obstacle to its realisation. In this particular sense one calls 
possible what is not impossible. … But the possible thus understood is in no 
degree virtual, something ideally pre-existent. If you close the gate you know no 
one will cross the road; it does not follow that you can predict who will cross it 
when you open it. … [I]t is clear that a mind in which the Hamlet of Shakespeare 
had taken shape in the form of possible would by that fact have created its reality: 
it would have thus been, by definition, Shakespeare himself.188 
 
185 CM 81/109. 
186 CM 82/111. 
187 CM 81/110. 
188 CM 83/112-13. This idea is also captured by Geach who — although for reasons different from Bergson’s — 
suggests that it is better to think of preventative actions relating to the future as preventing “that” something 
happened (e.g., that someone fell off a bridge) instead of designating a particular future event by a phrase 
(someone’s falling of a bridge) and then saying that it was that thing that had been prevented (Geach, ‘The Future’, 
211; Todd, ‘Geachianism’.). 
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In a recent analysis, the force of Bergson’s critique was taken up by Emmanuel Picavet and 
applied to current work in decision theory. Commenting on Bergson’s critique of the 
geometrical representation of decision-making, Picavet observes that thinking of a decision-
making process as a hesitation between two possibles ends up bizarrely “reifying” these 
possibles into distinct things: “[W]e conceive them as pure objects of choice, simple things 
belonging to the external world, towards which we successively turn our deciding gaze.”189 In 
reality, the two possibles which we are deciding between are never available except as already 
forming part of the fluid stream of mental states:  
Now, the tracks … are only given to the consciousness of a subject if they 
correspond to an experience of the subject. It is therefore inappropriate to 
consider them as being given simultaneously: we must recognise that they 
correspond more to successive experiences of consciousness.190  
 To further appreciate this point, consider the following example.191 Say you are deciding 
between two jobs, one in Aberdeen and one in Birmingham, and you are struggling to make up 
your mind, that is, you are not immediately drawn to one or the other. We usually think of the 
two choices in this way: 
 
Aberdeen Birmingham 
a1: close to the sea b1: close to London 
a2: lots of nice pubs b2: we do not know anyone there 
a3: horrible weather b3: friends in the workplace 




189 “[On] les conçoit comme de purs objets du choix, de simples choses du monde extérieur, vers lesquelles on 
tourne successivement le regard du décideur.” (Picavet, ‘Action et Décision : Le Sens Des Interrogations de 
Bergson’, 196, my translation.) 
190 “Or les vois … ne sont en réalité données à la conscience du sujet que si elles correspondent à une expérience 
du sujet. Il est donc abusif de les considérer comme données simultanément : il faudrait reconnaître qu’elles 
correspondent plutôt à des expériences successives de la conscience.” (Picavet, 199, my translation; see also 
Picavet, Choix rationel et vie publique : Pensée formelle et raison pratique, 43.) 
191 It should be pointed out that the discussion that follows still does not go far enough in capturing what Bergson 
is trying to say, since the identification of individual aspects of “Aberdeen” and “Birmingham,” however “fine-
graining,” still reifies the sub-elements of the decision-making process. 
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In this example, a1-n describe individual features of the job in Aberdeen, and b1-n of those in 
Birmingham that we have (or could have) listed on a sheet of paper to make our decision easier. 
The customary way of analysing the decision is to assume that the agent looks from one 
possibility to another and then considers which features matter more to them, perhaps even 
assigning values of preference, and then seeing that, say, Aberdeen, outweighs Birmingham: 
[a1(5 units) + a2 (2units) + … ] > [b1(3 units) + b2(3 units) + …] 
Once we have performed the calculation, a decision naturally results. 
 However, the Bergsonian would find several faults with this analysis. Let us leave aside 
that the table above is inaccurate as such by definition; our picking out of these features is 
already a process that took place in time and that expressed our character (for example, it seems 
like the author of the list above cares a great deal about pubs and London). More importantly, 
however, the process of shifting from one factor to the other, thereby oscillating between 
“Aberdeen” and “Birmingham” (a1, then b1, then a2, then b2 and so on, perhaps returning to 
some earlier features later) in fact changes the things we were deciding between. We started 
with two vague unspecified entities reified into “things” with distinct labels (Aberdeen, 
Birmingham), but then realised that the things change in the decision-making process. 
“Aberdeen” and “Birmingham” gradually took on more specific contours, became less blurry 
and began to produce different impressions on us; whereas Aberdeen started off at a1 as a place 
close to the sea, at a4 it becomes somewhere we consider not being great for our future career. 
Furthermore, it is not only Aberdeen and Birmingham qua possibilities of choice that change, 
it is us too. When considering factor a1, we did not perhaps realise that not knowing anyone in 
Birmingham mattered to us that much — by the time we get to a4, we discover that we are 
perhaps tired of working in places with bad career prospects or where one might not be able to 
go for a pint with friends. What the non-Bergsonian considers as a fixed agent S and two fixed 
reified possibilities A and B (taking a job in Aberdeen and in Birmingham respectively) is 
thought of by the Bergsonian as an indivisible process — a process in which everything 
changes — both us and the things we are deciding between: 
[W]hen we have to determine a future state of consciousness, however superficial 
it may be, we can no longer view the antecedents in a static condition as things; 
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we must view them in a dynamic condition as processes since we are concerned 
with their influence alone.192 
 Appealing to an example from Amartya Sen,193 Picavet demonstrates that the situation 
is even more complicated when we throw more factors into the set-up.194 Suppose we keep the 
same parameters of the situation, but instead Aberdeen and Birmingham do not designate jobs 
that we have already been offered, but jobs we are intending to apply for, having stipulated that 
we can only send one application. Now, suppose we find out that we are more likely to be given 
the job in Birmingham rather than the one in Aberdeen. Do “Aberdeen” and “Birmingham” 
remain the same things that we were deciding between? Or does one appear in a different light 
from the other? Knowing the probability of one of the possibilities, in fact, changes the 
probability of that possibility itself.195 This further illustrates that the decision-making process 
and the reified things being decided between form part of a whole: 
What matters from now is not merely the nature of the consequences [of 
decision]; it is also the manner in which they appear conjointly, interconnected 
by the actions which lead to them. … In these conditions, it is rather difficult to 
represent the choice between the options in the manner of (for example) the 
choice of a dish in a restaurant, since the options are in fact actions with uncertain 
consequences. … To put it simply: we do not understand the decision if we only 
consider the objects of choice considered separate from the choice itself; we must 
also consider the manner in which they appear to the deciding agents.196 
 
192 TFW 198/149, my italics. 
193 Sen, ‘Rationality and Uncertainty’. 
194 What follows is an adapted example from Sen quoted in Picavet, ‘Action et Décision : Le Sens Des 
Interrogations de Bergson’, 203–6. 
195 The situation could be even more complicated by telling the agent what their “new” probability (having found 
out the first probability) was going to be. For instance, if at t1 the probability of S choosing A is p, and we tell S 
that this is in fact the case at t2, this changes what p in fact is at t3 (either because the agent wants to resist the 
probability out of spite or because it confirms their confidence in choosing A). I am grateful to Hugh Mellor for 
this observation. 
196 “Ce qui compte dès lors, ce ne put pas être seulement la nature des conséquences ; c’est aussi la manière dont 
les conséquences possibles apparaissent conjointement, liées entre elles par les actions qui mènent à elles. … Dans 
ces conditions, il est assez difficile de représenter le choix entre des options à la manière (par exemple) du choix 
d’un plat au restaurant, lorsque les options sont en fait des actions aux conséquences incertaines. … Pour le dire 
simplement : on ne comprend pas vraiment la décision si l’on ne considère que des termes du choix mis à distance 
du choix lui-même ; il faut considérer aussi la manière dont ils apparaissent aux agents qui délibèrent.” (Picavet, 
‘Action et Décision : Le Sens Des Interrogations de Bergson’, 205–6, my translation.) 
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And here, of course, the way these choices appear to the individual agents changes as the 
decision-making process progresses. “The experience of choice by a subject becomes itself a 
factor in the evaluation of the options proposed to this subject. … The options do not exist 
independently of the movement of the mind in the choice under consideration.”197 
 The features of the retrospectively-identified objects of choice do not exist 
independently of our contemplation of them; we assign values to them depending on the 
preferences we have as unique individuals. Whereas an agent S might be able to cope with lots 
of horrible seagulls in Aberdeen because they prefer living by the seaside, this is not the case 
for agent T. The features of Aberdeen (including “the presence of evil seagulls”) are constant; 
but the features of Aberdeen qua an object of choice are not constant and depend on the 
character of the agent in whose decision-making process they feature. The preferences of the 
agent might change in the course of the decision-making process and as a result of the decision-
making process. Perhaps the agent is suddenly overcome by a strange passion for seagull-
watching. It is not only that the objects of choice exist merely qua objects of choice as seen 
through the preferential values of the decision-maker, but, more importantly, the values of the 
decision-maker are not fixed in advance of the decision. We, therefore, cannot say: “Well, S’s 
values are such and such, so these are S’s possibilities with their values assigned.” Of course, 
the job in Aberdeen and the job in Birmingham exist as two independent entities, but as such 
they do not feature in the agent’s decision-making process; and inasmuch as they feature in the 
decision-making process, the terms “Aberdeen” and “Birmingham” designate two constantly-
changing impressions. 
 
The tendency to picture the process of deciding using a schematic diagram of the branching-
tree also illustrates the crucial distinction that Bergson posits between “symbol” and “image.” 
Bouaniche defines this distinction as follows: 
An image is an adequate representation of reality; a symbol creates a 
correspondence between two elements of a heterogeneous nature. A line on a map 
is an “image” of the advance of an army, as the army has crossed space: the 
 
197 “L’expérience du choix par un sujet devient alors lui-même un élément de l’évaluation des options proposées 
à ce sujet. … [L]es options n’existent pas indépendamment du mouvement de l’esprit dans le choix que l’on 
considère.” (Picavet, 207, 209, my translation.) 
 
 40  
branches of a given decision are, by contrast, a “symbol,” since when I choose, I 
do not travel on a path and its branches, but through temporal states.198 
For Bergson, it is a mistake to draw any conclusions (e.g., about the number of antecedent 
possibilities or the point in time at which the decision was taken) from the diagram; we have 
made a mistake of using “diagrams which have for us become reality itself”199 and need to 
return to and think about reality, not its symbolic representation. And we must be careful: 
Bergson warns that even when we do not explicitly appeal to such diagrams, they are almost 
always there at the back of our mind.200 Bergson thinks that analysing free-will problems along 
the lines of these diagrams is the culprit behind the metaphysical problems of free will since 
we inevitably begin thinking of the symbol of the decision-making as an image.201 According 
to Pariente, asking whether we “could have done otherwise” does not make sense, because 
it presupposes the possibility of considering a schema of a representation to be 
adequate to the process inscribed in la durée, forgetting that one of them is 
successive, whereas the other is simultaneous; or, once again, because [the 
question] accords the same value of an image to what can only be a symbol.202  
As Picavet comments: 
The general formalism retained by decision-theorists is purely an instrument of 
representation or of projection, by which we enable ourselves to think of the 
decision as if it were a process external to consciousness, inscribed in time in the 
style of a physical phenomenon, and also inscribed in space in a certain way, due 
to the symbolism of trees of decision, [a symbolism], which assimilates choices 
to a trajectory leading across a hierarchised succession of branches. The 
mathematical formulation does not always rely on an explicit recourse to trees of 
 
198 “L’image est une représentation adéquate de la réalité ; le symbole opère une mise en correspondance de deux 
éléments de nature hétérogène. Le trait sur la carte est une ‘image’ de l’avancée de l’armée, car celle-ci a bien 
parcouru de l’espace ; les embranchements d’un arbre de décision sont en revanche un ‘symbole,’ car quand je 
choisis, je ne passe pas par un chemin et des bifurcations, mais par des états temporels.” (Bouaniche, ‘Dossier 
Critique’, 244–45, note 53, my translation; see also Pariente, Le Langage et l’individuel, 15–16.) 
199 MM 187/209. 
200 TFW 177/133; Picavet, ‘Action et Décision : Le Sens Des Interrogations de Bergson’, 193. 
201 Picavet, 197–98. 
202 “Une telle question n’a pas de sens parce qu’elle présuppose la possibilité de tenir un schéma pour la 
représentation adéquate d’un processus inscrit dans la durée, en oubliant que l’un est successif et l’autre 
simultané ; ou encore, parce qu’elle accorde valeur d’image à ce qui ne peut être que symbole.” (Pariente, Le 
Langage et l’individuel, 17, my translation.) 
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decision. But it is always presupposed, even if we adopt a different form of 
notation or representation.203 
This more general point, which is related to Bergson’s claim that homogeneous space is 
“simply conceived, never perceived [simplement conçu, jamais perçu], [and that] it has exactly 
the value of a symbol”204 can also be illustrated by a methodological point raised by 
D. C. Williams in his discussion of the passage of time. Williams argues that one of the reasons 
why many people struggle to accept the stasis theory of time is a “mismatch” between reality 
and its representation in the stasis theory: 
[T]he conceptual scheme is indifferently flat and third-personal, like a map, while 
the experienced reality is centripetal and perspectival, piled and palpitating where 
we are, grey and retiring elsewhere.205 
For the time being Williams’ point about the illusion of perspective-centredness that our 
experience of time gives us is not contested. Nevertheless, the metaphor of the map and reality 
to illustrate the relation between the conceptual scheme of the stasis theory and our experience 
of time can be used to clarify Bergson’s distinction between symbol and reality. Bergson would 
concede that the tree of branching possibilities adequately represents the past, but he would 
strongly disagree about the possibility of such a diagram representing our present decision-
making. Bergson does not question the heuristic assets of the map. Nevertheless, he wants to 
provide an adequate account of reality, not of the map itself. He would also point out that we 
cannot use the schema to infer conclusions about the action itself — similarly to the 
impossibility of inferring many things about reality from a given map; no map can completely 
and adequately reflect reality, unless the map becomes, to use an example of Borges’, so large 
as to coincide with reality itself.206 
 
 
203 “Le formalisme général retenu par les théoriciens de la décision est un pur instrument de représentation ou de 
projection, par lequel nous nous rendons capables de penser la décision comme s’il agissait d’un processus 
extérieur à la conscience, inscrit dans le temps à façon d’un phénomène physique, et aussi inscrit dans l’espace 
en quelque manière, à cause du symbolisme des arbres de décision, qui assimile les choix à un parcours réglé à 
travers une succession hiérarchisée d’embranchements. La formalisation mathématique des choix ne s’appuie 
toujours sur le recours explicite aux arbres de décision. Mais il est toujours entendu, lorsqu’on adopte d’autres 
formes de notation ou de représentation.” (Picavet, Choix rationel et vie publique : Pensée formelle et raison 
pratique, 38, my translation.) 
204 CM 153/204. 
205 Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 466. 
206 See Borges, ‘On Exactitude in Science’. 
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* * * 
 
This chapter has argued that the early analytic rejection of Bergsonian philosophy motivated 
by Russell’s critique is unjustified and proposed a new reconsideration of certain key insights 
from Bergson’s works, liberated from the initial suspicion instilled into analytic circles by 
Russell. However, one might ask: even if Russell had not been careful enough a reader of 
Bergson, can we draw significant methodological conclusions from a relatively minor debate 
in analytic philosophy taking place over a hundred years ago? Is Bergson’s philosophy relevant 
to contemporary treatments of time in analytic philosophy? We will put Bergson’s writings 
about free will aside for a moment, and explore the question about Bergson and analytic 
philosophy of time in the next chapter.  
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2. Bergson and McTaggart207 
This chapter aims to construct a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s argument for the 
unreality of time.208 I will further explore the two categories of temporality stipulated in the 
previous chapter (la durée and “spatialised time”) and demonstrate that (i) McTaggart’s 
argument does not apply to la durée and that (ii) although it applies to “spatialised time,” 
Bergson, unlike McTaggart, would not have regarded this as that much of a problem, thereby 
showing that B-series-oriented209 philosophies of time can be fitted into the framework of 
Bergson’s philosophy. This chapter will likewise respond to a caricature — frequently 
perpetuated by analytic philosophers — which presents Bergson as putting forward an A-
theory of time. Since many philosophers in the analytic tradition have taken Bergson’s claims 
about “spatialised” and “spatialising” time as applying to the B-theories, they have mistakenly 
classified him as an A-theorist.210 In turn, the suspicion of A-theories, together with a general 
suspicion of Bergson’s philosophy inculcated in the analytic context by Russell, significantly 
contributed to Bergson’s disappearance from discussions about philosophy of time in the 
English-speaking world. 
 The delimitation of context is crucial for this chapter. While there have been various 
attempts at relating Bergson’s philosophy to contemporary A and B-debates, their treatment of 
Bergson has not always been careful and has tended to extract individual arguments out of his 
overall metaphysical system.211 The same has recently been forcefully argued about 
McTaggart.212 This chapter will try to avoid two approaches to the paradox. On the one hand, 
I will not enter directly into contemporary debates about A- and B-theories of time. This is 
partially due to the fact that grasping the differences between A- and B-theories of time has 
 
207 An updated version of this chapter is currently forthcoming as Moravec, ‘Bergson and McTaggart’s 
Argument’. 
208 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’; McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§303-52; §521-89. 
209 By the B-series I understand the ordering of events by the relations of “before” and “after,” by the A-series the 
relations of “being past,” “being present,” and “being future.” 
210 See for example Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’; Grünbaum, ‘The Status of Temporal Becoming’. The 
accusation of putting forward the “spatialising” objection against B-theories is particularly anachronistic when 
applied to Bergson since this objection appeared after philosophy of time began to grapple with the way time was 
understood by the special theory of relativity. It is an anachronism that Bergson himself had tried to avoid: “[In 
TFW] I did in fact show that measurable Time could be considered as ‘a fourth dimension of Space.’ It was, 
naturally, a question of pure Space, and not of the mixture Space-Time of the theory of Relativity, which is quite 
another thing.” (CM 221, note 17, my italics/102, note 1) 
211 See for example Williams, ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’; A much more nuanced assessment of 
Bergson’s philosophical framework can be found in Deppe, ‘The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure 
of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-Theorists)’. 
212 See Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox. 
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recently become rather difficult and many of the concerns that have traditionally served as 
criteria to distinguish them (e.g., the question about the reducibility of tense or entailment of a 
particular temporal ontology) are now extremely hard to pinpoint with precision.213 On the other 
hand, I will not confront Bergson’s philosophy with the whole of McTaggart’s neo-Hegelian 
system and discussions about time that figure in it.214 McTaggart’s paradox proposes a real 
philosophical problem regardless of its setting within neo-Hegelianism (analytic philosophy 
has always treated it as such) and the fact that many of the notions that McTaggart operates 
with (especially the way he understands the C-series and/or eternity in The Nature of 
Existence215) have little, if any relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of time. Instead, 
I provide a Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s paradox as it was presented in “The Unreality 
of Time” from 1908. This should not only allow me partially to ignore questions about, for 
example, the truth-makers for propositions, or the status of tenseless language216 but also to 
diagnose certain problems with the way time was understood by McTaggart — problems which 
were later carried over into contemporary A- and B-debates.217 
 For the sake of clarity, this chapter will operate with the following two terms which are 
based on the overall framework of Bergson’s philosophy presented in the previous chapter: 
 
213 See particularly Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 22–25; Williams, ‘The Metaphysics of A- and B-Time’; 
Williams, ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’. 
214 For an excellent discussion, see Thomas, ‘British Idealist Monadologies and the Reality of Time: Hilda 
Oakeley against McTaggart, Leibniz and Others’. 
215 There is a significant shift between the role that the C-series plays in the constitution of the B-series in 
McTaggart’s system. In the “Unreality of Time,” McTaggart implies that the C-series has no intrinsic direction 
and merely determines the order of things. In The Nature of Existence, he argues that the C-series has some sort 
of direction, although this “direction” is not a temporal one (see McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 426; 
McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§351, §526; Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 54–56.). Bardon argues 
that the C-series  — at least in “The Unreality of Time” — is roughly analogous to the English alphabet – its 
members are ordered (i.e., “B” comes between “A” and “C” regardless of whether we read the alphabet from A 
to Z or backwards), but although we are used to reading it in a particular direction (A, B, C…), there is nothing 
intrinsically directional about it: no contradiction would arise if we were to read it backwards (Z, Y, X…) (Bardon, 
A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time, 122.). 
216 Ingthorsson insists that the questions that now dominate the A- and B-debates were completely alien to those 
of McTaggart (Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 60–76.). For an example of the shift from time as an 
ontological problem to a problem of philosophy of language, see Prior, ‘Changes in Events and Changes in 
Things’.  
217 Bergson never interacted with McTaggart’s argument. F. C. T. Moore attributes this silence to the fact that 
McTaggart’s “Unreality of Time” (1908) was published long after TFW and MM, which deal with the major 
issues proposed by McTaggart. (Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 54.) Nothing suggests that Bergson and 
McTaggart met during Bergson’s visit to Cambridge in 1920 (when McTaggart was still a fellow at Trinity 
College) to receive an honorary doctorate. There are no mentions of who suggested Bergson for the degree, no 
mentions of Bergson’s visit in the minute book of the Special Board of Moral Science or the Moral Sciences Club, 
both of which are stored in the Cambridge University Library. For details of the award of Bergson’s honorary 
degree, see the Cambridge University Reporter, 25th May 1920, p. 1021; 19th June 1920, pp. 1175-1180. 
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 By “objective time” I understand the medium applicable to objects in the external 
world, the “array of possible ways … in which [two objects] a and b can fail to be in contact 
when in the same place,”218 regardless of the presence of the human mind. Objective time is the 
medium discussed in physics and mathematics whose values are denoted by the variable “t.”  
The nature of objective time is what A- and B-theorists disagree about; it is quantifiable, 
divisible into instants and segments, sharing many (though not all) properties with space,219 
representable diagrammatically and allowing, in the vast majority of cases, of clear cut-offs 
between temporally extended objects that exist in it. Objective time carries with it a particular 
notion of change, Russellian change, which I take, following Mellor, to consist of “things 
having, at different times, incompatible properties, i.e., properties that no one thing could have 
at the same time.”220 
 By “la durée” I understand what is sometimes referred to as “subjective time,” the 
internal flux of consciousness immediately accessible by phenomenological introspection,221 
regardless of the presence of the external world. As the previous chapter has demonstrated, 
la durée is indivisible, unquantifiable, indescribable by literal language, constantly changing, 
and not allowing of clear-cut distinctions between its “areas” or “segments.” Bergson’s 
description of la durée entails a particular definition of change, which will here be understood 
as the qualitative heterogeneous development of consciousness described earlier (see 
section 1.2). 
 As we will see, the lack of a clear distinction between the two notions — to which, 
arguably, Bergson is guilty of having contributed by talking of “Real Time,”222 which he 
understood as la durée and contrasted with “spatialised time” — has led to the ongoingly-
perpetuated confusion of regarding Bergson as an A-theorist; where Bergson talked about la 
durée, the B-theorists have taken him to refer to external measurable objective time. 
 
218 Mellor, Mind, Meaning, and Reality, 163–64. 
219 For a discussion of which of these properties may be shared, see Schlesinger, ‘The Similarities Between Space 
and Time’. 
220 Mellor, Mind, Meaning, and Reality, 169. 
221 I leave undiscussed the specific details of this introspection. Bergson himself is surprisingly silent about this 
and a thorough account of “introspection” and “awareness” applicable to la durée is yet to be elaborated. A good 
framework for starting this engagement would be Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in 
Conscious Experience, 28–59. 
222 Maritain frequently stresses the “negative power” of la durée, that is, its ability to reject the reduction of all 
temporality to the time available in physics: “Real time is not the spatialized time of our physics; and this is true 
indeed, for the various times of the physicist are mathematical entities which are built up on complex patterns of 
spatio-temporal measurement, and which are doubtless based on real time, but are not that time.” (Maritain, 
Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, 306.) 
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2.1. McTaggart’s Argument 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to provide a discussion of the metaphysics, methodology, 
and structure of McTaggart’s paradox. It has also been done elsewhere in much more detail.223 
This section will merely focus on three key claims that McTaggart’s argument rests on. The 
next section will provide a Bergsonian response to each one of them. 
 Claim 1: There is no change in the B-series. McTaggart argues that the “earlier than” 
and “later than” determinations of the B-series are insufficient to constitute change, which is a 
necessary condition of time’s being time: 
If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will always be, and has always 
been, earlier than O and later than M, since the relations of earlier and later are 
permanent. And as, by our present hypothesis, time is constituted by a B series 
alone, N will always have a position in a time series, and has always had one.224 
Furthermore, McTaggart, disputing Russell’s theory of change,225 claims that if we try to look 
for change in the “numerically different moments of absolute time, supposing such moments 
exist,”226 we will not find it there, since those moments of absolute time themselves do not 
change. The individual points of absolute time are related to each other by permanent relations 
and arranged in a sequence which, itself, does not change. 
 Claim 2: The relations of past, present and future are mutually incompatible. 
McTaggart argues that “past, present and future are incompatible determinations.”227 It is 
important to point out that, contrary to the way that McTaggart’s paradox is usually understood, 
in his metaphysical system “past,” “present,” and “future” are not considered as monadic 
qualities predicated of individual substances,228 but as relations — although it remains unclear 
what they are supposed to be relations to.229 Ingthorsson comments: 
Although McTaggart explicitly states that he takes future, present, and past to be 
relations, he is often accused of treating them as monadic properties. It is difficult 
 
223 See for example Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox; Dummett, ‘A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the 
Unreality of Time’; Mellor, ‘The Unreality of Tense’; Dainton, Time and Space, 13–26. 
224 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 459; McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§313, §315, §324; 
Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 38–40. 
225 See McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§318. 
226 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 460. 
227 McTaggart, 468. 
228 See McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§326; McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 467–68. 
229 See Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 44; Dainton, Time and Space, 19. 
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to understand from where this misunderstanding derives, because he is quite 
explicit in his own claims. … I am inclined to think that the myth that McTaggart 
treats tenses as monadic properties owes its existence, originally, from a tendency 
— on behalf of commentators — to read expressions of the form “M is present, 
has been future, will be past” as inevitably implying some form of subject-
predicate structure and to assume that every such predicate must denote a 
monadic property … . Those who are acquainted … with McTaggart’s argument 
through commentaries then propagate the myth.230 
As a matter of fact, McTaggart himself briefly considers the possibility that these 
determinations could be monadic qualities and not relations,231 but notes that the same problem 
with regards to the contradiction in the A-series would also apply: 
If the characteristics of the A series were qualities, the same difficulty would arise 
as if they were relations. For, as before, they are not compatible, and, as before, 
every event has all of them. This can only be explained, as before, by saying that 
each event has them successively. And thus the same fallacy would have been 
committed as in the previous case.232 
 Claim 3: Time is unreal. Based on the fact that the A-series is both required for change 
(and therefore time) and that it is self-contradictory,233 McTaggart concludes that time is unreal: 
[McTaggart’s] conclusion is that he can decidedly prove that [the two aspects, A-
series and B-series] cannot be reconciled as real characteristics of Reality because 
any attempt to do so will inevitably lead to contradiction. Instead, they can only 
be reconciled as Reality and Appearance, i.e., that Reality is Absolute while 
appearing to be Temporal. … . In other words, a contradiction emerges only if 
one accepts the Hegelian characterisation of an Absolute Reality … and 
nevertheless tries to construe a concept of such a reality as also being Temporal.234 
 
230 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 44–45. 
231 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 469. 
232 McTaggart, 469–70. 
233 See McTaggart, 468–70. 
234 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 7. 
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2.2. La Durée, Memory, and Time 
In a frequently overlooked footnote in the second volume of The Nature of Existence, 
McTaggart offers the following distinction: 
By objectively real time, I mean a common time in which all existent things exist, 
so that they stand in temporal relations to each other. By subjectively real time, 
I mean one in which only the different states of a single self exist, so that it does 
not connect any self with anything outside it.235 
Refuting the claim that “we are so immediately certain of the reality of time, that the certainty 
exceeds any certainty which can possibly be produced by arguments to the contrary,”236 
McTaggart contends instead that “… any theory which treated time as objectively real could 
only do so by treating time, as we observe it, as being either unreal or merely subjective.”237 
The Bergson-style response to the paradox proposed below — resting on the distinction 
between objective time and subjective time (equated with la durée) — will, on the contrary, 
propose that (i) time “as we observe it” (coextensive with la durée) is real and not subject to 
the contradiction and that (ii) la durée plays a constitutive role in the way that our temporally-
objective concepts are built. This reverses the relation between objective and subjective time 
stipulated by McTaggart; objective time is secondary. Subjective time qua durée is not an 
illusory side-effect of objective time,238 rather, it is the bedrock on which objective time is 
constructed. 
 The relation between la durée and objective time in TFW can be plotted onto the 
following threefold sequence of dependence, which moves in direct opposition to McTaggart’s 
claim that the timeless objective C-series, as a feature of Absolute Reality, is primary in the 
order of existence, and that it grounds the B-series and the A-series in Reality as Appearance.239 
 (i) At the deepest level, la durée is the immediately accessible stream of mental states, 
in which memories of past states are retained240 and have an effect on the qualitative nature of 
 
235 McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§343, footnote 1. 
236 McTaggart, 2:§342. 
237 McTaggart, 2:§343. 
238 Mellor: “The fact is that temporal, personal, and spatial A-concepts all depend on the corresponding B-
concepts, not the other way round.” (Mellor, Mind, Meaning, and Reality, 173.) 
239 McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§526. 
240 Bergson does not provide many details of how this “retention” is supposed to work. For a non-Bergsonian 
account, see Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 123–27. For 
Dainton’s attempt at linking the standard accounts of “retention” and “extension” to Bergson, see Dainton, 
‘Bergson on Temporal Experience and Durée Réelle’. 
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the ones that follow (see section 1.2). The retention of memories that we carry with us and their 
blending with the present gives us an immediate qualitative perception of change. In this 
respect, Bergson would have once again been in complete agreement with J. R. Lucas who 
asserts that the (rather nebulous and confused) qualitative changes in our stream of 
consciousness are in themselves sufficient to instantiate temporality.241 Even if a philosopher 
completely banished time from the external world, he could not imagine the existence of 
a consciousness that would not, itself, instantiate an example of something that is intrinsically 
temporal. Bergson’s point is much stronger than claiming that la durée necessarily represents 
temporality — rather, he claims that la durée is itself necessarily an ontological instantiation 
of it.242 Or, on other words, the moment we imagine a possible world with consciousness in it 
(even if it were a consciousness existing as a disembodied spirit), in that very act, necessarily, 
we must imagine that in that possible world there exists something temporal. The intuition of 
a close link between temporality and consciousness, a link that is for Bergson equivalent to 
identity, is also what lies behind the frequent intuition of theologians that God, if He is to be 
conscious, may well exist outside of space (in the sense that his existence would not be limited 
or would not display the usual properties associated with spatial objects), but certainly may not 
exist outside of time (i.e., He must display at least some of the properties associated with 
objects existing in time).243 
 The inseparable link between temporality and consciousness is a point that McTaggart 
himself concedes; he accepts that our mental states cannot fail to appear to be in time, even 
when we doubt the existence of material reality.244 Of course, McTaggart argues that we should 
beware of treating experience as reliable evidence for the nature of reality,245 but this does not 
prevent us from treating experience as reliable evidence for that very experience itself. We may 
not infer from the fact that, for example, we experience a particular object as present that it is 
present (perceiving a star hundreds of lightyears away is a good example246), but we can surely 
 
241 Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §2. 
242 While it is difficult to fit Bergson into the absolutist/relationist distinction about time, if “time” is taken as la 
durée, then time is utterly dependent on events in it, i.e., Bergson is a relationist. For a detailed discussion, see Le 
Poidevin, ‘Relationism and Temporal Ontology: Physics or Metaphysics?’ 
243 See Pike, God and Timelessness, 121–30. 
244 See McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§303-4; Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 30. 
245 See Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 52. 
246 For an excellent discussion of what it means to perceive something as present, see Butterfield, ‘Seeing the 
Present’. Mellor: “… [T]he idea that we see events as present comes from confusing what we see with the 
experience of seeing it, which is indeed always present. … While as for what we see, that never looks present — 
or past, or future. We cannot for example see which of two celestial events is the earlier by seeing which looks 
more past.” (Mellor, Mind, Meaning, and Reality, 174.) 
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infer that our experience itself is present. To use an analogy, our immediate phenomenological 
evidence of tasting an apple gives us no grounds for inferring that we are eating an apple, but 
we may be certain about the phenomenological experience itself, i.e., we may be certain that 
our experience itself is apple-like: “Since the phenomenal is the realm of appearance, if 
experience seems to exhibit flow and passage, it does.”247 Similarly, la durée gives us an 
immediate experience of change and development, which serves as evidence for change at least 
“in our heads.” Introspecting ourselves, we feel that more and more present experiences are 
added to the overall sum of our memory which, in turn, affects the nature of present experience, 
even if this does not yet give us grounds for inferring that there is change in the external world. 
The hole that McTaggart digs himself into by positing a subject and simultaneously affirming 
the unreality of time is brilliantly captured by Dummett: 
[The conclusion that time is unreal] seems self-refuting in something of the way 
in which, as McTaggart himself points out, the view that evil is an illusion is self-
refuting: that is, if there is no evil, the illusion that there is evil is certainly evil. 
… Clearly, even if the world is really static, our apprehension of it changes. It 
does not help to say that we are even mistaken about what we think we see, 
because the fact would remain that we still make different mistakes at different 
times.248 
 (ii) At the second level, apart from giving us an immediate experience of qualitative 
change, la durée, in virtue of being the seat of memory, provides the synthesis required for our 
mind to retain external events, thereby enabling us to attribute temporality to the external 
world,249 as is illustrated by the example with the pendulum discussed earlier (see section 1.2). 
Bergson thus follows Kant in iterating a radical mind-dependence of time. “If there is no 
change in consciousness, there is no time.”250 Time is born at the point where our internal 
development of consciousness “comes into contact with the external world at its surface; 
… .”251 This is in direct agreement with Lucas’ earlier-quoted insistence that the crucial 
 
247 Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 178. 
248 Dummett, ‘A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time’, 503. Dainton: “How could we directly 
experience change and persistence unless experience itself encompasses a temporal interval?” (Dainton, Stream 
of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 114.) 
249 See for example HIT 79; EPL 339. Bergson does not think that this “synthesis” is a simple “glueing together” 
of distinct elements since these elements are only retrospectively identified as having been distinct. The unity of 
la durée is primary, before we start talking about it as being synthetic. 
250 “… quand il n’y a pas de changement dans la conscience il n’y a plus de temps.” (HIT 160, my translation.) 
251 TFW 163-4/123. 
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difference between time and space is that only the latter can exist without reference to the 
human mind.252 Curiously enough, failing to realise this is precisely what McTaggart himself 
got criticised for by H. Oakeley: it is not only the case that without the presence of the human 
mind there is no experience of time but also that as soon as we stipulate the existence of the 
self, the experience of time inevitably follows:  
McTaggart’s conception of the experience of the self is in essence incompatible 
with the unreality of time. His logical argument for treating the perception of the 
temporal as error is based on the assumption that time is inseparable from change. 
I would suggest — in general agreement with M. Bergson, though from a 
somewhat different point of view — that it is impossible to separate the thought 
of existence from the condition of time as duration, … .253 
The idea, shared by Kant, Oakeley, Bergson, and Lucas, that the existence of a conscious 
human mind with memory is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for temporality, has 
most recently been forcefully defended by Adrian Bardon. Bardon, appealing to Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, contends that although some have considered the experience of 
temporal passage to be a projection,254 that is, “[the act of] mistakenly representing some 
subjective phenomenal quality as instantiated in physical space or as belonging to an external 
object,”255 it is a special kind of projection, one without which our grasp on the world would 
be impossible:  
In the very first version of his Transcendental Deduction, [Kant] points out that 
the representation of any extended process or enduring object, or any coherent 
experience whatsoever, would be impossible if one forgot all one’s experiences 
from one moment to the next, or failed to recognize that the perceptions one 
retains have been progressively combined.256 
Although Bergson of course radically disagreed with Kant about the nature of temporality that 
lies at the bottom of our conscious experience (recall section 1.2: for Kant, the time of the 
synthesising consciousness is homogeneous and schematisable by counting, whereas for 
 
252 Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §7. 
253 Oakeley, ‘Time and the Self in McTaggart’s System’, 182. 
254 See Falk, ‘Perceiving Temporal Passage: An Indicator of the Nature of Consciousness’, 116. 
255 Bardon, ‘Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant’, 61; see also Bardon, A Brief History of the 
Philosophy of Time, 102. 
256 Bardon, ‘Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant’, 68; see also Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
A102-103; Wolff, ‘A Reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction’, 116. 
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Bergson it is heterogeneous and radically non-numerical), he agreed that the presence of 
memory is necessary for the existence of time. This follows regardless of whether we think of 
consciousness as the homogeneous a priori condition of sensibility in the case of Kant or as 
the heterogeneous flux of la durée in the case of Bergson.257 The following comment by R. P. 
Wolff regarding the role that memory plays in counting for Kant applies equally to Bergson’s 
earlier-discussed example of counting sheep: 
When I count a row of twelve stones, I look at the first one and say “one.” Then 
I look at the second, think of the first, and say “two” … . The process is repeated 
up to “twelve,” at which time I am aware of myself as having performed a series 
of connected acts. If I merely found myself saying “twelve” after a while, or if 
I could recall previous utterances of “one,” etc., but didn’t recognize them as the 
earlier stages of a single activity whose culmination was the “twelve,” then I 
could not know that I had just counted twelve objects. … .258 
 (iii) Finally, at the third level, once we have moved from the immediate perception of 
change in la durée to the synthesis of mental states as memories of external events to establish 
temporality, the mind looks back at the trace of la durée in our memory to identify distinct 
events juxtaposed next to each other and accessible to consciousness at once, similarly to the 
way that a historian has direct and immediate access to successive events in the past.259 This 
fixation and identification of distinct temporal positions can only be “achieved on the fixed 
memory of the duration [la durée], on the immobile track the mobility of the duration [la durée] 
leaves behind it, not on the duration [la durée] itself.”260 From this arrangement of temporal 
positions we remove the changing flux of our immediate experience of time. Deppe provides 
a helpful elucidation of this by observing the relationship between a melody and a sheet of 
music: a particular melody can be converted to the sheet of music that represents it for practical 
purposes, but something crucial is lost — namely, the experience of listening to the music, 
which is qualitatively different from the experience of reading the melody recorded (or rather 
 
257 Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Bergson and the Time of Life, 35. 
258 Wolff, ‘A Reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction’, 116; see also Bardon, ‘Time-
Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant’, 69; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A103. 
259 This illustration comes from Katherin Rogers: “Augustine proposes that God’s knowledge of the future and, 
presumably, of all time, is like our knowledge of the past. In a way, even the limited human knower can encompass 
an extended period of time in a single, present thought. Consider ‘the Norman Conquest.’ In a single concept we 
capture the crossing of the Channel, Stamford Bridge, Hastings, etc.” (Rogers, ‘Eternity Has No Duration’, 15.) 
260 CM 141/189. 
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the melody which has been recorded) on the sheet.261 We convert “… experienced successivity 
and continuous emergence of moments into ordered and easily accessible juxtaposition in a 
similar way that a sheet of music does with a melody.”262 Furthermore, we extrapolate the 
structure that underlies the series of past events in our consciousness into the future — a series 
of events e-3, e-2, e-1 etc., with e0 as our presently experienced event, is believed to continue 
into the future as e1, e2, e3 etc. I leave it open whether this particular series e-3-e3 corresponds 
to the B-series or the C-series (see footnote 215); either way, each of these is by McTaggart 
considered to be non-temporal since nothing changes in it. The phenomenological aspect of the 
B-series and the C-series is similar to the phenomenological experience of states retained in 
our memory, states which “stand permanently in transitive and asymmetric relations to each 
other, but those relations [do] not deserve to be called temporal relations because they are not 
associated with any kind of change.”263   
 As has been mentioned earlier, for Bergson the conception of a series that is based on 
the way that our mind structures the past and extrapolates the ensuing structure into the future 
is primarily driven by practical utility.264 Nevertheless, he would re-iterate that metaphysically, 
the following threefold sequence cannot be reversed: 
(i) la durée 
(ii) the synthesis of the mental states in la durée related to the events in the external world 
we are contemplating and then, once they have become past, spatially representing 
(iii) the removal of the phenomenologically characteristic features of qualitative change 
of the (i)-stage 
Whilst we can conceive of events in the four-dimensional space-time block as existing without 
the experience of the human mind, our ability to imagine this four-dimensional block in the 
 
261 Bergson: “That time implies succession I do not deny. But that succession is first presented to our 
consciousness, like the distinction of a ‘before’ and ‘after’ set side by side, is what I cannot admit. When we listen 
to a melody we have the purest impression of succession we could possibly have … and yet it is the very continuity 
of the melody and the impossibility of breaking it up which make that impression on us.” (CM 124/166.) 
262 Deppe, ‘The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-
Theorists)’, 121. 
263 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 35. Ingthorsson’s phrase “associated with” is slightly misleading — they 
are “associated with” change in that the positions play a role in McTaggart’s theory of error and the C-series. 
A better way of putting it is that “they do not deserve to be called temporal relations because they themselves do 
not change.” 
264 See for example CM 64/89. 
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first place requires the process of mental retention of past events in our own experience and 
the extrapolation of the relations that underlie them across the space-time block. As Deppe 
argues, although the A-series determinations are usually thought of as being more 
perspicuously related to the human mind, the B-series ones nevertheless also require the prior 
mental synthesis of events and thus cannot be separated from the existence of the mind.265 
Mind-dependence, therefore, cannot be used as a conclusive criterion to distinguish between 
the A-series and the B-series, as they are both mind-dependent in one way or another — the 
A-series directly, the B-series derivatively.266 It must be stressed, therefore, that the following 
remark on Bergson’s philosophy by D. C. Williams is deeply mistaken: 
He [the temporalist, i.e, Bergson] is more likely to mean … that over and above 
the sheer spread of events, with their several qualities, along the time axis, which 
is analogous enough to the spread of space, there is something extra, something 
active and dynamic, which is often and perhaps best described as “passage.”267 
The order of dependence for Bergson is exactly the opposite: it is not the case that we start with 
a spread of events in a four-dimensional continuum and then seek to “add” passage, temporal 
“now,” or direction into it, but rather, we must start with the qualitative and perhaps confused 
sense of irreversible temporal passage and then use this as a bedrock on which to create the 
logical construct of the four-dimensional block.  
 Now, it could be argued that criticising McTaggart for failing to see that our immediate 
subject-dependent feeling of passage comes before the B-series rests merely on a superficial 
reading of his texts. In another neglected footnote of The Nature of Existence, McTaggart 
explicitly states that the notion of passage in the A-series has to be present to us before we may 
start to construct the B-series:  
We cannot have time without change, and the only possible change is from future 
to present, and from present to past. Thus until the terms are taken as passing 
from future to present, and from present to past, they cannot be taken as in time, 
or as earlier and later; and not only the conception of presentness, but those of 
 
265 See Deppe, ‘The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say 
to B-Theorists)’. 
266 The precise sense of this “mind-dependence” will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
267 Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 460. 
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pastness and futurity, must be reached before the conceptions of earlier and later, 
and not vice versa.268 
Does this mean that McTaggart anticipates Bergson’s view that la durée must come before the 
B-series? It must be stressed that the A-series and la durée are two different things. As we will 
see in section 2.4, la durée is more fundamental than the A-series, as the separation of the 
temporal manifold into distinct events required by the A-series can only be accomplished once 
we have made the move to spatialised time. The Bergsonian “passage” is construed as la durée 
(i.e., indivisible, gradual, heterogeneous etc.), the McTaggartian “passage” is already indexed 
to distinct, divided, discontinuous events to which relations of future and past apply. 
 By combining the premise that the A-series results in a contradiction with the premise 
that the B-series is non-temporal, McTaggart concluded that time is unreal. Nevertheless, he 
believed that the atemporal C-series underlying these is real and not subject to the conditions 
of Appearance: “There is nevertheless a real series of constituents that stand in linear, 
asymmetric, and transitive relations that gives the series a sense of direction (but ultimately a 
sense that will be misperceived as temporal). This series is the C-series.”269 Nevertheless, as 
Ingthorsson observes, the attempt to exclude the purely apparent temporal progress — 
furnished by the consciousness of an experiencing subject — from Absolute Reality, thereby 
ignoring the role that our mind plays in establishing objective time, McTaggart ends up with 
another rather embarrassing paradox: 
The C series is presented as a series of discrete entities between which there hold 
the external relations of “inclusive of” and “inclusive in” relations, and there is 
nothing in this model which would explain why each of the terms of this series 
would appear to have the characteristic of being a state of one and the same self 
which is progressing through a series of states. Indeed, McTaggart should have 
noticed … that his model indicates the absence of a self that has experiences; it 
is a model of experiences had by nothing. We are faced with an argument that 
says that the continuity of experience can arise only if there is an enduring self.270 
 
268 McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§610, footnote 1. 
269 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 54. 
270 Ingthorsson, 59; see also Oakeley, ‘The Philosophy of Time and the Timeless in McTaggart’s Nature of 
Existence’; Oakeley, ‘Time and the Self in McTaggart’s System’. 
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2.3. A Bergsonian Response to McTaggart’s Argument 
Now that the centrality of la durée for time has been established, how can we respond to Claims 
1-3 from section 2.1? 
 Regarding Claim 1, i.e., that there is no change in the B-series, Bergson would happily 
concede this point. The B-series is a secondary structure extrapolated from la durée and 
applicable to the external world for reasons of practical utility; there is no change in it, simply 
because change proper may only be found in la durée, whereas objective time is, by its very 
nature and origin, characterised by the removal of the immediate phenomenology of change 
and the extrapolation of the structure underlying the unchangeable record of the past into the 
future, perhaps with qualifications regarding the modal status of future events. Contrary to what 
his remarks in some of his early works suggest, Bergson would not regard the existence of the 
B-series as particularly precarious — as long as we bear in mind that it is merely derivative 
and dependent on la durée. He acknowledges that there is a static realm which stems from real, 
lived temporality (he calls this realm “spatialised time” or occasionally simply “space”), but 
simply warns us against the metaphysical stumbling blocks of reducing all temporal 
phenomena to it. As Worms puts it: 
[T]he challenge of the philosophy of la durée will not consist only in criticising 
space, or in overcoming it, but also in justifying it and situating it in metaphysics, 
in a theory of knowledge and psychology, which it attempts to ground and which 
are articulated in it as in a philosophy of mind in its own right.271 
 Regarding Claim 2, i.e., that the determinations of past, present, and future are mutually 
incompatible, Bergson would have without doubt responded that McTaggart confuses la durée 
(as internal immediately accessible temporality) with objective time (as the external projected 
construct created by the human mind for practical utility). The fact that underlying 
McTaggart’s argument about a single “time” is a division between two realms that Bergson 
neatly delineates as internal temporality (la durée) and external stasis (objective time, or more 
specifically, B-time) is rather well captured by Lucas’ observation that McTaggart is subject 
to “philosophical schizophrenia:”272 “Although we can fault McTaggart’s arguments, his 
 
271 “[L]’épreuve de la philosophie de la durée ne consistera pas seulement à critiquer [l’espace], ou à le dépasser, 
mais aussi et surtout à le justifier et à le situer dans la métaphysique, la théorie de la connaissance et la psychologie 
qu’elle permet de fonder et qui s’articulent en elle comme en une philosophie de l’esprit à part entière.” (Worms, 
‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 91, my translation.) 
272 Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §52. 
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predicament is a real one. He feels the pull of Platonism, but senses that time is essentially 
unplatonic.”273 
 Now, as I have argued above, Bergson would agree with McTaggart that the B-series 
(which he would have identified with “spatialised time”) is not subject to the paradox, but at 
the same time changeless. Nevertheless, if la durée is where we should be looking for to find 
change, can we be certain that la durée is not subject to the same contradiction that McTaggart 
finds in the A-series? 
 The best way to see that la durée is conceptually immunised against McTaggart’s 
paradox is to start with thinking through his own example of the Death of Queen Anne: 
Take any event — the death of Queen Anne, for example — and consider what 
change can take place in its characteristics. That it is a death, that it is the death 
of Anne Stuart, that it has such causes, that it has such effects — every 
characteristic of this sort never changes. … But in one respect it does change. It 
began by being a future event. It became every moment an event in the nearer 
future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain so, 
though every moment it becomes further and further past.274 
Now, let us consider the characteristics of the death of Queen Anne as they figure in la durée, 
as they are directly experienced. First, when the death of Queen Anne is future, its contours are 
rather vague — we see or have heard about Queen Anne, we know she is going to die at some 
point, but we do not know what our experience of her death is going to be like, how we are 
going to respond to it emotionally, or who will be present at the death-bed. Perhaps we have 
never experienced anyone dying before. The event of her death exists in our durée as merely 
a vague anticipation of a “something” we cannot quite describe or picture to ourselves with 
much precision — not because we lack information, but purely because the event has not yet 
taken place. Second, when the death of Queen Anne is present in la durée (i.e., when it is being 
contemplated or felt by us), it is directly accessible to our consciousness — we think about it, 
we are just reading the news in the newspaper, or we are directly perceiving her final breath. 
The precise characteristics of the event (nebulous when the Queen’s death was far away) are 
being formed because they are currently happening. Finally, once it has become a memory, its 
 
273 Lucas, §52, my italics. Dainton: “In effect, [McTaggart’s] starting premise is that the world is fundamentally 
Parmenidean. He then considers whether such a world can also possess a dynamic Heraclitean character, while 
retaining its essentially timeless Parmenidean nature, and, not surprisingly, he concludes that it cannot.” (Dainton, 
Time and Space, 26.) 
274 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 460. 
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characteristics become more precise and fixed and we can describe the properties of the event 
with complete clarity. This clarity increases even further if we acquire further information 
about the event, for instance, about the number of people present at the death-bed, the cause of 
her death, or who was in a position to prevent it.  
 Straight away, three crucial points immediately strike us when considering the Death 
“from the inside” of our temporal experience: 
 First, note that the “events” of future-death, present-death and past-death in our durée 
are different from each other. The event of the death in memory is characterised by fixity, by 
a set of properties that exhaustively describe the event, and by a clear identification of causal 
chains leading up to it. The event in the future, on the other hand, is characterised by a vague 
anticipation, based on an extrapolation about already-known elements in memory (individual 
instances of “queens,” “deaths,” and of seeings of Queen Anne), but with blurry outlines. 
 Second, — and this is a point that will be explored in more detail in the final chapter 
— if we have free will, an important characteristic that distinguishes the death-as-future and 
death-as-past in our durée is the possibility of our causal contribution. The death-as-past can 
no longer be changed. The death-as-future, on the other hand, can be changed, either by our 
killing Queen Anne earlier, by finding a medicine that could save her, or by altering the 
qualitative characteristics of the event itself, perhaps by moving the dying queen to a different 
room. The idea that there are fixed and clearly defined events of which “Death of Queen Anne” 
is an example and over which glide the determinations of “future,” “present,” and “past” would 
perhaps work in a world in which we would merely exist as “big viewers” without the ability 
to change anything, but we cannot conceptualise the world in this way when our actions can 
contribute both to the existence and the character of events to come. 
 Third, Bergson would consider even the notion of an “event” of the Death of Queen 
Anne in la durée to be a metaphysically dubious entity. Not only is it susceptible to the problem 
of vagueness (Did it begin when the Queen got ill or when her heartbeat dropped to a particular 
value?), but, more importantly, its existence significantly depends on the way we use language. 
Since our previous experiences of other people’s deaths were all unique (the death of a 
statesman was different from the death of our relative) and can all be subsumed under the same 
concept (“death”), we come to believe that the phrase “Death of Queen Anne” refers to the 
same entity regardless of whether the term is considered before, after, or during her death: 
[T]he word with well-defined outlines, the rough and ready word [le mot brutal], 
which stores up the stable, common and consequently impersonal element in the 
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impressions of mankind, overwhelms or at least covers over the delicate and 
fugitive impressions of our individual consciousness.275 
But the actual impressions in la durée referred to by “Death of Queen Anne” differ depending 
on whether the event is being anticipated, experienced or remembered.276 
 Bringing all of the three points together, it seems reasonable to conclude that our durée 
contains (at different points of objective time) three distinct qualitative entities, or “substances” 
in McTaggart’s language: 
Substance1: The vague anticipation of the death of someone we know as Queen Anne, 
characterised by a certain openness (our ability to change the character of the event) and 
an extrapolation of past experiences of deaths and instances of seeing Queen Anne. This 
substance is always present, but represents the event as “future.” 
Susbtance2: The immediate experience of the death of Queen Anne. This is, trivially, 
always “present.” 
Substance3: The memory of the death of Queen Anne, that is, the precise set of properties 
that characterise the event with an exact date in B-time and fixity (our inability to change 
the character of the event). This substance is always present, but represents the event as 
“past.” 
 
275 TFW 132/98. 
276 Note that Bergson’s point is not only one about the application of rigid concepts to fluid reality, but also one 
about our being tricked by language into thinking that the objects being referred to by identical concepts are 
themselves identical. Whilst this is much easier to see with words like “sadness,” “love,” or “pain” (we intuitively 
feel that every instance of “love” is unique), Bergson claims that this is the case with all moments of la durée. 
Here, since the external event (before or after its happening) is designated by the phrase “The Death of Queen 
Anne,” we mistakenly think that the mental events of anticipating it, contemplating it, and remembering it are 
identical too. Bergson is not opposed to all conceptual thought. He is primarily concerned with specifying the 
metaphysical problems resulting from rigidly applying concepts to la durée, but within the typology of concepts, 
he distinguishes some that are more suitable than others. For more on Bergson’s discussion of “fluid concepts” 
(EPL 101; IT 104), see Bouaniche et al., ‘Dossier critique’, 436–39, note 15; Pariente, Le Langage et l’individuel, 
21–25. This goes directly against Russell’s earlier accusation of “anti-intellectualism.” Bergson explicitly says: 
“I claim that this work [i.e., delving into intuition] of the spirit which transcends logic must not be illogical, and 
must always be able to reduce the largest part of our own selves to logical terms in such a way that there will 
always be in this work something clearly expressible and communicable, and something, a small part, almost 
nothing, and, however, the most important [part], which cannot be communicated, … .” (“Ce que je prétends c’est 
que ce travail de l’esprit qui transcende la logique, ne doit pas être illogique, et doit pouvoir toujours réduire la 
plus grande partie de nous-mêmes en termes logiques ; de telle sorte qu’il y a toujours dans ce travail quelque 
chose de clairement exprimable et communicable, et quelque chose, peu de chose, presque rien, et cependant le 
plus important, qui ne se pourra pas communiquer, … .” (IT 82, my translation.) 
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These three are different substances, composed of pure qualities in la durée. And now we move 
to the crucial step in the Bergsonian response to McTaggart’s paradox. If Substance1, 
Substance2 and Substance3 are different in la durée, then there is no one thing to which the 
three determinations could attach and thus generate a contradiction. Of course, there is the 
event of the death of Queen Anne described in objective-time terms but that does not concern 
us here, since we have already conceded that objective time should be analysed using the non-
contradictory B-series terms, and not the A-series ones. Here we are talking merely about la 
durée. McTaggart insists that 
… changes must happen to the events of such a nature that the occurrence of these 
changes does not hinder the events from being events, and the same events, both 
before and after the change.277 
However, when this dictum is applied to la durée (and not events in the external world, say, 
the rising of the moon, to use McTaggart’ original example278), it becomes clear that the mental 
“event” of the death of Queen Anne is different before being experienced and after being 
experienced, simply because the “event” is constituted by different pure qualities in each case. 
To use an analogy: when reading a detective story, the objective order of words on the pages 
of the book remains the same before and after reading it. But once we have read it, the 
qualitative impression of reading the same order of words for the second time is different, since, 
for example, we now know who the murderer is and cannot regard their character without 
constantly thinking that they are about to kill someone. 
 By shifting to the contents of subjectively experienced time (la durée), which is 
composed of pure qualities, we see that anticipations of objective-time events, their 
experiences, and memories do not have the same qualities and are thus not the same “things.” 
Of course, the events being anticipated, experienced, etc. may have identical descriptions in 
objective time, but, as McTaggart has shown, external time (or B-time) is immune from 
contradiction — although it does not seem to satisfy his intuitive conception of what “change” 
should consist of.  
 Symptomatic of McTaggart’s confusion is the fact that he used an example of an event 
in his own past (namely, the Death of Queen Anne). One can see that he has been tricked by 
the retrospective illusion (i.e., the view that in la durée future possibilities in the present are 
 
277 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 460. 
278 McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, 2:§337-8. 
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qualitatively identical to their past recognition in our memory (see section 1.2)) pertaining to 
his own experience of the Death of Queen Anne — which was entirely in his past — into taking 
the event as fixed, precisely defined (see quote above about “every characteristic of this thought 
never changes”) and then imagining placing himself at different points of the time-axis either 
before, at, or after the event. Similarly, we can place ourselves, mentally, before reading the 
detective story and after reading it, and designate the substance of the reading by a single word 
“detective story,” but this merely obscures the fact that, in la durée, this substance was 
something completely different before the reading (e.g., vague anticipation about who the 
murderer might be) than it was after the reading. The anticipation is replaced by a perception, 
which is replaced by memory. Had McTaggart used an event that was actually future for him 
(say, the death of Bertrand Russell), one would be surprised to see him maintain “[t]hat it is a 
death, that it is the death of [Bertrand Russell], that it has such causes, that it has such effects 
— every characteristic of this sort never changes.”  
 The fact that McTaggart falls prey to the illusion of retrospectivity is also evidenced by 
the role he accords to the C-series. Both in the Nature of Existence and in “The Relation of 
Time and Eternity” from 1909,279 McTaggart seems to think of the entirety of the C-series (the 
whole of past, present, and future) as somehow like our own past — the C-series is simply the 
totality of time considered as completed, unchangeable and unchanging. Ingthorsson 
comments: 
In McTaggart’s view, the last stage of the C series is a mental stage which is 
inclusive of all previous stages of the universe but is not itself included in any 
further stages, … . At that point, the illusion of passage is lifted and we will 
indeed be aware of reality, sub specie aeternitatis, as the complete and perfect 
whole he indeed believes it to be.280 
Recall again that the idea that the future is already “there,” waiting for our durée to reach, the 
idea that the future is existent from an ontological point of view but inaccessible epistemically, 
is precisely what Bergson cautions against: “[W]e imagine that everything which occurs could 
have been foreseen by any sufficiently informed mind, and that, in the form of an idea, it was 
thus pre-existent to its realization.”281 Of course, the question of whether this is true of the 
 
279 McTaggart, ‘The Relation of Time and Eternity’. 
280 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 70. 
281 CM 10-11/13-14. The most extreme version of this can be found in Williams who claims that “… each of us 
proceeds through time only as a fence proceeds across a farm: that is, part of our being, and the fence’s, occupy 
successive instants and points, respectively.” (Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 463.) 
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external world of objects depends much on the question of determinism and determinateness 
in the universe, which will be put aside until the final chapter. Nevertheless, it is manifestly 
true when applied to la durée, which is immediately accessible and not subject to the separation 
of epistemology and ontology. It is what it appears to be: as Worms emphasises, the “immediate 
data of consciousness” in TFW’s subtitle must be thought of as data of consciousness (i.e., 
composing consciousness), not being given to consciousness.282 What is preventing us from 
knowing what the weather will be like tomorrow is perhaps lack of information about today’s 
and yesterday’s weather and the laws of meteorology; what is preventing us from knowing the 
qualitative impression that tomorrow’s weather will make on us is the necessity to live up 
through all of the development of our consciousness which will impact the way we feel about 
tomorrow’s weather, “because [our] state tomorrow will include all the life [we] will have lived 
up until that moment.”283 
 McTaggart defined an event as the “content of a position in time,”284 but, once we 
stipulate two different realms (la durée and objective time of the B-series), “time” in this 
definition becomes ambiguous. If “time” is understood as external objective time, then, without 
the presence of human beings, the contents of all events represented in it are indeed somewhat 
“static” — but, as McTaggart claims, this does not lead to a contradiction. If, on the other hand, 
“time” is taken as la durée, then the purely qualitative contents that this durée takes at different 
positions of objective time clearly change, in which case they are to be regarded, as has been 
argued above, as different events. And since they are different events, no contradiction arises 
from attaching the same determinations to them — as is in fact the case with the determination 
of “presentness.” 
 As a matter of fact, McTaggart himself almost reaches a similar conclusion, although 
without the delineation of objective time and la durée. Regrettably, the point is also made in a 
completely different context, in the section of the paper where he argues against the claim that 
“past,” “present,” and “future” are not relations, but qualities (see section 2.1): 
No doubt my anticipation of an experience M, the experience itself, and the 
memory of the experience are three states which have different qualities. But it is 
 
282 Worms, ‘Présentation’, 9. Barnard: “Durée is accessed through a subtle intuitive introspective awareness, not 
simply as the contents of our consciousness, but rather as the dynamic essence of who we really are, both the inner 
knower and what that inner knower knows.” (Barnard, Living Consciousness. The Metaphysical Vision of Henri 
Bergson, 7.) 
283 CM 8/11. 
284 McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 458. 
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not the future M, the present M, and the past M, which have these three different 
qualities. The qualities are possessed by three distinct events — the anticipation 
of M, the experience of M itself, and the memory of M, each of which is in turn 
future, present, and past.285 
This observation coheres perfectly with what I have been arguing for, with the sole exception 
that the last phrase of McTaggart’s quotation should be rephrased as “…and the memory of M, 
each of which is earlier or later than the others.” 
 McTaggart simply uses this to conclude that “… this gives no support to the view that 
the changes of the A series are changes of qualities”286 and does not discuss the matter further, 
but it must be re-iterated, following the analysis of the three different substances or contents 
denoted by the single phrase “Death of Queen Anne” from above, that it is incorrect to say that 
each of the events in la durée is in turn future, present and past. The “anticipation of M” is 
never past — the “something,” which is presently anticipated is always future, although it can 
retrospectively be regarded as having been anticipated. Similarly, the “experience of M” is 
never future, although, of course, it can be regarded as having been future once it is past. 
 Now, a significant objection may be proposed against the view that la durée escapes 
the contradiction that McTaggart finds in the A-series. Recall that the Bergsonian response 
relied on the fact that la durée is primarily construed as unceasing novelty: every “moment” 
(and, of course, Bergson would speak of “moments” of consciousness only very cautiously) of 
la durée is different. The “Death of Queen Anne anticipated” is qualitatively different from 
“The Death of Queen Anne experienced,” which, in turn, differs from “The Death of Queen 
Anne remembered.” But this seems to pose the following rather strange dilemma: either what 
I have said above is wrong and the three “contents” of la durée (or “substances” to use 
McTaggart’s language) are identical, in which case McTaggart’s paradox ensues. 
Alternatively, what I have said above is correct and the “three deaths” are different, but in that 
case, a particular problem arises for episodic memory.287 If the three substances are not the 
same, how are we able to keep track of the same event through time? How do we know that 
the current perception, the memory, and anticipation relate to the same event? Note that 
appealing to the Bergsonian emphasis on the radical difference between events-qua-anticipated 
and events-qua-remembered is not sufficient to respond to the paradox since McTaggart’s 
 
285 McTaggart, 469. 
286 McTaggart, 469. 
287 For a discussion, see Le Poidevin, The Images of Time. An Essay on Temporal Representation, 57–62. 
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contradiction gets off the ground even if only two of the determinations (past and present) are 
attached to the same event. So either they attach to the same event in la durée — in which case 
la durée is subject to the contradiction as much as A-series is — or they do not, in which case 
we are unable to keep track of changes through time. 
 Bergsonian philosophy offers two possible solutions to this problem. The first option is 
to appeal to Bergson’s rather complex theory of memory and perception from MM. In MM, 
using the concept of “images,” he offers a sophisticated account of how the qualitative 
development of la durée, always different at every point in its content, is nevertheless able to 
relate to identical objects in the external world perceived previously. Unfortunately, a thorough 
account of this response is far beyond the scope of this study.288 However, for the present 
purposes, there is another easier way out of this conundrum, which Bergson develops in length 
in IT. One could respond by clarifying that although la durée is pure heterogeneous quality and 
so it is indeed the case that every “part” of it is different from another, this does not mean that 
we are unable to generalise over the pure qualitative substratum. Although there are three 
different substances, they present enough similarities to warrant our ability to track them 
through time.289 The three substances are different, but not completely different. As Bergson 
says: 
In one sense, nothing resembles anything, since all objects are different. In 
another sense everything resembles everything, since one will always find, by 
climbing enough on the ladder of generalities, some artificial genus into which 
two different objects taken at random can go.290 
This means that although the contents of our durée are always different (and thus exclude the 
possibility of the same relation being attached to every moment in it), they may nevertheless 
be sufficiently similar to allow our recognition. For instance, two triangle-shaped objects may 
all be sufficiently similar to allow us to call them “triangles,” but still differ in the totality of 
their qualities: by one being, say, green and another red, or by one being wonkier than the other. 
Similarly, “the Death of Queen Anne experienced” is fundamentally different from “the Death 
of Queen Anne remembered,” but similar enough to warrant our recognition — if nothing else 
then at least by the fact that we refer to each by the same set of words. 
 
288 The literature on this is rather vast, but see especially Başar, ‘Bergson’s Intuition Memory and Episodic 
Memory’; Heymans, ‘Les “Deux Mémoires” de M. Bergson’; Wolff, ‘La Théorie de la mémoire chez Bergson’. 
289 For Bergson’s full account of tracking changes through time, see IT 125-33. 
290 CM 40/56. 
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We are now in a position to evaluate Claim 3, the claim that time is unreal. It should now be 
clear that for Bergson there are two distinct realms, two radically different ways of 
understanding temporality, even though he would, unlike the B-theorist, refuse to call the first 
of these “time.” 
 First, there is what is called “real time” by Hugh Mellor, and what Bergson calls 
“spatialised time.” This is B-time, the objective time of physics and mathematics. It is time 
conceived.291 McTaggart concedes that this time, although lacking the quality of “change,” is 
not subject to a contradiction. We can call this time “real” if we are prepared to pay the price 
of accepting that it lacks what McTaggart regarded as the fundamental aspect of change, 
namely, an intuitive sense of experienced temporal becoming.292 Bergson would accept the 
existence of this “time” although he would refuse to call it “time” and would regard it primarily 
as a utilitarian tool that enables us to function in society, use language, make calculations about 
the positions of planets, and perform scientific experiments. Nevertheless, it is not suitable for 
the analysis of lived conscious experience. Williams raises the following critique: 
Most of the effect of the prophets of passage, on the other hand, is to melt back 
into the primitive magma of confusion and plurality the best and sharpest 
instruments which the mind has forged.293 
Bergson would agree: the conception of time understood in physics is a “sharp instrument” in 
our analysis of external reality, as well as in our use of language and survival in general.294 
However, he would caution that if not enough attention is paid to another more fundamental 
realm of temporality, namely la durée, “le temps fondamental,”295 unresolvable metaphysical 
problems soon arise: “[H]abits that are primarily utilitarian, once they find their way into the 
sphere of speculation, tend to create fictitious problems, … .”296 As Deppe explains: 
 
291 CM 153/204. 
292 Etienne Klein has recently called into question the obviousness of the connection between our conception of 
time and the variable “t” used to represent it. The “thing” that Newton designates by the variable “t” and calls 
“time” has very few features in common with what we normally experience as “time.” To give just a few examples 
of these differences, the “time” we experience does not have a consistent affine structure, has an obvious single 
direction (which was certainly doubted by Newton regarding “t,”), and it is difficult to quantify it without appeal 
to a clock (Klein, ‘Who Is Entitled to Talk About Time?’; see also Merleau-Ponty, Signes, 317.). 
293 Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 472. 
294 CM 39/54-5. 
295 DS 30/42. 
296 MM 16/9. 
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This setting may give an idea of how the juxtaposing structure [of B-time] of an 
earlier/later ordering of moments in fact facilitates our handling of time within 
our everyday acting. Within this exposure, however, the relational structure 
appeared to be merely secondary, applied by us to our original experience [i.e., 
la durée].297 
Furthermore, quantum mechanics aside,298 this “time” can — at least in thought — be 
contracted, conceptualised without an ontologically privileged “present” and in some cases 
even considered reversible.299 What Bergson would disagree with is that this exhausts all there 
is to temporality. 
 Second, there is what is called “real time” by Bergson, i.e, la durée. This is what 
analytic philosophy has generally dismissed as subjective time. It is time perceived.300 It is 
intimately connected with our own perception of the world and ourselves; it is the time of the 
immediate data of consciousness. As we have seen earlier, since la durée does not have the 
topological features applicable to objective time (e.g., divisibility into events and their 
subsequent conceptual juxtaposition), it is not subject to the contradiction that McTaggart finds 
in the A-series. In order for McTaggart’s paradox to get off the ground, we would need to 
identify discrete events to which the contradictory determinations could attach. But this is 
impossible in la durée. La durée offers an immediate, intuitive qualitative account of 
experienced change. Our own experience frequently provides us with confirmation of the 
disconnection between la durée and objective time, for example, when we experience surprise 
at the fact that (objective) time has gone by much faster than we thought (on the basis of our 
immediate conscious experience). 
 Furthermore, unlike the time that operates in physics (again, putting questions about 
quantum mechanics in brackets), there cannot even be a question about la durée being 
reversible. Although we can form a logically coherent story about processes in the external 
world going backwards (e.g., there is no logical contradiction in imagining a fallen apple rising 
 
297 Deppe, ‘The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-
Theorists)’, 120. 
298 Although the literature on this is quite vast, for a discussion of recent discoveries in quantum mechanics 
suggesting the possibility of an irreversible arrow of time in reality, see ’t Hooft, ‘Time, the Arrow of Time, and 
Quantum Mechanics’. 
299 See for example Price, Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point; Price, ‘The Flow of Time’. Bergson himself 
discusses this in DS 112-13/164-5. 
300 CM 153/204. 
 
 67  
back to the branch and then turning into an apple-tree flower301), we cannot do that with la 
durée as this would entail reversing our memory of the past and anticipation of the future, and 
lead to the following absurd picture: we would have direct immediate access to events existing 
in “the future,” although we could not do anything about them. We would then feel them 
“coming towards us” and gradually becoming more and more blurry. At the point at which they 
became present, we would immediately forget them but somehow obtain the feeling that there 
is something we can do about them, that we can causally contribute to them.302 As a matter of 
fact, even when Williams briefly considers the possibility of time-reversal, he is forced to admit 
that this is impossible to do with consciousness: 
F. Scott Fitzgerald tells the story of Benjamin Button who was born in the last 
stages of senility and got younger all his life till he died a dwindling embryo. 
Fitzgerald imagined the reversal to be so imperfect that Benjamin’s stream of 
consciousness ran, not backward with his body’s gross development, but in the 
common clockwise manner.303  
 To conclude, one might say that McTaggart is led to the conclusion about the unreality 
of time (itself entailed by the premise that anything real must not be self-contradictory) by 
mixing two different times, each of which is immune from contradiction. The categories and 
observations pertaining to the two realms must be kept distinct. 
2.4. Bergson and The A-series 
A few things need to be said about the way that the arguments above relate to the relationship 
between the “two realms” of Bergson’s philosophy (i.e., la durée and objective time) and the 
contemporary debate about A- and B-theories of time. So far I have been arguing that 
“objective time” is the B-conception of time, coextensive with Bergson’s idea of “spatialised 
time,” and that it is opposed to la durée. Does this mean that la durée is coextensive with an 
A-conception of time? 
 
301 Dummett, ‘Bringing About the Past’, 339; Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §8; Dainton, Time and Space, 
45, 48. 
302 See Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §8; Dainton, The Phenomenal Self, 51–73; Dainton, Time and Space, 
116–17. 
303 Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 468–69. For a more sophisticated — but, in the end, equally philosophically 
incoherent — attempt at “reversed chronology,” see Amis, Time’s Arrow. 
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 Although the view of Bergson as an A-theorist has frequently been assumed by analytic 
philosophers,304 it is a gross misrepresentation of Bergson’s thought. As a matter of fact, 
Bergson would likely have identified the A-theory as far more troublesome than the B-theory. 
When Bergson’s writings dealing with the philosophy of time were written (especially TFW 
(1889) and MM (1896)), the B-theory was not yet around and therefore his writings, despite 
all anachronisms, should primarily be read as being directed at the “intuitive” conception of 
time — which is the A-theory. Moreover, although both space and time analysed using a non-
durée-based topology (i.e, as divisible, analogous to a line, etc.) are severely criticised in 
Bergson’s early works (TFW and MM), in his later writings they come to adopt a positive role 
— as social tools enabling survival, social communication, and scientific research, but, at the 
same time, as hiding the true nature of temporality which resides in la durée. It is therefore 
likely that McTaggart’s A-series would have been regarded by Bergson as a naïve attempt to 
“have it all.” On the one hand, the A-series retains the B-theoretical topology (ordering of 
distinct separable juxtaposed events), but at the same time, it tries to infuse it with features that 
only apply to la durée (the “feeling” of the past, present, and future, the entity of the present, 
the feeling of “flow” etc.). Perhaps tentatively, I would argue that it is the A-theory which is 
the concept batârd305 resulting from the mixture of pure spatiality and pure temporality, not the 
B-theory. For the Bergsonian, both the A-series and B-series are guilty of “spatialising” time 
— but whereas the B-theory is clear and explicit about its motivations and metaphysical 
grounding, the A-theory attempts to smuggle in concepts (such as “the flow” of time or the 
immediate phenomenology of change) that are only applicable to la durée. Ingthorsson claims 
that the contradiction in the A-series arises because “we try to construe a descriptive model 
that satisfies both the requirement of what an Absolute Reality must be like and what a 
Temporal Reality must be like.”306 Here the Bergsonian insight is to claim that Absolute 
Reality, as construed by McTaggart, will always necessarily be changeless, and our immediate 
perception of Temporal Reality will always be durée-like. But we should not subsume both 
under the same category. 
 Perhaps a good way to see how difficult it is to fit Bergson into the A- and B-typology 
is to consider the fact that at the core of the distinction between A- and B-theories is the goal 
of identifying a coherent description of time, which is mind-independent. However, as we have 
seen earlier (section 2.2), time is, in one way or another, utterly dependent on the synthesising 
 
304 See Williams, ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’, 387. 
305 TFW 98/73. 
306 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 69. 
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mind. In Kant and Bardon it is Intuition which brings about the existence of time by way of 
synthesising distinct moments of existence, in Bergson it is la durée. For example, let us take 
the question of whether the “flow of time” is part of the objective (i.e., mind-independent) 
description of reality. In McTaggart’s lingo, let us ask whether the “flow of time” is part of 
Absolute Reality or merely a part of Reality as Appearance. Huw Price helpfully distinguishes 
three theses that could justify the view that time objectively passes, theses that are frequently 
confused or not carefully delineated: 
1. The view that the present moment is objectively distinguished. 2. The view that 
time has an objective direction; that it is an objective matter which of two non-
simultaneous events is the earlier and which is the later. 3. The view that there is 
something objectively dynamic, flux-like, or “flow-like” about time.307 
Roughly speaking, the A-theory maps onto the first of these claims (since the presence of the 
objective now is required for there to be an objective future and a past) and the B-theory can 
be identified with asserting exclusively claim 2 (since the B-series is supposed to provide an 
objective ordering of events in reality by relations of earlier and later), but rejecting the others. 
Does Bergson fit into any of these?  
 (1) First, let us consider the claim that there is a “now” in reality, existing either as a 
moving spotlight gliding over a row of houses308 or as, simply, all there is, as the presentist 
claims. Bergson radically rejects the idea that the “now” is constituted by a point in spacetime309 
but rather argues that the “now” can only be located in the durée of an observer, as the extent 
of our present attention. We can, of course, retrospectively, identify a mathematical “point” at 
which we imagine ourselves and at which we found ourselves, say, either before or after the 
Death of Queen Anne, but in that case, we are merely operating on the trace of la durée, which 
is always static and B-theoretical, and not in la durée, which is always currently developing. 
For the A-theorist, “the present … is an ontological / objective notion”310 — for Bergson, it is 
a notion that cannot be located in reality without reference to the human durée. And even then, 
this extended “now” of an individual durée cannot be easily mapped onto the “now” of other 
 
307 Price, ‘The Flow of Time’, 277. 
308 See Broad, Scientific Thought, 59. 
309 MM 137/152. 
310 Butterfield, ‘Seeing the Present’, 161. 
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durées — not least because each of them has a different length, as McTaggart also recognised 
in closing off the possibility of locating the objective now in the “specious present.”311 
 (2) Second, as regards the objective direction of time, Bergson, again, argues that 
without the human mind, there is nothing intrinsically directional about time in external reality. 
Once time has been translated into the B-theoretical construct, it can be accelerated, stopped, 
and reversed. In short, we can imagine moving in its spatialised conceptualisation in the same 
way we can imagine moving around in space.312 Crucially, this theoretical construct plays an 
important role in our practical every-day survival but obscures the fundamental nature of 
la durée. It is, therefore, not the case, as D. C. Williams argues, that “[temporal passage] is [in 
Bergson] supposed necessary and sufficient for adding to the temporal dimension that intrinsic 
sense, from earlier to later, in which it is supposed to differ radically from any dimension of 
space.”313 Rather, the immediately felt temporal passage is required for us ascribing temporality 
to the external world in the first place. Even if temporal passage were “added” to objective 
time, this would not make it any less “spatial” than the A-theory, since both already operate 
with distinct separable juxtaposed events. 
 (3) Finally, third, as regards the question of there being something objectively “flow-
like” about time, Bergson would, again, struggle to understand what this is supposed to mean 
without reference to our lived experience. The “feeling” of temporal passage is something that 
can only be qualitatively felt in lived durée, it cannot be found in the order of events once these 
 
311 See McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, 472; for a discussion, see Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. Unity 
and Continuity in Conscious Experience, 116–17, 120–23. Bergson: “My present, at this moment, is the sentence 
I am pronouncing. But it is so because I want to limit the field of my attention to my sentence. This attention can 
be made longer, or shorter, … The distinction we make between our present and past is therefore, if not arbitrary, 
at least relative to the extent of the field which our attention to life can embrace.” (CM 126-7/169-70) 
312 Here Bergson would have been (and, as some references to his works suggests, probably was) in agreement 
with the emphasis that A. Eddington placed on the fact that consciousness seems to have a “private door” onto 
reality, which escapes the measurement of physics (Eddington, The Nature of The Physical World, 91.). Price 
discards the possibility of grounding the direction of time in human epistemology mainly because it conflicts with 
the contemporary philosophical preference for physicalism: “… [W]hat about conscious experience? Here the 
defender of an objective direction of time faces a dilemma: either consciousness is time-blind, too, in which case 
the internal phenomenology ‘as of’ an orientation of time doesn’t actually fix the direction of a mental life, or 
there is a radical discontinuity between consciousness on the one hand, and ordinary physical systems, on the 
other. The former option undermines the claim that our conscious experience could be a guide to existence or 
orientation of a privileged direction of time, while the latter seems contrary to the spirit of physicalism, in the 
sense that it implies that there is something that can be detected by a conscious instrument that cannot be detected 
by a physical instrument.” (Price, ‘The Flow of Time’, 299–300.) 
313 Williams, ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’, 464. 
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have been converted into distinct entities. The idea of stipulating a “rate of flow”314 of time is 
symptomatic of the category mistake between time and space.  
 This point can be stressed even more by clarifying the core of the “spatialising 
objection.” As I have already mentioned, many analytic philosophers have made an inference 
from the fact that B-theories are frequently accused of “spatialising time” and from the fact 
that Bergson frequently opposes his durée to “spatialised time,” to the conclusion that Bergson 
is one of the “time snobs”315 who reject the B-conception of time.316 This is misleading because 
for Bergson the spatialisation does not concern what I would call the “operational” features of 
space and time (e.g., the ability or inability to move in one direction or another, to locate a 
privileged location (here / now), to distinguish two different features of spacetime etc.), but 
rather its experienced topological properties (e.g., the ability to divide it into distinct units, to 
regard the arrangement of these as analogous to a line in space, to imagine it existing without 
reference to the human mind etc.) 
 
What I have sketched above is perhaps not as radical as it may initially seem. The category of 
la durée is not a concept that has never appeared in analytic philosophy of time. It has just been 
discussed under the heading of “subjective time”317 and mostly neglected, since it has primarily 
been regarded, suspiciously, as a problematic peculiarity of our human condition preventing 
us from fully embracing the “objective time” of physics and creating a coherent theory of time. 
For example, Russell comments — and his comments below are directed at “subjective time” 
— as follows: 
[T]here is some sense … in which time is an unimportant and superficial 
characteristic of reality. Past and future must be acknowledged to be as real as the 
present, and a certain emancipation from slavery to time is essential to 
philosophic thought. … A truer image of the world, I think, is obtained by 
picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, 
than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is. Both 
 
314 See for example Schlesinger, ‘How Time Flies’. 
315 Williams, ‘The Myth of Passage’, 458. 
316 Williams: “[The view that the non-dynamic theory makes time a dimension of space] is close kin to Bergson’s 
allegation that the principle of the manifold ‘spatializes’ time.” (Williams, 470.) 
317 Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §2. 
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in thought and feeling, even though time be real, to realise the unimportance of 
time is the gate of wisdom.318 
This disdain for time (especially subjective time) has obscured the role it plays in undergirding 
a coherent picture of the world. Kant was aware of the role of the temporal nature of the human 
mind, but, relating it to the schema of number and thereby to homogeneity, not of its nature. 
Analytic philosophy was aware of its nature (i.e., as being an unreliable guide to objective 
time), but not its role, the fact that without this underlying and slightly chaotic heterogeneity, 
we would not be able to think any time at all. It is only in Bergson that the two come together.  
 Bergson provides an analysis that indexes the time of science and the time of immediate 
experience to two different structures underlying temporality and explains how they are related. 
McTaggart, ignoring the separation between the two realms of la durée and objective time, 
creates a conceptual framework that leads to a contradiction. So he concludes that the thing to 
which the conceptual network applies is not real. What he should have concluded is that there 
is, on the one hand, a reality to which this conceptual network is inapplicable and, on the other 
hand, a second reality that is dependent on the first, but results from the removal of its 
characteristically “change-like” features. 
 
* * * 
 
This chapter has shown how la durée and spatialised time, introduced in Chapter 1, relate to 
McTaggart’s argument. However, we have already begun to see that there is a degree of 
ambiguity in some of the claims that Bergson has made along the way; is la durée required for 
the representation of the future, present, and past, or for the existence of the future and past? 
If the past exists and the future does not, is this existence simpliciter or existence “in our 
heads”? What is the relationship between the existence of “Death of Queen Anne anticipated, 
experienced, and remembered” and the existence of the Death of Queen Anne? These questions 
may only be answered by looking beyond the primarily representational structures of the A-
series and B-series and exploring Bergson and temporal ontologies. This is the goal of the next 
chapter. 
 
318 Russell, Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, 21–22. 
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3. La Durée and Temporal Ontologies: Relativising 
Existence319 
The previous chapter has shown that Bergson’s distinction between la durée and “spatialised 
time” cuts across the differences between A- and B-theories of time. As we have seen, the A-
series and the B-series are primarily views about the way that events in time may be ordered: 
either by the relations of “past,” “present,” and “future” in the case of the former or of “earlier” 
and “later” in the case of the latter. Since Bergson only allows for the possibility of “ordering” 
events in spatialised time and not in la durée,320 it was demonstrated that la durée may not be 
subsumed under either the A-series or the B-series. 
 Nevertheless, questions about the existence of events in time, orderable or not, have 
still been left unanswered. If the A- and B-distinction is inapplicable to the relation between la 
durée and “spatialised time,” how do we answer questions about the existence of temporal 
entities? One cannot evade this question by simply reiterating that since there are no distinct 
events in la durée, there can be no ordering (what is not there may not be ordered) — although 
la durée is indivisible, there is still a vague distinction between the past, the present, and the 
future. Inquiring about which of these exist is still pertinent. 
 One may therefore still ask Bergson: If it is only past and perhaps present events that 
exist, do they exist only in la durée, “in our heads,” or can they be assigned extramental reality? 
And if so, how does the existence of events in la durée relate to external “spatialised” time? 
Do Bergson’s frequent claims about the non-existence of the future321 represent a striking 
incompatibility with discoveries about the nature of time in physics, incompatibilities that, it 
must be said, Bergson has unsuccessfully attempted to resolve by incorporating Einstein’s 
relativity into his philosophical framework?322 These are questions that the Bergsonian 
overcoming of the A-series and the B-series cannot escape. Even worse, a thorough look at 
these problems seems to push Bergson into a strange dilemma: If, on the one hand, the 
 
319 Few sections from the following two chapters are currently forthcoming in Moravec, ‘Eternity, Relative 
Realities, and Ontological Idealism About Time’. 
320 This is where Bergson’s “present durée” differs from the Jamesian “specious present”; not only does James 
not think of the specious present as indivisible, the crucial observation about the difference between the present 
as it is experienced and as it is thought of in the trace of la durée is a distinctly Bergsonian notion. 
321 Kołakowski: “[W]e may sum up Bergson’s philosophy in a single idea: time is real. … To say that time is real 
is to say, first, that the future does not exist in any sense.” (Kołakowski, Bergson, 2.) 
322 For a discussion of Bergson’s ‘monstrous blunders,’ as Einstein referred to them, see Lévy-Leblond, ‘Le Boulet 
d’Einstein et les boulettes de Bergson’; Canales, The Physicist and the Philosopher. Einstein, Bergson, and the 
Debate That Changed Our Understanding of Time; Sherman, ‘Who Speaks for Nature? On the Continued 
Importance of the Bergson-Einstein Debate’. 
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existence of temporal content is limited to the heterogeneous development of la durée “in our 
heads,” Bergson’s philosophy seems to lead in the direction of idealism, a philosophical 
position he attempted to refute in his second book.323 If, on the other hand, the existence of 
temporal content pertains to the real existence of external events, regardless of the presence of 
la durée, then it seems that such existence can be analysed purely using the A- and B-series, 
making la durée otiose. In other words, although the A-series and the B-series, qua claims 
about the fundamental ordering of events, may not be exhaustive of the way Bergson’s 
philosophy explains the nature of temporality, the ontological query about whether the events 
ordered thereby exist may not be dissolved just by appealing to the machinery of “spatialised 
time” and la durée. This is a question the answer to which will have a knock-on effect on the 
available solutions to the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will to be discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
 The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, I will examine Bergson’s thought with regards 
to temporal ontologies available in analytic philosophy: eternalism, presentism, and the 
growing-block theory.324 Second, I will show that the key insights of Bergson’s philosophy, 
specifically circumscribed to a particular set of ideas from his early works, can be combined 
with a largely unexplored strategy of frame-relativising existence briefly mentioned by Kristie 
Miller325 and extensively studied by Mauro Dorato,326 thus enabling my proposed reading of 
Bergson’s philosophy to escape the problems that plague more traditional versions of non-
eternalist ontologies. In Chapter 4, I will add a final ingredient, the relation between God and 
time, to ensure that although my interpretation of Bergson commits him to ontological idealism 
about time, it does not commit him to ontological idealism simpliciter. This chapter, therefore, 
forms the beginning of a transition from the purely metaphysical section of this study (Chapters 
1-3) to the one concerned with philosophy of religion (Chapters 4-5). 
 
323 MM 9-16/1-9. 
324 The delineation of these views is taken from Miller, ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’, 346–
47. The claims about temporal existence discussed here apply also to the “moving spotlight,” as well as other 
typologies of temporal ontologies available in the literature using different terminology, for example, Dorato’s 
distinction between the “instant view of reality” and the “empty,” “half-full,” and “full” views of the future 
(Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming.). 
325 Miller, ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’, 354. 
326 Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming. 
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3.1. Temporal Ontologies and the A/B-Series 
Bergson aside, one might question the legitimacy of the methodological separation between 
the A- and B-theories on the one hand, and the three types of temporal ontologies on the other 
hand. Indeed, a vast amount of literature treats these distinctions not as ranging over a different 
set of problems, but either as co-extensive or as subspecies of one another; most authors 
presume at least a partial coextension between the B-series and eternalism, and the A-series 
and either the growing block theory or presentism.327 There are several reasons for this. For 
example, the B-theories classify events by the “earlier” and “later” relation, and since it is 
assumed that relations may only hold between things that exist,328 the only available ontology 
capable of providing the co-actual (though not simultaneous329) existence of events at different 
parts of spacetime is eternalism. In the same vein, since the growing-block theory and 
presentism generally make claims about the existence or non-existence of the past, present, and 
future, they at least seem to require those very categories (i.e., “past,” “present,” and future”) 
furnished by the A-series. 
 Nevertheless, whilst this essay acknowledges a close link between the A/B-distinction 
and ontologies, it will not presume that the former maps directly onto a part or the entirety of 
the latter. This is first and foremost motivated by the fact that whilst the ontological 
philosophical positions themselves are rather easy to define (eternalism as the claim that “past, 
present, and future times and events exist,”330 presentism as the claim that “only the present 
moment, and hence present objects and events, exist,”331 and the growing-block as the claim 
that “past and present moments and events exist, but future moments and events do not 
exist”332), contemporary analytic philosophy has moved far away from the rather 
straightforward formulation of the questions of temporal ordering in McTaggart’s original 
argument. Current philosophy of time offers an intractable plethora of definitions of what the 
A-theories and B-theories are supposed to be about. To give just a few examples: (i) Oaklander 
identifies the A-theory as consisting of claims about temporal becoming and the B-theory as 
consisting of claims about temporal relations.333 (ii) Clifford Williams uses the appeal to our 
experience of time to argue that there might not even be a significant difference between 
 
327 See for example Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’, 475. 
328 See for example Oaklander, The Ontology of Time, 43–45. 
329 For this distinction, see Leftow, Time and Eternity, 18; Oaklander, The Ontology of Time, 39. 
330 Miller, ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’, 347. 
331 Miller, 346. 
332 Miller, 347. 
333 Oaklander, The Ontology of Time, 18. 
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them.334 (iii) One also finds the formulation that the B-theory is not really about “the permanent 
or eternal existence of events, but only [about the fact] that statements that express tenseless 
truths do not change their truth value.”335 (iv) Perhaps the A/B distinction is primarily 
concerned with the question of which determinations are “more fundamental” to the nature of 
time.336 (v) In some cases, it is presumed that the debate has to do with tensed or tenseless 
“facts,”337 in others that it is primarily a question about obtaining tensed or tenseless 
truthmakers for tensed or tenseless sentences or tokens thereof.338 (vi) In the worst scenarios, 
one sees the A- and B-distinction simply reduced to the claim that the A-theory is the “intuitive 
one,” because it affirms the reality of change and coheres with the common-sense view about 
the past, present, and future, whereas the B-theory does not (an accusation the B-theorists have 
had to defend themselves against since the time of Russell339) and is, therefore, the “unintuitive” 
one. The list could continue.340 Ryan Mullins recalls: 
When I discussed an earlier version of [the second chapter of The End of the 
Timeless God] with the Metaphysics Reading Group at the University of Notre 
Dame, there was much debate in the room over the meaning of the A-theory and 
the B-theory. No consensus on the meaning of these theories was reached among 
the metaphysicians.341 
 There are further reasons that could motivate one to engage with questions about 
temporal ontology without entering the minefield separating the A- and the B-theorists. Mullins 
has recently argued that the A- and B-debates, being primarily theories about the truth of 
propositions, have obscured much more fundamental questions about temporal ontology.342 He 
claims that “[t]he debate between A-theorists and B-theorists is relatively new in the history of 
ideas. The distinction that McTaggart made was not a common distinction in earlier eras.”343 
Since Bergson’s thought is not easily translatable into categories fundamental to the A- and B-
 
334 Williams, ‘The Metaphysics of A- and B-Time’; Williams, ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’. 
335 Oaklander, The Ontology of Time, 25. 
336 Oaklander, 51. 
337 Oaklander, 61. 
338 Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 3. 
339 See Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 23. 
340 For a succinct exposition of all the various claims involved in the A/B-distinction, see Dorato, Time and 
Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 1–16. 
341 Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 23; for a similar point, see Williams, ‘The Metaphysics of A- and B-
Time’. 
342 Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 24. 
343 Mullins, 25. 
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distinction, as the previous chapter has shown, a fruitful dialogue between Bergson and analytic 
philosophy (of time and religion) may only be obtained by a return to questions regarding the 
common underlying ontological substratum. 
 It may still be objected that the link between ontology and the A/B-distinction is not as 
inseparable as it might seem. Indeed, this has become apparent in the historical development 
of the debates regarding A- and B-theories, which has seen a shift from providing “translation 
manuals”344 for converting A-sentences into B-sentences to the problem of providing 
ontological truthmakers for those sentences themselves. Ryan Mullins may be right that the 
delineation of the difference between A- and B-theories is rather confusing, but their claims do 
not simply float free independent of ontology, seeing that the truth of propositions depends on 
the existence of things they are propositions about. 
 Despite this objection, I will still treat the ontological question independently of the A- 
and B-debates. There are three reasons for this. First, the A- and B-theories are almost always 
phrased in terms of the ordering of distinct events in the external world; it is unclear how this 
“ordering” should be articulated in terms of the stream of mental states of la durée. On the 
contrary, questions about the existence of the past, present, and future are still legitimate in the 
realm of la durée. In other words, we may ask questions raised by temporal ontologies about 
la durée, even though we might not do so with questions raised by the A/B distinction. 
 Secondly, although the three ontologies and the A- and B-theories may be linked (the 
B-theories seem to be almost universally equivocated with eternalism and A-theories with 
presentism), they are, nevertheless, responses to different questions: one about ordering, the 
other about existence. One, therefore, cannot prima facie exclude the possibility that an 
exploration of the ontology will reveal something that an exploration purely in terms of 
temporal ordering might not. Probing into a burger as a dietitian reveals different things than 
exploring it as a food critic, even when they both wolf down the same dish. Third, the fact that 
the two distinctions may come apart is also confirmed by examples where some aspects 
traditionally associated with either of the A/B-theories are combined with certain aspects of 
the non-corresponding ontological position. For example, one can take the moving spotlight 
theory as combining the eternalist claim about the co-actual existence of all events with the 
characteristically A-theoretical belief about there being “something special” about the present. 
Conversely, Michal Tooley has succeeded in combining the growing-block claim with the 
 
344 Dolev, ‘The Tenseless Theory of Time: Insights and Limitations’, 263. 
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characteristically B-theoretical belief that about tenseless facts’ being more fundamental in the 
description of reality.345 
 
Lamentably, a shift away from the A/B-distinction to ontology does not make Bergson’s 
categorisation any easier. In the case of the A- and B-series, Bergson did not really fit into 
either. However, in the case of the eternalist / presentist / growing-block distinction, a quick 
glance at the Bergsonian corpus suggests that he was committed to all three!  
 Some of Bergson’s remarks clearly point to something like a growing-block theory. 
Apart from the frequent insistence on the non-existence of the future,346 and the real, literal 
existence of the past,347 Bergson’s talk of “universal becoming” also fits rather nicely with his 
approval of the Aristotelian solution to the sea-battle paradox in his lectures at the Collège de 
France from 1904-1905.348 There, Bergson seems to argue for something like a truthmaker-
based solution to the problem: 
“At this moment I am talking about philosophy” — here is a proposition which 
is true, because it conforms to what exists. If I say, “Yesterday at four o’clock I 
was out on a walk,” provided that I was out on a walk at four o’clock, it would 
also be a proposition about what exists, since the past exists, … . But if I say, 
“I will be out walking at four o’clock tomorrow,” is the proposition true or is it 
false? Tomorrow does not exist; nothing that will take place tomorrow exists. 
Consequently, to ask whether the proposition “I will be out on a walk tomorrow” 
is true or false is to ask a meaningless question, since it is to ask whether the 
proposition conforms or not to what exists and tomorrow does not exist yet, does 
not exist now.349 
 
345 Tooley, Time, Tense and Causation, 28–29; see also Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the 
Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 23–32. 
346 CM 73-86/99-116. 
347 Dainton: “[Bergson] spends a good deal of effort in Part 3 of Matter and Memory attempting to overcome 
resistance to the idea that the past is fully real, … .” (Dainton, ‘Bergson on Temporal Experience and Durée 
Réelle’, 99.) 
348 EPL 97-112. See Aristotle, The Categories. On Interpretation, IX, 135. 
349 “‘En ce moment je parle philosophie’, voilà une proposition qui est vraie parce qu’elle conforme à ce qui 
existe. Si je dis: ‘Hier à quatre heures je me suis promené’, en admettant que je me sois promené à quatre heures, 
voilà une affirmation qui est vraie parce qu’elle est conforme à ce qui existe, car le passé existe, … . Mais lorsque 
je dis: ‘Demain à quatre heures je me promènerai’, la proposition est-elle vraie, est-elle fausse? Demain n’existe 
pas ; rien de ce qui se passera demain n’existe. Par conséquent demander si cette proposition: ‘Je me promènerai 
demain’ est vraie ou fausse, c’est poser une question qui n’a pas de sens parce que c’est demander si cette 
proposition est conforme ou contraire à ce qui existe et que demain n’existe pas encore, n’existe pas maintenant.” 
(EPL 105, my translation.) 
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 However, Bergson does insist at various places that without the synthesis of la durée, 
“everything is in a present which seems to be constantly starting afresh.”350 For example, in 
MM, he argues that when the brain is taken merely as a material object, without the presence 
of memory, it “never occupies more than the present moment.”351 Once we remove la durée 
from the world, “this universe dies and is born again miraculously at each moment … .”352 
If la durée is the only thing that lends the past the ability to connect to the present and if 
la durée exists in the mind, does this mean that in the external world only the present moment 
exists? And, conversely, is it not the case that la durée is required for the connection of the 
different presents to create a coherent unified reality (see section 2.2)? Although one of the 
chief projects of MM was to surmount the opposition between idealism and realism, Bergson 
fails to treat the question of temporal existence — he just about discusses existence 
simpliciter,353 but without further qualifications about the existential status of the present, past 
or future. Bergson’s primary question in MM is in overcoming the opposition between 
existence “inside the head” and “outside the head,” not between existence in the past and/or 
the present and/or the future. 
 Finally, one can even find passages that could give Bergson’s durée an eerily eternalist 
twist. I have previously appealed to the following observation in Bergson to argue that divine 
eternity — conceived along the Boethian lines of tota simul et perfecta possessio354 — to which 
all things are present, may justify the belief that the category of la durée can be stretched to 
apply to the entirety of all times:355 
Do we not sometimes perceive in ourselves, in sleep, two contemporaneous and 
distinct persons one of whom sleeps a few minutes, while the other’s dream fills 
days and weeks? And would not the whole of history be contained in a very short 
time for a consciousness at a higher degree of tension than our own, which should 
watch the development of humanity while contracting, so to speak, into the great 
phases of its evolution?356 
 
350 CM 106/141-2. 
351 MM 149/165. 
352 MM 149/165. 
353 “[T]he capital problem of existence [is] a problem we can only glance at, for otherwise it would lead us step 
by step into the heart of metaphysics. [It is] matters of experience … which alone concern us here. … .” (MM 
146-7/163.) 
354 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 422. 
355 See Moravec, ‘A Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration’. 
356 MM 207-8/233. 
 
 80  
If all things can be present to a durée at a higher degree of tension (God’s ever-present durée), 
does their presence to such a durée not in turn require their existence? Does Bergson simply 
confuse the representation of temporality (events existing “for a consciousness”) and 
temporality (events existing simpliciter)? To be fair to Bergson, one must avoid the temptation 
to conflate an ontology of events with a theory of representations of those events. A very large 
scope of history can be represented by something very short, without this entailing that all the 
moments of time are themselves co-actual. Nonetheless, eternalism offers the most 
straightforward explanation for the presence of all events to the hypothetical durée that 
Bergson talks about.357 
 What is going on? Perhaps one could simply say that Bergson is just being inconsistent. 
This conjecture would be supported by Bergson’s autobiographical assessment of the 
development of la durée across his works: 
I have written each one of my books whilst forgetting all the others. I throw 
myself into thinking about a problem: I start from “la durée” and I try to throw 
light on the problem, either by contrast or by similarity with it. Unfortunately, 
you see, my books are not always mutually coherent: the “time” of CE does not 
“bond” well with that of TFW.358 
However, as will become clear below, these apparent inconsistencies in Bergson’s philosophy 
point to a much more complicated relationship between la durée and the world. 
3.2. La Durée and the External World 
It is important to bear in mind that these inconsistencies cannot be resolved without due 
attention not only to the chronological development of Bergson’s thought but also to the 
philosophical development of the relation of mind (qua durée) to the external world. 
 Before providing an exegetical account of the development of the scope of la durée in 
the Bergsonian corpus, it is worth noting that what it means for temporal things to “exist” in 
analytic ontologies is also not as straightforward as I may have presented it in the previous 
 
357 For examples of the inference from divine eternity to a B-theoretical view, see for example Mellor, ‘History 
Without the Flow of Time’; Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’ 
358 “J’ai fait chacun de mes livres en oubliant tous les autres. Je me plonge dans la méditation d’un problème ; je 
pars de la ‘durée’ et je cherche à éclairer ce problème, soit par contraste, soit par similitude avec elle. 
Malheureusement, voyez-vous, mes livres ne sont pas toujours cohérents entre eux: le ‘temps’ de l’Évolution 
créatrice ne ‘colle’ pas avec celui des Données immédiates.” (Béguin and Thévenaz, Henri Bergson: Essais et 
témoignages, 360.) 
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section. For example, Miller argues that when it comes to properly understanding the 
disagreement between, say, presentists and eternalists, things are not always quite as simple as 
to warrant a reduction of the conflict to a disagreement about the extension of the existential 
quantifier: 
Another way to interpret the claim that the two parties are talking past one another 
is that the domains of quantification are the same, but “exists” means something 
different in the mouths of each party. It is controversial whether “exist” can have 
different meanings and whether if it can, it actually does have different meanings 
in the mouths of presentists and eternalists … . Even if it can and does, it is 
noteworthy both that neither eternalists nor presentists accept that this is an 
accurate diagnosis of the dialectic; nor does a stipulation about what “exist” 
means seem to result in an evaporation of the dispute between the parties.359 
Similarly, Dorato — discussing Gödel’s unpublished works on the philosophical implications 
of relativity for the notion of “temporal becoming” — contends that Gödel seems to distinguish 
between “reality” and “existence,” thus making the issue of reducing ontological questions to 
existential quantification particularly difficult. For Gödel, all the temporal “nows” are “equally 
real” (this being implied by the fact that the past/present/future distinction is inevitably tied to 
a particular reference frame), but only the one “present” now “exists.” Gödel seems to think 
that “the real comes into existence in time:”360 
To make sense of this coming into existence from a “mere” state of reality, we 
must assume that Gödel refers to the tenseless sense of existence presupposed by 
the existential quantification in standard predicate logic as “reality,” and 
considers “existence” as essentially tensed.361 
Or in other words, change consists of equally real things coming to possess (and losing) the 
property of “existence.” But does this not look like a presentist or moving-spotlight position? 
 Let us return to Bergson. As has been mentioned before, when following the chronology 
of Bergson’s works from TFW through MM to CE as the primary points of reference, one 
observes that the category of la durée “moves out,” or, more precisely, Bergson extends the 
 
359 Miller, ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’, 349. 
360 Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 119. 
361 Dorato, 119. 
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applicability of la durée from consciousness to the external world and, subsequently, to the 
whole of evolutionary history: 
In his earlier work, particularly the 1889 [TFW], Bergson confined durée — and 
its flowing and distinctively unified character — to consciousness alone; he 
explicitly contrasted the dynamic character of experience with the static character 
of the physical realm. In his later work, beginning with the 1896 [MM], he 
abandoned the earlier dualism in favour of a form of panpsychist monism.362 
At the risk of committing an ironic transgression of the main dicta of the Bergsonian method 
by chopping up Bergson’s philosophy — a philosophy regarded by the Jankélévitchian reading 
as something of an instance of la durée itself363 — into distinct segments, the process of 
“ontologisation” of la durée, so strongly emphasised by Deleuze,364 can roughly be partitioned 
into three crucial moments which I will here designate as “stages.” Each one of these, mostly 
revolving around one of Bergson’s major works, may also be characterised by a particular 
Bergsonian example, all of which exemplify la durée, but each of which illustrates the relation 
between the mind and the world in a significantly different way.365 
 Stage 1 corresponds to TFW from 1889. The paradigm example of the relation between 
la durée and the world is that of the movement of the pendulum requiring the synthesis of 
memory (see p. 16). Here we find a radical dualism between the internal and the external, with 
la durée constituting true or “real” time that affects synthesis on individual instantaneous static 
slices of external reality. In the external world, we can find “displacement” (i.e., the set of facts 
about the positions of the pendulum at different points of spatialised time), but not real 
“movement:” 
Thus in consciousness we find states which succeed, without being distinguished 
from one another; and in space simultaneities which, without succeeding, are 
distinguished from one another, in the sense that one has ceased to exist when the 
 
362 Dainton, ‘Bergson on Temporal Experience and Durée Réelle’, 94. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty says that la durée 
gradually becomes a “reduction” through which all things come to be observed and studied (Merleau-Ponty, 
Signes, 300.). 
363 See Jankélévitch, Henri Bergson. 
364 Deleuze, Le bergsonisme. See also During, ‘Dossier critique’, 279–80, note 1. 
365 The following typology differs from that suggested by Deleuze (Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, 75–79.), who 
phrases the gradual extending of la durée in terms of (i) monism, dualism, and pluralism, (ii) different rhythms of 
la durée and (iii) the move from purely psychological claims of TFW to ontological ones from MM onwards. 
Where Deleuze’s account focuses on the nature of the different durées and their mutual relations, my classification 
focuses on the existence of the “stuff” which la durée as a category describes. 
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other appears. Outside us, mutual externality without succession; within us, 
succession without mutual externality.366 
In other words, without the human mind, there would be no time. The quote above, however, 
requires some clarification. By speaking of “simultaneities … distinguished from one another,” 
Bergson does not mean the simultaneity of different moments of the external world (if reality 
is “reborn every minute,” then surely these minutes are not all mutually simultaneous!), but the 
simultaneity of events or objects in each one of these slices of reality that is being reborn. 
“Mutual externality without succession” refers to the fact that the individual “slices of 
reality”367 are “disconnected” without a mind that connects them into a succession, in much the 
same way that it connects the individual sheep in the act of counting. “Succession without 
mutual externality” refers to the fact that in la durée, there is a clear unified development of 
elements which seamlessly follow one another, and in which earlier ones qualitatively affect 
the ones that follow. Moreover, la durée should not be considered as something that this 
synthesis is effected on, it is primarily given as a simple unity and only then, in the second 
instance, retrospectively divided into separate moments.368 The talk of “multiplicities” is only 
permitted once we have performed the abstraction on the immediately given indivisibility (see 
footnote 249). As Bergson later says:  
Everyone will concede that in fact we do not conceive of time without a before 
and after: time is succession. Now, we have shown that where there is no 
memory, no consciousness, real or virtual, affirmed or imagined, actually present 
 
366 TFW 227/171. 
367 These “slices” may be understood in terms of disconnected “planes of simultaneity.” On a more speculative 
note, one may only wonder what Bergson’s engagement with relativity would have looked like had he become 
acquainted with it immediately after writing TFW and not after CE, by which point the externalisation of la durée 
seems to commit him to something like a global growing-block theory of time. 
368 Bergson rejects models that try to “build up” the unity of the phenomenal flow from prior distinct units. The 
Bergsonian “specious present” (unlike that of William James) is indivisible (see section 1.2), the divisibility 
applies only to the memory of what was the specious present. For a discussion of alternative models that start with 
units, see Dainton, Time and Space, 103–20; Dainton, Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in 
Conscious Experience, 136–61. Dainton himself observes the following: “A stream of consciousness is extended 
through time, and we can, if we choose, regard time as divided into instants and intervals in exactly the same 
manner as the real numbers. If we do this, there is no limit on how finely a given stream of consciousness can be 
divided into different intervals. But the legitimacy of purely formal manoeuvre does not mean that all the intervals 
thus recognized in thought correspond to anything recognizable in experience.” (Dainton, 171.) Bergson would 
have agreed with this, though he would point out that the first two sentences of the quotation apply to memory, 
the second to present experience. Dainton specifically discusses the account of phenomenal continuity in Husserl, 
which — despite Husserl’s oft-quoted 1911 remark that the Göttingen Circle were “the true Bergsonians” — 
differs significantly from Bergson. For a discussion, see Winkler, ‘Husserl and Bergson on Time and 
Consciousness’. 
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or ideally stipulated, there cannot be a before and an after: there is one or the 
other, but not both: and we need both to have time.369 
And by this, Bergson means time simpliciter, objective or durée. Note that Bergson’s point is 
much stronger than simply stating that the human mind is required for there to be a 
representation of time (a trivial point which may, in the end, be reduced to something like “the 
human mind representing time is required for time to be represented by the human mind”), thus 
reducing claims about la durée to phenomenology. Bergson says more — for him, the human 
subjectivity is constituted by la durée, it is an instantiation of temporality: the representation 
of time qua durée is homomorphic — it instantiates what it represents.  
 TFW establishes a separation between the external “spatialised” multiplicity and the 
internal durée, in the process resolving a whole host of problems to do with free will, Zeno’s 
paradoxes, and more general stumbling blocks of Kantian metaphysics.370 However, as Kouba 
points out, the book leaves unresolved the question of how la durée (in TFW equated with the 
human mind) and the spatial exteriority (the external world) are related: 
In principle, one could say that in TFW, Bergson succeeds in preserving the 
fundamental dichotomy which he has exposed. The relation between 
consciousness which endures and extended objects which do not is reduced to the 
distinction between two essentially different realities, even though an analysis of 
concrete experience affirms a permanent exchange between them, an 
“endosmosis.” … Between the two realities, a hierarchy has been well defined, 
but their mutual relation remains obscure.371 
 
369 DS 45-6/66. 
370 A deeper engagement between contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and Bergson’s theory of perception 
(especially MM) would be required to clarify whether, in a sense, the states of la durée are not reducible to external 
reality. My separation of the different stages of Bergsonian philosophy works in a more or less dualist framework 
(see Hypothesis 4 from my introduction), but, say, for an identity theorist, an emergentist or a supervenience 
theorist, mental states are part of the “outside stuff” of reality. The simplest way to respond to this is simply to 
stipulate (with Bergson at Stage 1) that mental states are constituted by la durée. La durée is the ontological 
foundation of all temporality. Since there is no durée and consequently no temporality in the external world, we 
cannot find mental states there. This, of course, changes in Stages 2 and 3, where the “stuff” maintains its own 
connections between the before and after and thus constitute temporality. For Bergson’s own thoughts on the 
relation between brain states and mental states, see for example EPL 301-2. 
371 “En principe, on peut constater que dans l’Essai, Bergson réussit à préserver la dichotomie fondamentale qu’il 
a exposée. Le rapport entre la conscience qui dure et les objets étendus qui ne durent pas est ramené à la distinction 
entre deux réalités essentiellement différentes, bien que l’analyse de l’expérience concrète constate un échange 
permanent entre elles, une ‘endosmose.’ … Entre les deux réalités, la hiérarchie est très bien définie mais leur 
rapport mutuel reste assez obscur.” (Kouba, ‘Le Mouvement Entre Temps et Espace (Bergson Aux Prises Avec 
Sa Découverte)’, 211, my translation.) 
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At Stage 2, roughly coextensive with MM from 1896, Bergson relates the two realities to each 
other by demonstrating that the matter constitutive of the external world has a durée of its 
own,372 an independently existing durée phenomenologically inaccessible to us.373 This 
undertaking is driven by the idea of durées at different degrees of “tension” from that of our 
own.374 As Arnaud Bouaniche comments: 
If external phenomena “appear” to succeed [in TFW], it is always from the point 
of view of the observing consciousness. It is therefore us who attribute durée to 
things, it is us who introduce succession in them by making them participate in 
our own temporality, whereas in themselves, they know only simultaneity or the 
present. In MM (1896), however, Bergson attributes to matter a durée of its own, 
analogous to our consciousness, revealed by our perception which contracts 
moments of matter.375 
The paradigm example here is the colour red — which is by us perceived as a singular item of 
consciousness (say, a patch of the colour red), but in itself consist of millions of vibrations of 
the ray of light reflecting off the surface of the red patch:376 
The duration lived by our consciousness is a duration with its own determined 
rhythm, a duration very different from the time of the physicist, which can store 
up, in a given interval, as great a number of phenomena as we please. In the space 
of a second, red light … accomplishes 400 billion successive vibrations. If we 
would form some idea of this number, we should have to separate the vibrations 
sufficiently to allow our consciousness to count them or at least to record 
explicitly their succession, and we should then enquire how many days or months 
or years this succession would occupy.377 
 
372 See Kouba, 214. 
373 See Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, 73. 
374 See Riquier, ‘Dossier critique’, 230, note 19. 
375 “Si les phénomènes extérieures ‘paraissent’ se succéder [dans l’Essai], c’est toujours du point de vue d’une 
conscience spectatrice. C’est donc nous qui attribuons une durée aux choses, nous qui introduisons la succession 
en elles en les faisant participer à notre propre temporalité, tandis qu’en elles-mêmes, elles ne connaissent que la 
simultanéité ou le présent. Dans Matière et mémoire (1896), Bergson attribuera cependant à la matière une durée 
propre, analogue à celle de notre conscience, révélée par notre perception qui contracte des moments de la 
matière.” (Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 229, note 42, my translation.) 
376 It is also important to note that despite Bergson’s frequent appeal to a fixed set of examples throughout his 
works, the pendulum one never reappears after TFW. I am grateful to Frédéric Worms for this observation. 
377 MM 205/230-31. 
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The synthesis required for gluing together the before and after can now be located in the matter 
itself, which now provides its own durée-like continuity: 
It is necessary to concede that beyond the infinitely variable succession of our 
perception, objects have their own succession, their own relation to what precedes 
and what follows, that is to say, their own relation to other objects, … .378 
Similarly, the way that “movement” is understood changes between TFW and MM. Whereas 
in TFW “movement” was understood as something peculiar to and inevitably grounded in 
consciousness (recall the pendulum example), now it is accorded to external matter itself. There 
is “real movement” outside the mind and the philosophy of la durée consists merely in 
criticising inappropriate ways of treating it by metaphysicians. Matter becomes a reality 
analogous to consciousness, qualitative in its own right, with a durée of its own:379 
Motion, as studied in mechanics, is but an abstraction or a symbol, a common 
measure, a common denominator, permitting the comparison of all real 
movements with each other; yet these movements, regarded in themselves, are 
indivisibles which occupy duration [la durée], involve a before and an after, and 
link together the successive moments of time by a thread of variable quality which 
cannot be without some likeness to the continuity of our own consciousness.380 
By parity, the negotiation of the separation between the “spatialisation” and la durée is moved 
into matter itself, a metaphysical negotiation not requiring to take into account the human mind: 
My interior consciousness is no longer needed to grasp the internal duality of 
movement: the movement itself is differentiated from its trajectory, and it is in 
exteriority where it is necessary to separate “real movement” from “space 
traversed.”381 
 
378 “Il nous faut admettre qu’au-delà de la succession infiniment variable de notre perception, les objets ont leur 
propre succession, leur propre relation à ce qui précède et à ce qui suit, c’est-à-dire leur rapport aux autres objets, 
… .” (Kouba, ‘Le Mouvement Entre Temps et Espace (Bergson Aux Prises Avec Sa Découverte)’, 216, my 
translation.) 
379 See Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 105; HIT 255. 
380 MM 202-3/227. 
381 “Il n’y a plus besoin de ma conscience intérieure pour saisir la dualité interne du mouvement : il se distingue 
de lui-même de sa trajectoire, et c’est dans l’extériorité qu’il faut dissocier le ‘mouvement réel’ de ‘l’espace 
parcouru.’” (Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 106, my 
translation.) 
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 But Bergson does not stop there. At Stage 3, the plurality of durées is affirmed and 
extended to the entirety of the evolutionary development, thus creating what F. C. T. Moore 
refers to as a “super-phenomenology” of everything.382 La durée becomes “a fundamental 
feature of the Universe as a whole.”383 This roughly corresponds to CE from 1907. A succinct 
summary of this development may be found in Deleuze: 
In a key text from 1903, he insists on the progress made since Time and Free 
Will: Psychological duration, our duration, is now only one case among others, 
among an infinity of others, … . We can see that, as in Matter and Memory, 
psychology is now only an opening onto ontology, a springboard for an 
“installation” in being … . The idea of a virtual coexistence of all the levels of 
the past, of all the levels of tension, is thus extended to the whole of the universe 
… . Everything happens as if the universe were a tremendous Memory. … This 
extension of virtual coexistence to an infinity of specific durations stands out 
clearly in Creative Evolution, where life itself is compared to a memory, the 
genera or species corresponding to coexisting degrees of this vital memory.384 
In CE, la durée no longer just describes the merely phenomenological experience of the 
passage of time “inside our heads,” rather, a multiplicity of real durées in the universe “outside 
our heads” is what grounds the phenomenology of our own durée.385 The human durée and that 
of — or those of — matter (which was at Stage 1 regarded as the domain of juxtaposition, 
externality, spatialised time etc.) and living organisms are now placed on the same scale, 
simply differentiated by different degrees of “tension.”386 Our durée is no longer special. 
Nevertheless, the move from Stage 2 to Stage 3 is not as radical as the step from Stage 1 to 
Stage 2. The main shift to Stage 3 consists in extending the applicability of la durée 
diachronically across the evolutionary development and synchronically elaborating a hierarchy 
of durées that was merely hinted at in the previous stage. At Stage 2, la durée has already been 
“ontologised” and Stage 3 drives home the consequences of this “ontologisation.” Since it is 
now organisms, plants, matter etc. that provide their own continuity, their own “memory,” one 
can begin to see that CE was by many taken to postulate a deeply panpsychist project.387 One 
 
382 Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 9. 
383 Moore, 116 
384 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 76–77. 
385 Deleuze adds that our durée “reveals” the existence and nature of other durées in the universe (Deleuze, Le 
bergsonisme, 24, 77.). 
386 See Worms, ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’, 111. 
387 See for example Dolbeault, ‘Bergson’s Panpsychism’. 
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can already see that Bergson’s philosophy heading in this direction in the conclusion to MM,388 
where he argues that “the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images, is a kind of 
consciousness.”389 
3.3. Ontological and Epistemological Idealisms 
Given the foregoing discussion, one can begin to see how impossible it is to classify la durée, 
where ontology and epistemology are inseparable, with one of the analytic ontologies, all of 
which aim at mind-independent descriptions of time. There are two further problems with the 
application of Bergson’s insights to the analytic discussion. 
 The first problem has to do with methodology. For the purposes of Bergson’s fruitful 
interaction with analytic philosophy, where does one stop the extending of la durée from 
Stage 1 to Stage 3? Do we follow Bergson all the way to Stage 3 and affirm a universal 
becoming, a full realism about time, and something like a growing-block theory, where the 
“growing block” is la durée: a “growing durée theory”? Or do we leave him at Stage 2 and 
affirm the reality of time without the human mind, which is only one of two instances of la 
durée? Perhaps controversially within the context of Bergsonian scholarship, this study will 
opt for the “minimal” option and leave Bergson immediately after Stage 1. That is, I limit the 
existence of la durée to human consciousness and deny it of the external world. There are at 
least three reasons for this. The first has to do with the principal aim not only of this chapter 
but of this entire essay — to find a coherent solution to the problem of free will and divine 
foreknowledge. As we will see in Chapter 5, it is precisely the separation between the external 
durée-less multiplicity and the internal durée that will permit the resolution of the problem. 
The second reason may betray a lack of courage on the part of the author, but following 
Bergson to Stage 3 would likely make his philosophy immediately vulnerable to the various 
accusations directed at him by Russell and other early analytic philosophers.390 As has been 
shown in Chapter 1, it was Bergson’s later works written in Stage 3 that have gained him fame 
and were the first to be translated and read (and intensely criticised) by analytic thinkers. The 
time has perhaps come to focus on themes central to his earlier works and see whether they are 
applicable to current debates in analytic philosophy of time and religion, thereby avoiding the 
necessity to ward off various objections against panpsychism, the idea of grounding mind-
 
388 MM 226-33/254-65. 
389 MM 235/264. 
390 For an extensive treatment, see Salmon, ‘L’apogée de la réception de Bergson en Angleterre’. 
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independent becoming based on the shift from determinism and determinateness,391 or lack of 
a clear distinction between the subject and object in MM.392 Thirdly, affirming the reality of a 
large-scale durée outside the mind makes Bergson’s position vulnerable to innumerable 
objections from the special theory of relativity, since Bergson argues that although there are 
durées at different degrees of “tension,” they still partake of a single unique universal durée, 
with its own present: 
The instances of durée enduring only billionths or trillionths of a second (or less), 
which are to be found at the atomic and sub-atomic levels, flow synchronously 
with the instances of durée which exist at the macro-level.393 
Stipulating a hierarchy of durées that compose the single universal becoming of the entire 
universe may perhaps work in Newtonian physics, but it is difficult to see how it can be made 
compatible with relativity’s removal of a single objective present. The “edge,” however 
vaguely extended, of the growing flux of being is not simultaneous throughout the universe, 
a point which is difficult to make compatible with Bergson’s stipulation of la durée of the 
entire material world: 
It seems as if all the durées distributed throughout the universe were more and 
more punctuated by the bass line which constitutes the durée of the material 
universe: as if this counterpoint-like relation, manifested locally by the 
phenomenon of perception and by the evidence of a lived simultaneity between 
the flux of consciousness and the flux of nature, indicated ways of an intuitive 
grasp on the coexistence and actual communication of the durées.394 
The material universe, as much as it endures “of a piece,” so to speak, is an 
extensive expression of an intensive unity of coexistent durées of different 
contractions.395 
 
391 See for example Grünbaum, ‘The Status of Temporal Becoming’, 389. 
392 See Russell, ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’, 345. 
393 Dainton, ‘Bergson on Temporal Experience and Durée Réelle’, 99, my italics. 
394 “Tout se passe alors comme si les durées distribuées dans l’univers étaient scandées de loin en loin par la basse 
continue que constitue la durée de l’univers matériel ; comme si ce rapport contrapuntique, manifesté localement 
par le phénomène de la perception et l’évidence d’une simultanéité vécue entre le flux de la conscience et les flux 
de la nature, indiquait les voies d’une saisie intuitive de la coexistence et de la communication effective des 
durées … . ” (During, ‘Dossier critique’, 242, my translation.) 
395 “L’univers matériel, en tant qu’il dure pour ainsi dire d’une pièce, est l’expression extensive de l’unité intensive 
des durées coexistantes, variablement contractées.” (During, 244, my translation.) 
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Indeed, it was precisely the attempt at harmonising the various “fictional times”396 of different 
reference frames that have led Bergson mistakenly to postulate a unique single real time of the 
universe:397  
[According to Bergson] there are indeed a multiplicity of actual durations, …, but 
equally, there is a single time or duration which encompasses them, and which 
discloses them as such … .398  
Understandably, this was one of several mistakes committed in the course of his engagement 
with Einstein that have lamentably contributed to the discrediting of the relevance of his views 
on time in analytic philosophy. I believe that this issue can be neatly resolved by limiting 
la durée to the mind of the observer; in this way, the Einsteinian observers with their own 
durées can happily coexist together in different reference frames.399 The mismatch between 
their durées (say, in the twin paradox, which Bergson merely reduced to a thought experiment, 
unaware of its empirical verifiability400) remains resolved using spatialised time. The 
immediate temporal experience of this mismatch (say, one of the twins being surprised by how 
quickly the other has aged) has no more import than the mismatch between la durée and 
spatialised time in everyday life — say, when one realises with surprise how quickly objective 
time flies at a party. 
 The last observation also brings us to the second problem. As section 3.2 has indicated, 
one of the motivations for the move from Stage 1 to Stages 2 and 3 was to deal with the 
problems regarding the relationship between the mind and the external world. How can these 
problems be resolved now that the solutions devised by Bergson in Stages 2 and 3 become 
unavailable? Specifically, recall that one of the aims of moving to Stage 2 was to respond to a 
lurking worry about idealism. If we limit the existence of la durée only to the mind, how do 
we explain the existence of positions (say, of the pendulum) in spatialised time in the external 
world without attributing la durée to the world itself? The second problem may, therefore, be 
stated as a list of questions: Is Bergson of Stage 1 an idealist? And if so, is he an ontological 
 
396 See During, 249, note 1. 
397 During, 243; see also Durie, ‘Introduction’, xii. 
398 Durie, ‘Introduction’, xxi. 
399 One might here object that Einstein’s theory does not rest on the existence of real observers, who may easily 
be replaced by, say, machines. This is a point which will be treated in the following section. 
400 See During, ‘Dossier critique’, 243; Lévy-Leblond, ‘Le Boulet d’Einstein et les boulettes de Bergson’, 246–
52. 
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or an epistemological idealist? Or is he confusing the two? And whichever he is, how does this 
relate to the analytic ontologies outlined above? 
 Let us start with the following definitions:401 
By ontological idealism (OI), I understand the claim that the mind is the ultimate 
foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality. 
By epistemological idealism (EI), I understand the claim that something exists 
independently of the mind, but that everything we can know about this mind-independent 
“reality” is so permeated by the formative or constructive activities of the mind that all 
claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of knowledge about 
the content of the mind. 
Guyer and Horstmann, who have provided the basis for these definitions classify Berkeley as 
holding OI and Kant as holding EI.402 Each one of these positions can further be refined by 
limiting the particular type of idealism in question to be an idealism about something, in the 
case of this essay, about time. Therefore: 
By ontological idealism about time (OIT), I understand the claim that la durée is the 
ultimate ontological foundation of time (however understood), or perhaps even exhaustive 
of time (however understood). 
By epistemological idealism about time (EIT), I understand the claim that although 
something related to “time” exists independently of the mind, everything we can know 
about this temporally extended “reality” is so permeated by the formative or constructive 
activities of la durée that all claims to knowledge about such a reality are, in some sense, 
a form of knowledge about the contents of la durée. 
Or in more simple terms, OIT implies that there is no time without la durée, EIT implies that 
there is no representation of time without la durée, that is, that knowledge about any temporal 
object is partially knowledge about our own mind. Both OIT and EIT are thus “smaller-scale” 
idealisms, they imply idealism about a certain part of reality, but not about reality as a whole. 
 Bergson’s durée, whose extension will from now be limited to Stage 1, is clearly an 
example of EIT. As we have learnt in section 2.2, introspection gives us immediate access to 
 
401 These definitions are based on and use exact wording from Guyer and Horstmann, ‘Idealism’. 
402 Guyer and Horstmann; see also Brook, ‘Kant and Time-Order Idealism’. 
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change in consciousness (la durée), which is then transformed into the representational 
spatialised structure appealed to by the A/B-theories. We start with the immediate indivisible 
experience of change and then break it up for the purposes of practical knowledge. The 
“something” existing independently of the mind consists of the external world “reborn at every 
instant,”403 it is only represented as temporal once it has come into contact with la durée. 
 How about OIT? Here the picture is much more complex. With Stages 2 and 3, the 
answer is evident — Bergson would certainly deny OIT since the universe endures 
independently of the human mind. Conversely, one certainly cannot accuse him of holding OI 
at Stage 1. Take the example of the pendulum: although Bergson argues that the movement of 
the pendulum does not exist without the mind since the movement is always grounded in la 
durée, he would nevertheless say that the positions of the pendulum are still there — perhaps 
one could go as far as to claim that he denies EI about the positions of the pendulum. To make 
matters even more complicated, in some of his writings from Stages 2 and 3, he seems to make 
unwarranted conclusions from epistemology to ontology and thus glide back and forth between 
OI and EI. For example, he frequently seems to use the fact that we do not know the entire set 
of facts about the future (epistemological premise) to support the non-existence of the future 
(an ontological conclusion).404 The most flagrant example of this confusion is his proof against 
the possibility of nothingness from CE,405 where he fallaciously argues from the 
epistemological impossibility of conceiving nothingness (the conception of nothingness 
requires someone to conceive it, i.e., a conceiving mind, which, itself implies the existence of 
something, i.e., the conceiving mind itself) to its ontological impossibility.406 Although one 
could here attempt to defend Bergson by saying that the non-existence of the future is an 
inference to the best explanation  (in that its non-existence best explains the lack of knowledge), 
this would be completely unsupported by Bergson’s actual statements in the relevant sections 
of CE. 
 However, things are much simpler if we limit Bergson’s writings to Stage 1, where it 
seems coherent to ascribe OIT to his thought. La durée in TFW is both the immediately 
accessible ontological source of time since it is itself an instantiation of temporality (OIT) as 
well as the basis for the synthesis of individual unconnected positions of spatialised time in the 
 
403 DS 30/41. See also Barnard, Living Consciousness. The Metaphysical Vision of Henri Bergson, 39–40. 
404 CM 84-5/113-14; DS 43/61. 
405 CE 272-98/272-98. 
406 This argument is vehemently refuted in Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, 90. 
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external world (EIT); nevertheless, the positions of time in the external world (e.g., the 
positions of the pendulum) still exist (not-OI).407 
 
Before continuing, let us summarise where the argument has proceeded so far. We have seen 
that the distinction between temporal ontologies, that is, theories about what exists in time, are 
more fundamental than the distinction between A/B-theories, a distinction that Bergson has 
been shown to evade in Chapter 2. We have also seen that the development of Bergson’s 
positions on the relation between the mind and the world makes it necessary to stipulate a cut-
off point in this development — this cut-off point was placed after Stage 1.408 Finally, we have 
seen that at the end of Stage 1, although Bergson does not propose an ontological idealism 
simpliciter (OI), he does hold onto both an epistemological and an ontological idealism about 
time (EIT and OIT). With Bergson’s insights thus circumscribed and refined, have we come 
any closer to answering the fundamental questions raised by analytic temporal ontologies? 
3.4. Observer-Relativising Temporal Dimensions 
The main function of the three analytic temporal ontologies outlined earlier lies in providing 
answers to the question “Does x exist?” where x refers to an object or event in objective time.409 
Thus, for example, for all x, eternalism would answer in the affirmative (provided, of course, 
that the events or objects in question do in fact exist) and index the existence of x to a set of 
points in objective time, i.e., in the “spatialised” structure shared by the A and B-theories and 
discussed in Chapter 2. Similarly, the growing-block theorist would only answer in the 
affirmative where x refers to a past or a present event, but in the negative where x refers to a 
future event. 
 However, formulating the question about temporal ontologies by asking “Does x exist?” 
presents two problems — the first for philosophy of religion (which will be treated in the 
following chapter), the second for Bergson’s philosophy limited to Stage 1. 
 First, Ryan Mullins has recently argued that with the exception of Wycliffe, most of the 
classical theists who affirmed divine eternity were presentists,410 and points out that the claim 
 
407 I leave undecided the question about the extent of EI in Bergson — here EI is limited only to time (i.e., EIT). 
408 This does not mean that Bergson’s later works will not be appealed to from this point, but that some of the 
conclusions of those books will be rejected. 
409 The problem is different when it comes to the existence of timeless objects, such as numbers, propositions or 
universals, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this work. Bergson treats this topic in EPL 107-8. 
410 Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 74. 
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endorsed by many contemporary theologians about medieval theists holding eternalism is 
deeply anachronistic.411 As a matter of fact, the compatibility of divine atemporality and 
presentism has been recently explicitly defended by Leftow.412 But note that, intuitively, there 
seems to be an immediate problem with trying to square divine eternality with non-eternalist 
ontologies. If all events co-exist with eternity, but at the same time do not exist at individual 
points in time (past and future for the presentist, future for the growing block theorist), it seems 
that in such a set-up we cannot provide a definite answer to the “Does x exist?” question. Take 
an event y in the future. On the presentist view, the answer to “Does y exist?” is negative. 
However, since y must co-exist with eternity for God to know it, it seems that we should answer 
in the affirmative. A succinct formulation of this problem can be found in Prior: 
I simply cannot see how presentness, pastness or futurity of any state of affairs 
can be in any way relative to the persons to whom this state of affairs is known. 
What makes this quite impossible to stomach is precisely the truth … that the 
future has an openness to alternatives which the past has not; such openness is 
just not the sort of thing that can be present for one observer and absent for 
another — either it exists or it doesn’t and there’s an end to it; … . So I don’t 
understand what is meant by saying that contingent future occurrences are neither 
contingent nor future as God sees them, though I do understand what would be 
meant if it were said that they are neither contingent nor future when God sees 
them. How, in fact, could God know a state of affairs to be present and beyond 
alteration, until it is present and beyond alteration … ?413 
To clarify, Mullins does point out that the claim about events co-existing with eternity is, in 
classical theism, primarily one about divine knowledge, not about ontology: 
When the Christian tradition says that all moments are present to God in eternity 
— at least with regard to God’s omniscience — it is not meant to say something 
about the ontology of time. Rather it is saying something about God’s mode of 
cognition.414 
 
411 Mullins, 75. 
412 See his most recent Leftow, ‘Presentism, Atemporality, and Time’s Way’; see also Leftow, ‘Aquinas on Time 
and Eternity’. 
413 Prior, ‘The Formalities Of Omniscience’, 128; see also Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in 
Aquinas’, 203. 
414 Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 86. 
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However, even though we may have evaded the apparent contradiction in answering “Does x 
exist?” both in the affirmative and in the negative by arguing that presentism really has to do 
with ontology in the temporal realm, whereas eternity has to do with divine knowledge of the 
temporal realm, the ontological question about things existing in eternity still remains 
unanswered. Besides, separating epistemology and ontology to dissolve the contradiction is 
not as easy as one might think. Knowledge is factive. “Truth goes with existence.”415 One thus 
cannot simply put the truthmaker problem in brackets and argue for different senses of “being 
present” (the one epistemic, the other ontological). One suggested solution to this problem is 
to accept eternalism. For example, Craig contends that this was, in fact, Aquinas’ original 
solution to the foreknowledge problem: 
[T]he presence of all events to God does not seem to be merely epistemic; rather 
Aquinas’ understanding of foreknowledge seems to require that the past and 
future be ontologically on a par with presently existing reality.416  
[T]he entire temporal series would seem to exist timelessly, on the analogy of a 
spatial extension, and as such is known by God.417  
Similarly, Mellor argues that the “tenseless” view of time, most closely affiliated to the 
eternalist ontology, does seem to resolve a whole host of problems regarding divine knowledge 
of the world: “Whenever I write this article, if it tenselessly exists at all it exists always, and 
God can know it at any time.”418 However, if Mullins is right about the fact that classical theism 
affirms a non-eternalist ontology, it is still legitimate to ask whether there is a way of squaring 
divine eternity with a non-eternalist ontology without obtaining contradictory replies to the 
“Does x exist?” question. We will return to this problem in more detail in the following chapter, 
although the ontological solution proposed below will already begin to indicate how the matter 
may be resolved. 
 Secondly, an identical ambiguity regarding answers to “Does x exist?” is present in 
Bergson, although here the stating of the problem is slightly less complicated. Take a particular 
event in the past, say, watching a film a week ago. Do the individual scenes of the film exist? 
On the one hand, Bergson’s repeated claims about the past existing (see section 3.1) seem to 
force an affirmative answer — the event exists in the past of my durée (in my memory), which 
 
415 Mellor, ‘Special Relativity and Present Truth’, 74. 
416 Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’, 480. 
417 Craig, 482. 
418 Mellor, ‘History Without the Flow of Time’, 74. 
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I “carry with me.” On the other hand, Bergson’s statements about matter being “reborn at every 
instant” (see the previous section) seem to require an answer in the negative — surely, if matter 
is reborn at every instant, the same must be the case for individual scenes in the film, 
themselves constituted by matter or matter-related phenomena indexed to the spatialised A/B-
structure (see Chapter 2), say, rays of light passing through the translucent film and then 
refracting off the surface of the wall and into my retina. Note that the conflict in question cannot 
be dealt with simply by saying that this situation is approximately analogous to the colour red 
example (see section 3.2), whose light-wave oscillations, connecting “before” and “after,” 
provide their own continuity without any need for the human durée; this option is now off the 
table since we have left Bergson before Stage 2, and denied an independent existence of la 
durée in the external world.  
 Is there a way to solve both of these problems? Can we generate an ontology of time 
that, on the one hand, harmonises with Bergson’s durée at Stage 1 and is thus faithful to our 
immediate phenomenological experience of time and, on the other hand, fits into classical theist 
positions about the relation of time and eternity? Although one might say that simply accepting 
eternalism à la Craig or Mellor quoted above (thereby simply rejecting Bergsonian philosophy 
tout court) is the way to go, I will argue that there is an alternative option that is not only 
compatible with Bergson’s philosophy at Stage 1 but also furnishes a model that can generate 
a more powerful solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. This 
model, based on a durée-oriented development of Mauro Dorato’s “ontologisation” of space-
time points in Time and Reality from 1995, consists of changing the fundamental question 
about the existence of temporal objects from “Does x exist?” to “Whom does x exist for?”, thus 
taking up Prior’s challenge about presentness, pastness, and futurity of a set of affairs being 
relative to the persons by whom this set of affairs is known. In a peculiar twist, the following 
argument could be considered as staging what Bergson would have (and should have) said to 
Einstein, had the unfortunate 1920s exchange taken place 20 years earlier, before Bergson 
moved to Stage 2. 
 
Following the formulation of the special theory of relativity, philosophers of time have 
recognised that simultaneity and succession cannot be extended as absolute relations 
throughout the universe, but may only be limited to a given frame of reference. That is, one 
cannot meaningfully answer questions of the form “Is x simultaneous with y?”, but only 
questions of the form “Given a particular reference frame, is x simultaneous with y?” Note 
that the relativity of the ordering of events (already rather problematic for the A-theorist) poses 
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a particular ontological problem for the presentist observed by Putnam,419 which Miller 
summarises as follows: 
[S]uppose that John and Bert co-exist, that is, each judges the other to be 
simultaneous with himself. Suppose that according to Bert, Mary co-exists with 
Bert. Suppose existence is transitive — if x co-exists with y, and y co-exists with 
z, then x co-exists with z. Then it follows that John co-exists with Mary. But it is 
consistent with all that we have said that from John’s frame of reference, Mary 
does not co-exist with John but instead Mary is located earlier, or later, than John. 
So if John is committed to Mary’s existence, then he is committed to the existence 
of objects that are not, relative to his frame of reference, in the present. Since we 
can set up long chains of observers located in different frames of reference, we 
can derive the conclusion that John ought to be committed to the existence of 
objects he takes to be very distantly located in the past or future, and likewise for 
all the other observers in the chain.420 
Contrary to the seemingly inevitable inference from relativity to eternalism put forward by 
Miller,421 in the remainder of this chapter, I wish to defend the following argument, which 
demonstrates that the “Does x exist?” question (where x refers to a temporally extended object), 
to which eternalism is the answer, is not a well-formulated one and should instead be replaced 
with a different question that partially relativizes the existence of x to the durée of a particular 
human observer, thus appealing to Bergson’s OIT from Stage 1: 
P1: The temporal dimension of a given segment of spacetime is an instance of spatialised 
time. 
P2: Spatialised time is ontologically dependent for its existence on la durée.422 (OIT) 
P3 (from P1 & P2): The temporal dimension of a given segment of spacetime is dependent 
for its existence on la durée. 
 
419 See Putnam, ‘Time and Physical Geometry’; Rietdijk, ‘A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the 
Special Theory of Relativity’. 
420 Miller, ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’, 352. 
421 Mellor provides three examples of failed attempts at avoiding the inference from special relativity to the 
existence of all things on a par in Mellor, ‘Special Relativity and Present Truth’, 75–76. 
422 The relations of “being relative to” and “being dependent on” are transitive. Furthermore: let R designate 
“being relative to.” Then: if aRb, then (a & c)Rb. For example, if the property of “being to the left of Lewis” is 
relative to Lewis, then so is the property of “being to the left of Lewis and liking coffee.” 
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P4: La durée is human-observer-relative. 
P5 (from P3 & P4): The temporal dimension of a given segment of spacetime is human-
observer-relative. 
P6: All temporally extended objects423 are partially constituted by a temporal dimension 
forming a segment of spacetime, whose existence is human-observer-relative. 
C: (from P5 & P6): Existence of temporally extended objects is human-observer-
relative. 
The conclusion, roughly speaking, states that for non-timeless garden-variety objects (i.e., 
objects excluding numbers, universals and the like424), asking, “Does x exist?”, is incomplete. 
We should instead ask, “Does x exist for a human observer S?” Let us look at the individual 
premises of the argument and the intermediary conclusions. 
 P1: The temporal dimension of a given segment of spacetime is an instance of 
spatialised time. The fact that the temporal dimension of a given frame of reference (a system 
of coordinates with conventionally fixed points of reference) is Bergson’s “spatialised time” 
should now be fairly clear from the foregoing discussion. It displays all the features that 
Bergson accords to spatialised time, be it divisibility, susceptibility to mathematical 
representability by geometric objects (lines, angles etc.), applicability to material objects, 
inability to capture the heterogeneous development of mental states etc. Chapter 2 has clearly 
demonstrated that the B-series is an instance of “spatialised time” — and, as Leftow observes, 
“every temporal frame of reference generates its own unique B-series.”425 Note again that the 
“spatialisation” here is not caused by the fact that objective time forms a part of spacetime (see 
the discussion in Chapter 1, especially Mellor’s claim that “time’s being a dimension of 
spacetime does not make it spatial,”426 as well as the discussion of D. C. Williams in Chapter 2), 
 
423 In what follows I treat temporal “events,” “entities,” and “objects” as interchangeable terms. By each of these, 
I understand a “thing” in spacetime that has three spatial and one temporal dimensions, none of the values of 
which are zero. That is, my usage of “event,” though comprising the fact that it is located in spacetime, or, as 
Maudlin puts it, is a “place-in-space-at-a-time” (Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, 60.), departs 
slightly from the usual terminology of physics (where an “event” in spacetime is taken to be instantaneous), since 
I do not discuss instantaneous events. 
424 For a discussion of how the existence of these relates to time, see Leftow, Time and Eternity, 39–49.  
425 Leftow, ‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’, 393, footnote 10. 
426 Mellor, Mind, Meaning, and Reality, 164. 
 
 99  
but by the internal topological features that constitute objective time (as opposed to those that 
constitute la durée). 
 P2: Spatialised time is ontologically dependent for its existence on la durée. This was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2. Recall that la durée, an ineliminable and irreducible instance of 
change, is the ontological ground of all temporality (spatialised or not), it is therefore also the 
basis for the spatialised structure used by A/B-theorists to capture objective time. But, as 
Bergson argues (in Stage 1), without la durée’s synthesis of successive states of the external 
world, the set of those successive states would not exist as a unified structure; it would simply 
consist of individual disconnected instantaneous slices of reality existing each by itself without 
any connection to the others.427 In the case of relativity, every instance of the B-structure of 
objective time (dependent on the human mind) is a subset of Minkowski spacetime: the 
“instantaneous” visions, therefore, are best understood as planes of simultaneity relativized to 
particular space-time points. This is precisely what constituted a part of the disagreement 
between Bergson and Einstein; although Einstein insisted that the “observer” (say, in the 
famous train and lightning thought experiment) is only introduced as an illustration (and could 
easily be replaced by a measuring instrument recording the light-signals and noting positions 
of simultaneity/succession), for Bergson a real human mind qua la durée is required to 
synthesise various spatial positions of objects for there to be relations of simultaneity and 
succession in the first place: “[F]or Bergson, the physicist’s time is no time at all when it is 
separated from duration.”428 Succession and simultaneity, according to Bergson, require a 
human mind; not only to represent them (EIT) but also to ontologically ground them (OIT). 
 P3: The temporal dimension of a given segment of spacetime is dependent for its 
existence on la durée.429 The conclusion reached from the two preceding premises means that 
every instance of the B-structure (i.e., the ordering of events by “before” and “after” relations) 
 
427 See for example Kouba, ‘Le Mouvement Entre Temps et Espace (Bergson Aux Prises Avec Sa Découverte)’, 
209; Durie, ‘Introduction’, viii. 
428 Durie, ‘Introduction’, xiv, xx. 
429 Strictly speaking, one should speak not of “a reference frame relative to a particular instance of la durée”, but 
perhaps of “a reference frame relative to a particular instance of la durée at a given present moment,” since there 
may not be a one-to-one correspondence between an observer and a reference frame. If la durée is limited to the 
present, speeds up and slows down, does each one of these “presents” generate its own retrospective B-series-like 
reference frame? In what follows, I leave this question undecided for two reasons. First, the reference frames are 
generated by appealing to the hypothetical transmission of light signals between physical clocks — the moments 
measured out by these clocks (in a given reference frame) are constant and regular; la durée merely serves to 
synthesise these into a unified whole. Second, since la durée (as opposed to its trace analysable directly by the B-
structure) is located in the present, it is questionable whether one should methodologically differentiate between 
“la durée” and a “la durée at a given present moment.”  
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should be relativized to a particular instance of la durée. This means that the ordering of events 
by relations of “before” and “after” is different depending on which particular durée 
constituting it we pick to relativize it — for some durées two events could be related by a 
simultaneity relation, for others, they could be related by a “before and after” relation. Note 
that the difference between (i) a reference frame being mind-dependent and (ii) the relations 
between whatever occupies different points of the reference frame being mind-dependent, is 
otiose. This is because a particular reference frame is defined using temporal relations which 
are themselves mind-dependent. A reference frame, in this context, can thus be understood as 
a “triadic” B-series; one that involves the dyadic relation of “before” and “after” with the added 
relation of this dyadic relation to a particular observer whose mind is required for its ontological 
constitution. 
 P4: La durée is human-observer-relative. This premise is a restating of Bergson at 
Stage 1: every human mind is a different durée. Recall that we have limited Bergson’s claims 
about la durée to human observers, thus excluding the possibility of non-human durées at 
different degrees of “tension.” In Stages 2-3 Bergson says that all durées ontologically 
instantiate time, but it is only at Stage 1 where this ontological instantiation refers to the human 
mind. Here it is worth pointing out that Bergson would have probably agreed with some of 
Grünbaum’s claims about the mind-dependence of temporal becoming. Grünbaum argues that 
“becoming is mind-dependent, because it is not an attribute of physical events per se, but 
requires the occurrence of states of conceptualised awareness.”430 Bergson would simply say 
that this claim is trivial since any temporal notion (la durée or objective time) is always mind-
dependent (OIT). However, he would likely have been in agreement with him about the fact 
that a reference to a real human observer is required to establish the existence of the present 
moment (perhaps with a partial disagreement about the idea of “conceptual awareness”): 
What qualifies a physical event at a time t as belonging to the present or as now 
is not some physical attribute of the event or some relation it sustains to other 
purely physical events; instead what so qualifies the event is that at least one 
human or other mind-possessing organism M experiences the event at the time t 
such that at the time t, M is conceptually aware of the following fact: this having 
of the experience of the event coincides temporally with his awareness of the fact 
that has it at all.431 
 
430 Grünbaum, ‘The Status of Temporal Becoming’, 375. 
431 Grünbaum, 381. 
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 Bergson would, nevertheless, disagree with Grünbaum’s insistence that temporal 
precedence (i.e., two events in spacetime ordered by reference-frame-relative B-relation) is not 
mind-dependent; the synthesising consciousness with memory is required to establish the 
relations of before and after in the first place.  
 P6: All temporally extended objects are partially constituted by a temporal dimension 
forming a segment of spacetime, whose existence is human-observer-relative. This premise 
implies the controversial claim that co-existence is not transitive. To see this, take a particular 
human observer, Emma, a temporal dimension relative to her position in spacetime (five 
minutes) and two temporally extended objects/events that co-exist in that human observer’s 
temporal dimension, Emma’s watching an advert on the living-room TV and boiling an egg in 
the kitchen. Suppose Emma lives on a particularly large spaceship where her kitchen is half a 
light-year away from her living room. In that case, her boiling egg does not coexist with the 
advert for another observer, Eleanor, who is passing on a different spaceship past Emma’s: the 
temporal dimension constituting the temporal extension of the four-dimensional event of the 
boiling egg event may exist in her durée when the event of the advert on the TV does not, 
depending on whether she flies past the kitchen or the living-room first. The earlier-suggested 
possibility of not treating temporal co-existence as a transitive relation is briefly considered by 
Miller, but later rejected on the basis of its counter-intuitiveness: 
[I]t can be argued that what we have learned from S[pecial] T[heory of] 
R[elativity] is that all talk should be frame-relativized, and therefore that talk of 
existence and co-existence ought to be frame-relativized. … The idea that 
existence itself is not transitive is counterintuitive. It is, after all, the idea that 
although x exists relative to Peter, and Peter and Bert exist relative to one another, 
nevertheless x does not exist relative to Bert.432 
Similarly, Dorato, raising a potential objection against his own position says: 
The main point raised by the full-view theorist [i.e., the eternalist] is that a 
relativization of ontological notions is much more dubious than one concerning 
an epistemic or semantic notion, because we resist thinking that the 
determinateness of what is can depend on a spacetime point or, worse, on an 
inertial frame. Frames should not carry such a heavy metaphysical weight, 
because, after all, the partitions into past and future they induce by an orthogonal 
 
432 Miller, ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’, 354. 
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hyperplane of simultaneity do not represent possible worlds, but rather different 
spatio-temporal “coordinatizations” of the same world.433 
Two things need to be said: first, following relativity, the counterintuitiveness of many basic 
notions must simply be accepted as a fact, especially if they cohere with other scientific facts. 
Secondly, there is a way of making the notion of frame-relativising existence more plausible, 
which is precisely what Dorato himself demonstrates. Space does not permit me to present his 
argument in full,434 but, in summary, he draws an intrinsic connection between the notions of 
determinedness and determinateness which, for him, are always relativized to a particular 
space-time point,435 thus contradicting much of what was said in Prior’s earlier quote on p. 94. 
Once space-time points are understood not purely epistemically or semantically, but 
ontologically, we can place the weight of relativizing ontological qualifications about existence 
and non-existence onto them and subsequently, onto reference frames consisting of sets of 
these space-time points, thus not necessarily following the inference from relativity to 
eternalism: 
[I]f we interpret the claim of unreality of the future as meaning that the future is 
(wholly, or partially) indeterminate or undetermined not with [respect] to a spatial 
hypersurface, but with respect to a spacetime point, the formulation of the 
relativist non-full [i.e., non-eternalist] views is not outright incoherent.436 
There is no one single existent reality that all the different “visions” dependent on individual 
space-time points are visions of.437 We thus end up with what Le Poidevin has fittingly captured 
in a review of Dorato’s book as “relative realities.”438 This is not that different from Kit Fine’s 
suggestion that once we abandon the idea of a single unified reality, we may well stipulate that 
every given standpoint (“standpoint” in the context here being coextensive with a given 
coordinate system generated by an observer’s mind) gives rise to its own reality, without this 
necessarily running into contradictions with the special theory of relativity: “Each 
(representative) standpoint will give rise to its own reality and no one can be singled out as 
being the standpoint of reality.”439 
 
433 Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 124. 
434 For a summary of his argument, see Dorato, 210. 
435 Dorato, 124–25. 
436 Dorato, 147. 
437 Dorato, 128, 152. 
438 Le Poidevin, ‘Relative Realities’. 
439 Fine, ‘Tense and Reality’, 305. 
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 C: Existence of temporally extended objects is human-observer-relative. Tooley 
argues that the notions of “existing” and “not existing” are insufficient: they must be coupled 
with the notion of existing as of a given time.440 He is right, but we need to take a step further. 
Since the objective time as of which things exist is relative to a given durée (which is 
instantiated by actual real human beings “in flesh and blood” so to speak), I argue that existence 
and non-existence in time should be relativized to a human observer with memory, i.e., 
replaced with “existence/non-existence for whom.” This obviously entails something like a 
local growing-block theory of time, although one relativized to sets of space-time points with 
durées in them — the past and present exist only insofar as they are the present and past of 
a particular instance of la durée occupying a set of space-time points. 
 Note that in this respect my view follows Dorato in the relativization of existence (with 
the difference that for him existence is relative to space-time points, whereas on my account 
existence is relative to human observers occupying particular worldlines and generating frames 
of reference consisting of specific space-time points), but goes against his attempt to exclude 
the human mind from the picture.441 For instance, Dorato says the following: 
In spacetime physics, talk of observers, often associated with misleading 
“anthropocentric” philosophies of relativity according to which the human 
observer has a special role in the universe … , can be replaced completely in 
favour of talk involving clocks and coincidences of light rays. The latter talk, still 
extrinsic because based on frames, can in its turn be replaced by an intrinsic, 
geometric formulation of the theory. This can only be welcomed in the present 
approach because we want the formulation of the relativistic non-full views to be 
as mind- and observer-independent as possible.442 
Leaving aside the question of whether the human observer has a “special” role in the 
universe,443 it should now become clear from the previous chapters that the human mind does 
have a special role in the ontological foundation of temporality. For example, Dorato defines 
temporal becoming as consisting of two ingredients: “One is a mind-independent distinction 
between past and future. The other is a mind-independent, continuous change of the instant of 
separation, the present.”444 Bergson would argue that by their very nature, neither of these two 
 
440 Tooley, Time, Tense and Causation, 37–40. 
441 See for example Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 139. 
442 Dorato, 137. 
443 In the quotation above, Dorato refers to Prigogine and Stengers, Order out of Chaos. 
444 Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 10. 
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ingredients can ever be mind-independent. The point can be made even more pertinent by 
returning to the distinction between two “real times” discussed in section 2.3. As has been 
argued there, physics operates with objective “real time.” Once la durée has established the 
fundamental temporal relations of precedence and posteriority that link any two states of the 
external world at a given time and used this to build objective time, physicists can calculate 
using objective time without reference to la durée. La durée, which is the ontological 
foundation of time simpliciter never features in the mathematical equations that represent it.445 
The relation between la durée and objective time is primarily a metaphysical question, one an 
answer to which cannot be answered by physics. This is related to a point raised about 
Bergson’s engagement with Einstein by Lévy-Leblond, who argues that Bergson was 
unjustified in stressing to the physicist that notions of simultaneity and succession are 
inevitably tied to the prior lived experience of la durée since 
physics is physics and we cannot accuse it of not providing responses to global 
questions about where it originates from. Quite the contrary, it is precisely by 
reducing its field of enquiry and its level of conceptualisation that it manages to 
give a representation of the world, which is certainly partial, but reliable.446 
 A methodological point needs to be said to the Bergsonian scholar who has begun to 
detect eerie echoes of Bergson’s engagement with relativity: Was it not the dangerous fusion 
of la durée and relativity that led to Bergson’s outright wrong conclusions such as denying the 
empirical possibility of the twin paradox447 and the postulation of a single real time in the 
universe?448 Would the Bergsonian scholar not be better off following Lévy-Leblond’s 
suggestion that it is better to avoid attempts at subsuming physics into the Bergsonian 
metaphysical system and instead opt for something like Gaston Bachelard’s radical separation 
between scientific and common or intuitive knowledge?449 Although the point regarding 
methodologically subsuming relativity under an a priori philosophy is certainly true, what my 
project of fusing la durée with the reference-frame-relativization of existence attempted is 
 
445 TFW 193/145. 
446 “[L]a physique n’est que la physique et on ne saurait lui reprocher de ne pas fournir une réponse globale aux 
questions d’où elle part. Bien au contraire, c’est en réduisant son champ d’investigation et son niveau de 
conceptualisation qu’elle arrive à donner du monde une représentation certainement partielle, mais fiable.” (Lévy-
Leblond, ‘Le Boulet d’Einstein et les boulettes de Bergson’, 245, my translation.) 
447 DS 127-34/183-98. 
448 For a summary of the type of mistakes that Bergson committed, see Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space 
and Time, 79–80. 
449 See Lévy-Leblond, ‘Le Boulet d’Einstein et les boulettes de Bergson’, 255. 
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precisely the opposite: I am subsuming Bergson’s durée under the physical theory and not the 
other way around. That way, I am merely “attaching” the human-mind-dependent durée to 
individual points in spacetime rather than — as Bergson did — trying to locate a single “real 
time”450 hiding under the spacetime as a whole and somehow disclosed through a priori 
reasoning about individual durées. (This “attachment” is merely methodological and not 
ontological, since, ontologically, it is the subsets of the space-time structure that are “attached” 
to individual instances of la durée.) In this respect, my model maintains the link between 
human consciousness and time (be it as la durée or as objective time) that Bergson affirmed in 
the third chapter of Duration and Simultaneity451 but rejects the two unacceptable conclusions 
that Bergson affirmed there: (i) Langevin’s twin paradox can, on the theory suggested above, 
simply be interpreted as a mismatch between la durée and objective time — the earth-twin’s 
surprise at the unequal ageing of the space-twin is, (a) if based on spatialised time (noting that 
the space-twin’s clocks are mismatched) explicable by physics, (b) if based on a surprise about 
the durée of the earth-twin not being in sync with the clock of the other one, no more different 
than the mismatch we sometimes experience between our durée and objective time in a single 
reference frame (“Oh gosh, is that the time?!”). (ii) A single “real time” is rejected simply 
because “reality” is relativized to a given durée occupying a particular set of space-time points. 
 
* * * 
 
This chapter has shown that Bergson’s philosophy cannot be easily subsumed under either of 
the available analytic ontologies of time. The examination of the possibility of such submission 
has, however, revealed a further inescapable link between the existence of the human mind and 
time. I suggested that Bergson’s philosophy, when circumscribed to his early works, can be 
taken to imply an ontological (“no mind” = “no time”) and therefore an epistemological 
idealism about time, both of which, when combined with the relativization of existence, results 
in the surprising conclusion that the existence of temporal objects is human-observer-relative. 
We started by asking whether Bergson’s philosophy fits better into eternalism, presentism, or 
the growing-block theory and ended with something that is best described as a “mind-
dependent local growing-block theory indexed to the durées of individual observers occupying 
various worldlines in spacetime.” 
 
450 For a discussion of the notion of ‘Real time,’ see During, ‘Dossier critique’, 278–79, note 24. 
451 DS 30-47/41-67. 
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 The questions that this conclusion opens up are numerous: Does the claim about 
temporal objects’ existence being relative to a human observer not look like an ontological 
idealism simpliciter? Have we not incautiously slipped from claiming that the “existence in 
time” of an object is observer-relative to claiming that the “existence of an object” is relative 
to an observer existing in time? And how does this relate to the presence of all things to eternity 
hinted at earlier? These are questions that the next chapter will turn to. 
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4. Eternity and Ontological Idealism About Time 
The previous chapter concluded with the observation that for any object existing in spacetime, 
its existence must be relativized to a human observer whose mind is defined as la durée.452 In 
other words, for every temporally extended object or event, we cannot simply ask “Does it 
exist?”, rather, we must reformulate the question as “Whom does it exist for?” This partially-
idealist ontology presents several problems. For example, it is difficult to see how to prevent 
an idealism about the temporal aspect of objects from sliding into an ontological idealism about 
all objects simpliciter. One might also wonder whether such an ontology can ensure objectivity 
between various observers with la durée or, perhaps most problematically, how to avoid the 
route from “existence of objects being partially relativized to observers’ durée” to “la durée 
‘producing’ existing objects.” 
 This chapter argues that the temporal ontology outlined in the previous chapter is 
incomplete and deficient without an appeal to the nature of the relation between any existing 
thing and God. More specifically, I will argue that an appeal to God’s “creative knowledge” of 
the world, most clearly elucidated in a series of canonical papers by Shanley453 and recently by 
Matthews Grant454 is required to make the fusion of Bergson’s philosophy and partial 
relativizing of existence coherent. The lack of a single coherent ontology of extra-mental 
temporal objects in Bergson  (see footnote 353) will here be supplanted with the idea of God 
as the Creator of everything in the temporal realm. Bergson dedicates MM to explaining how 
to overcome the apparent dualism between la durée (internal fluid multiplicity) and spatialised 
time (external static multiplicity) that was left unresolved by the conclusions of TFW. This, in 
the end, led him to posit a single flux of the universe that is impossible to harmonise with the 
special theory of relativity. What I propose, following the delimitation of Bergson’s philosophy 
to Stage 1, is to keep la durée in the human mind, but account for the continued existence of 
material objects not by their having a durée of their own, as Bergson does in MM, but by 
matter’s being the product of divine creative activity.  
 According to Ryan Mullins, “it makes no sense to ask what God’s relationship to x is if 
one does not have a clue what x in fact is.”455 I argue that the articulation of a coherent theory 
 
452 Note that for Bergson, the relation between la durée and the mind is one of identity; unlike in Kant, the 
synthesising durée is not a distinct or separate “faculty” of the mind. 
453 See especially Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’; Shanley, ‘Aquinas on God’s Causal 
Knowledge: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’; Shanley, ‘Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas’. 
454 Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual Sources Account. 
455 Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 11. 
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of time requires starting from God as the Creator of the world composed of objects existing in 
time. I do agree that fixing the precise meaning or meanings of the word “time” is an 
irreplaceable building block in the process of this articulation, but Mullins’ claim about us “not 
having a clue what time is” seems far-fetched, since we do all seem to share a pre-theoretical 
notion of what “time” roughly refers to. To put things in context; whereas the aim of Chapter 2 
was to provide an analysis of what “time” is (or, more specifically, what objective time and la 
durée are), Chapters 3 and 4 articulate a theory of time which provides further information 
about the nature of the thing(s) being referred to by the term(s) “time(s).” 
 This chapter will create a metaphysical groundwork for the solution to the problem of 
divine foreknowledge and human free will presented in the concluding chapter, by bringing 
together three ingredients. The first is Bergson’s durée, which provides the synthetic “glue” 
that makes the existence of objects or events qua temporal objects possible.456 The second is 
the relativization of objects’ existence to a particular durée defended in the previous chapter. 
In this respect, la durée functions a bit like Arthur Eddington’s “private door”457 (see 
footnote 312) in that it enables us to discover the temporality of the universe — but, unlike 
Eddington’s “private door,” this is only because our durée has put time into the universe in the 
first place.458 The third ingredient is the dependence of things’ non-durée-relative features on 
the divine mind articulated by Aquinas. Recall the different questions of analytic temporal 
ontologies. The defining question of the growing-block theory and presentism is “Does x 
exist?,” whereas its equivalent on an eternalist theory is “At what time [i.e., at what point(s) of 
the B-structural spacetime] does x exist?” The Bergsonian EIT and OIT convert the defining 
question to be “Whom does x exist for?” The answer regarding a particular x depends on the 
particular durée of which we ask this question: the Death of Queen Anne exists for my and 
McTaggart’s consciousness, but it did not exist for Mary Queen of Scots.459 
 
456 Bizarrely, although the human mind (or soul) is crucial for Augustine’s writing on time (McGinnis, ‘Creation 
and Eternity in Medieval Philosophy’, 78.), Bergson never refers to Augustine, not even in his lectures on the 
history of theories of time (HIT). Kołakowski comments: “[I]t is strange that Bergson … never made a reference 
to [St Augustine’s Confessions] … which, at various points, is so close to his own struggling with the same 
intractable puzzle. The only conceivable reason is that Bergson had simply never heard of, let alone read, the 
Confessions.” (Kołakowski, Bergson, 17.) 
457 Eddington, The Nature of The Physical World, 91. 
458 This is not unrelated to Anthony Quinton’s argument demonstrating that whereas it does not seem like reality 
need be spatially unified, we cannot construct a picture of a temporally un-unified reality; the temporal unification 
of reality relating to a single subject is indispensable. See Quinton, ‘Spaces and Times’, especially 145-7. 
459 It is worth noting that the account of “anticipation” from Chapter 2 creates space for the existence of future 
objects, as long as they are related to la durée qua anticipations. For example, although the Death of Queen Anne 
did not exist for Mary Queen of Scots, when I am writing this (15th April 2020), the end of the Covid-19 lockdown 
exists for my durée, though merely as an indeterminate anticipation. 
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 Two important delimitations are required: First, this chapter is not an exegetical 
exercise in medieval theology. Much as I am aware of the perils connected with de-
contextualising and re-contextualising Aquinas’ and Scotus thought,460 I will merely be using 
some themes from their works as a springboard to offer a feasible solution to the free will and 
foreknowledge problem based on my reading of Bergson’s philosophy. This is also motivated 
by the fact that many of the metaphysical facets of the medieval debates have become obsolete 
after the discovery of the special theory of relativity and that engagement with some 
conclusions of this theory is required to obtain a fully coherent ontology of time. I agree with 
Leftow’s claim that “[i]f bringing contemporary conceptuality into an exposition of a historic 
thinker were ruled out a priori, then there just would be no way to develop [Aquinas’] answers 
to contemporary philosophical questions.”461 
 Second, one may protest that the “Thomist” and “Bergsonian” ingredients are 
inherently incompatible, as has been indicated by the shortcomings of early 20th-century 
Roman Catholic engagements with Bergson.462 Maritain’s Bergsonian Philosophy and 
Thomism (first edition published in 1913) provides a very good example.463 Space does not 
permit me to do justice to the full force of Maritain’s critique, so I merely offer a few remarks 
highlighting the way that my methodology avoids it. First, the vast majority of issues that 
separate Bergson and Maritain (e.g., the critique of intelligence,464 the opposition of truth and 
intellect,465 an emphasis on the notions of élan vital or creative evolution466) are cordoned off 
by confining Bergson to Stage 1. Other examples of methodological moves criticised by 
Maritain that do not play any role in my argument are the reliance on intuition,467 the 
abandoning of concepts,468 the chasm between intellect and intuition,469 or, perhaps, more 
importantly, the claim that la durée is the “substance” lying at the foundation not just of us as 
 
460 See for example Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 202–4. 
461 Leftow, ‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’, 397. 
462 For a summary of these debates, see Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, 16–19; for a discussion 
of the controversy resulting in Bergson’s books being placed on the Index, see Neveu, ‘Bergson et l’Index’. 
463 Maritain, Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. 
464 Maritain, 16. 
465 Maritain, 21–22. 
466 Maritain, 19. 
467 See especially Maritain, 108–16. 
468 See especially Maritain, 65–72. 
469 See especially Maritain, 27–45. 
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human beings, but also of the material world.470 Such a delimitation also renders irrelevant the 
extensive debates about the “anti-intellectualism”471 of Bergson that Maritain engages in.472 
4.1. Time and Eternity 
The most suitable place to start considering the intricacies of God’s relation to time is the 
medieval dispute between Scotus and Aquinas about the compatibility of two seemingly 
contradictory notions: a dynamic view of time and the presence of all things to eternity. The 
problem is roughly the following: on the one hand, medieval scholastics assumed, for the most 
part, what looks like a presentist ontology,473 whilst at the same time affirming that all things 
are somehow present to eternity where they exist “all at once,” which seems to require 
something like eternalism. 
 We can begin to see this tension by closely examining Aquinas’ appeal to two famous 
metaphors: the first, of his own making, is that of the relation between the circumference of 
the circle and its centre as a tool to elucidate the relation between time and eternity: 
[S]ince our time lies with motion, eternity, which is completely outside motion, 
in no way belongs to time. Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does 
not pass away, eternity is present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time. 
We may see an example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a 
determined point on the circumference of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it 
does not co-exist simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the 
order of position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other 
hand, the center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly 
opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever 
is found in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it, 
although with respect to some other time it be past or future. Something can be 
present to what is eternal only by being present to the whole of it, since the eternal 
does not have the duration of succession. The divine intellect, therefore, sees in 
the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever takes place through the 
 
470 See Maritain, 67–68. 
471 See Maritain, 132–79. 
472 The charge of ‘anti-intellectualism’ also played a crucial role in Russell’s engagement with Bergson. For a 
detailed discussion, see Salmon, ‘L’apogée de la réception de Bergson en Angleterre’, 152–54; Husson, 
L’intellectualisme de Bergson : genèse et développement de la notion bergsonienne d’intuition. 
473 This is affirmed by Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 74–86. Mullins, quoting Pasnau (Pasnau, 
Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671.) argues that Wycliffe was the only scholastic philosopher to whom we can 
ascribe something like an eternalist ontology. 
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whole course of time. And yet what takes place in a certain part of time was not 
always existent. It remains, therefore, that God has a knowledge of those things 
that according to the march of time do not yet exist.474 
The above-quoted metaphor of the circumference of the circle seems to commit Aquinas to 
some sort of presence of things to eternity. Aquinas wants to say that things are not present to 
God simply in their causes or as divine ideas, they are directly present to His cognition, 
eternally available for His contemplation.475 Commenting on Craig’s reading of Aquinas’ 
Summa Theologiae IaQ14a13,476 Leftow claims the following: 
[Aquinas] is seemingly saying that God is aware of temporal (including future) 
things because they are contained in eternity and so really present for him to see, 
even as you see this page because it is really present for you to see.477 
For the time being, let us put aside the question of whether this type of epistemic presence 
requires a literal “coexistence.”478 Aquinas mainly wants to oppose his notion of “presence” to, 
for example, the claim that things are present to God merely as ideas, put forward by 
Bonaventure479 and Albert the Great480 or the claim that God knows things merely in their 
causes, in the way that, for example, an astronomer can know the future position of a given star 
even though that position is not yet present.481 
 
474 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I.66.7; see also Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 
198; de Finance, ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 28; Stump and Kretzmann, 
‘Eternity’, 441. 
475 For the development of Aquinas’ ideas on this topic from the Commentary on the Sentences to De Veritate, 
see de Finance, ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 26–28. 
476 Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’ 
477 Leftow, ‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’, 389. Craig claims that “the presence of all events to God does not 
seem to be merely epistemic; rather Aquinas’ understanding of foreknowledge seems to require that the past and 
future be ontologically on a par with presently existing reality.” (Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of 
Time?’, 480.) 
478 For an objection against this, see Pasnau, ‘On Existing All at Once’, 17. 
479 de Finance, ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 30–31. 
480 de Finance, 32. The differences between Bonaventure and Albert on the one hand and Aquinas on the other 
are not as great as they are sometimes taken to be: “Even according to Thomas himself, God knows things through 
his ideas, that is to say, his own essence inasmuch as it is representative of things.” (“[P]our Thomas lui-même 
Dieu ne connaît les choses qu’à travers ses idées, c’est-à-dire sa propre essence en tant que représentative des 
êtres.” (de Finance, 34, my translation.)) 
481 de Finance, ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 29. Mullins’ insistence that “it is 
not clear that anyone prior to the nineteenth century actually held the view that all times are literally present to 
God” (Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 84.) seems questionable; one may disagree with de Finance about 
his ascription of the belief in “objective presence” (présence objective) of things to eternity to Aquinas, but it is 
difficult to see how not to read in this way the views that he ascribes to Peter John Olivi (de Finance, ‘La Présence 
Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 35.). All things considered, however, the seeming falsity of 
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 The second metaphor appealed to by Aquinas that he took over from Boethius’ 
Consolation of Philosophy is that of an observer standing on top of a mountain. Boethius writes 
that God “looks forward on all things as though from the highest peak of the world.”482 Whereas 
humans may be likened to travellers who travel through the valley and see various sections of 
the road one step after another, God sees the entirety of the road from the peak of eternity, 
quasi ab aeternitatis specula:483 
If someone were to see many people walking successively down a road during a 
given period of time, in each part of that time he would see as present some of 
those who walked past, so that in the whole period of his watching he would see 
as present all of those who walked past him. Yet he would not simultaneously see 
them all as present, because the time of his seeing is not completely simultaneous. 
However, if all his seeing could exist at once, he would simultaneously see all the 
passers-by as present, even though they themselves would not all pass as 
simultaneously present. Therefore, since the vision of divine knowledge is 
measured by eternity, which is all simultaneous and yet includes the whole of 
 
Mullins’ claim is not so straightforward: although the rough opposition between, on the one hand, “epistemic,” or 
“objective” types of presence (i.e., things’ being present to God in virtue of their being known by Him, in their 
causes or as ideas) and “real,” “physical,” or “literal” presence (i.e., things being somehow “coexistent with/next 
to/in” eternity) is clear, it seems much more difficult to elucidate what the more nuanced difference between 
“physical” (Suarez, according to de Finance), “real” (Olivi and perhaps Aquinas) and “literal” (Mullins) presence 
is supposed to mean. This terminological conundrum is even more aggravated by the examples that Aquinas 
himself uses. In addition to the “mountain” and “circle” metaphors discussed above, in the Commentary on the 
Sentences (Aquinas, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 1:Id38Q1a45.), he says that divine knowledge of successive 
contingent things may be likened to five men who, successively, observe five contingent events. Intuitively, we 
should understand the presence of these individual contingent things to the five individual men as all of the above 
(“literal,” “objective,” “real,”  “physical,” and “epistemic”), but our intuitions fail us when we try to picture the 
presence of these things once the five men’s views are “fused” to create a model of the way that all successive 
things are equally “present” to God. This is also because — if omniscience conceived in terms of perfect 
knowledge of causes or as ideas are unavailable to us — finding a coherent picture of things’ “real” presence to 
someone’s knowledge without appealing to their usual ontological reality is rather difficult. Mullins’ remark that 
this is primarily a question about God’s mode of cognition, and not about ontology (Mullins, The End of the 
Timeless God, 86.) does not help. Unless we can come up with a picture of epistemic presence that does not 
require real or physical presence of the garden variety (without adopting the views of things known in their causes 
or as ideas that Aquinas rejects), Aquinas’s authentic position remains a dead-end. For a discussion of the problem 
involved in working out what this “presence” precisely means, see Goris, ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, 
Predestination, and Human Freedom’, 110–11; Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on 
God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 242–44. Goris takes this “presence” to be literal, although he claims 
that the relation of “things being present to eternity” is in Aquinas taken in an analogical, not a univocal sense 
since this type of “presence” is radically different from the types of presence we are used to in our everyday 
experience (Goris, 251.). 
482 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V, Prose 6, 427. 
483 Aquinas, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 1:Id38Q1a5. For further references to this metaphor, see Aquinas, 
On Evil, Q16a7; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1964, 4. Knowledge in God (Ia.14-18):IaQ14a13. 
 
 113  
time without being absent from any part of it, it follows that God sees whatever 
happens in time, not as future, but as present.484 
 When observing these two metaphors one may already begin to see the tension between 
the dynamic view of time and the presence of things to eternity. On the one hand, Aquinas 
affirms an ontology of time that is closest both to the picture of the A-theories discussed in 
Chapter 2 and, more importantly, to the presentist ontologies discussed in Chapter 3. The texts 
that could be quoted in support of this are innumerable, but, for example, in De Veritate, he 
claims that “[a]lthough a contingent does not exercise an act of existence as long as it is future, 
as soon as it is present it has both existence and truth, and in this condition stands under the 
divine vision.”485 Similarly, in Summa Theologiae, he writes: 
The “now” remains unchanged in substance throughout time, but takes on 
different forms, because, just as time corresponds to movement, so the “now” 
corresponds to the thing moving. Now the thing moving remains in substance the 
same throughout the course of time, but it differs in position, first here and then 
there, its movement consisting in the change of position. … But eternity remains 
unchanged both in substance and in form. Eternity therefore differs from the 
“now” of time.486 
Although we may not need to go as far as Leftow487 or Goris488 who use both of the texts above 
to conclude that Aquinas’ was something like a proto-A-theorist of time, the picture that 
emerges from such texts is one of what would most closely be associated with presentism. 
Besides, according to Pasnau, the belief that only the present exists is not specific to Aquinas 
but forms part of the metaphysical milieu in which he was operating.489 
 
484 Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, Q2a12. 
485 Aquinas, Q2a12, ad 9. 
486 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1964, 2. Existence and the Nature of God (Ia.2-11):IaQ10a4, ad 2. 
487 Commenting on a passage from the Summa Theologiae, Leftow proposes: “Thomas declares the essence of 
time to lie in the flow or passage of the present successively ‘lighting on’ different positions in the temporal series. 
This is an A-theory of time and passage.” (Leftow, ‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’, 388.) While Chapter 2 
questioned the equivalence of “presentism” and “A-theory,” the entity of the present is nevertheless still required 
for the articulation of the A-series in the McTaggartian sense and this is how Leftow uses the term “A-theory.” 
488 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 94. 
489 Pasnau: “The assumption that only the present exists seems so engrained in pre-modern thought that it is hard 
to believe anyone would question it.” (Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671, 389; see also Mullins, The End 
of the Timeless God, 74–76.) Goris also observes that although the Boethian picture of eternity endorsed by 
Aquinas seems to cohere best with a tenseless theory of time, it is precisely presentism that they both required for 
the solution to the problem of future contingents relying on future-oriented propositions lacking a truth-value. 
(Goris, ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom’, 107–8.) 
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 On the other hand, however, the commitment to the “presence” of things to eternity 
(however defined), elucidated by the circle metaphor from above, seems to cohere best with a 
tenseless theory of time. Craig explicitly asserts that this is exactly what Aquinas believed490 
and insists that we cannot simply get out of this dilemma by taking the “presence” of things 
merely in the epistemic sense:  
[T]he presence of all events to God does not seem to be merely epistemic; rather 
Aquinas’ understanding of foreknowledge seems to require that the past and 
future be ontologically on a par with presently existing reality.491 
This, Craig argues, is evidenced by the fact that even in passages where Aquinas discusses the 
temporal aspects of things’ existence in an epistemic context, he stresses that God knows 
particulars as they actually are, i.e., as existing. To support this interpretation, Craig refers to 
the following passage from Compendium Theologiae: 
[G]od has certain knowledge of contingent things. For even before they come to 
be, he sees them as they are actual in their existing, and not only as they are future 
things and in their causes virtually, as we can know some future things. 
Contingent things, as future things existing virtually in their causes, are not 
determined to one thing, so that we can have certain knowledge of them. But as 
actual in their existing, they are now determined to one thing, and we can have 
certain knowledge of them.492 
Summarising all of the above, Craig concludes that “Thomas held to a B-theory of time.”493 
Once again, we may not go as far as Craig to argue that Aquinas was a proto-B-theorist,494 but 
it is difficult to either imagine how the presence of things to eternity squares with a presentist 
ontology of time, or to at least conclude that this is what Aquinas should have believed. One 
struggles to escape either of these conclusions in particular when observing the pedagogical 
tools of the top of the mountain and of the circumference of the circle that Aquinas utilises. 
One need merely to observe that whereas the road that the traveller walks on may be visually 
accessible from the top of the mountain, the individual steps of the traveller are still 
 
490 Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’, 478. 
491 Craig, 480. 
492 Aquinas, Compendium of Theology, I.133. 
493 Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’, 483. Since Craig does not differentiate between “B-
theory” and “eternalism,”  his claims about Aquinas in this context should be taken as implying eternalism. 
494 For a critique of the anachronism in ascribing eternalism to classical theologians, see Mullins, The End of the 
Timeless God, 75. 
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successive.495 Similarly, Aquinas’ metaphor of the circle relies on the circle having been drawn, 
not being drawn496 — if all of its points exist on a par (as they do in a circle), then it cannot 
serve as a useful analogy for points of time which, at least according to medieval presentists, 
do not all exist on a par. And, conversely, if the circle is merely in the process of being drawn 
(as a schoolchild draws a circle with a compass), then they are not all “yet” present to eternity. 
 It is precisely the circle metaphor that forms the springboard for Scotus’ critique and 
his opposition to the “real” or “literal” presence of things to God.497 Scotus says the following: 
Let us imagine a straight line with two end-points a and b, let point a be stationary 
and point b be moved around it in a circle … , then b creates the circumference, 
in the way that this is done by geometers, who take the moving point to create the 
line. On this assumption, if nothing is left of the circumference caused by the 
moving of point b and there is only this point b on the circumference (such that 
whenever that point ceases to be anywhere there is then nothing [left] of the 
circumference [at that point]), then the circumference is never simultaneously 
present to the centre, but only a [given] point of the circumference is present to 
the centre. But if the whole circumference were simultaneous, the whole would 
be present to the centre. Therefore: since time is not a static [stans] but a flowing 
circumference, in which only a particular instant is in act, nothing of it is ever 
present to eternity (which is its centre, so to speak) except the [particular] instant 
which is like [the] present; and yet if per impossibile one were to hypothesise the 
whole of time standing simultaneously, the whole would be present to eternity as 
its centre.498 
 
495 See Padgett, ‘The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered’, 122. 
496 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 202. 
497 de Finance, ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 35. 
498 “Quia si imaginemur lineam rectam habentem duo puncta terminatia a et b, sit a punctus immobilis et b 
circumducatur …, b circumductum causat circumferentiam secundum imaginationem geometrarum, qui 
imaginantur punctum fluens causare lineam; hoc posito, si nihil remaneat de circumferentia per fluxum ipsius b, 
sed tantum in circumferentia sit punctus iste (ita quod quandocumque punctus ille desinet esse alicubi, tunc nihil 
circumferentiae est ibi), tunc numquam circumferentia est simul praesens centro, sed tantum aliquis punctus 
circumferentiae esset praesens centro; si tamen tota circumferentia esset simul, tota praesens esset centro. Ita hic: 
cum tempus non sit circumferentia stans sed fluens, cuius circumferentiae nihil est nisi instans actu, — nihil etiam 
eius erit praesens aeternitati (quae est quasi centrum) nisi illud instans quod est quaesi praesens; et tamen si per 
impossibile poneretur quod totum tempus esset simul stans, totum esset simul praesens aeternitati ut centro.” 
(Scotus, Ordinatio I, 4:d38 part 2 and d39 Q1-5, [35], (Appendix A, 441-2), my translation.) See also Rogers, 
‘Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless God’, 8. The same example is discussed in de Molina, On 
Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia), d49, §18. 
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Scotus’ move is rather simple but powerful: “(1) only what actually exists … can be present to 
God and (2) only the temporal present actually exists.”499 According to Scotus, therefore, 
“Aquinas’ view of the eternal knowledge of things contradicts the reality of temporal 
becoming.”500 Since “coexistence presupposes existence,” things cannot coexist with God in 
eternity if they do not yet exist or anymore exist.501 Furthermore, Scotus says this problem is 
particularly difficult to deal with for Aquinas since the appeal to the presence qua divine ideas 
is one he had earlier rejected:502 
Scotus objects to [Aquinas’ view that the future and past is coextensive with 
eternity] because the future precisely qua future is non-existent now and just as 
God’s omnipresence does not extend to non-existent places, so neither does the 
“now” of God’s eternity coexist with the as yet non-existent future. Scotus objects 
to [Bonaventure’s view that God knows the future through the ideas of creatures] 
because ideas are in the divine intellect prior to any creative decision on the part 
of his will.503 
In short, however we try to get out of this conundrum, we seem to run into contradictions. 
Either we posit an eternity to which the entirety of the temporal realm is present, which 
commits us to eternalism about time. Or we posit presentism or growing-block theory of time, 
but this position entails that not all things are present to eternity and poses insurmountable 
obstacles to divine omniscience. 
 Before proceeding to the discussion of a potential solution to this conundrum offered 
by Brian Shanley, it is worth pointing out that this is a problem that my earlier attempt at 
relating la durée to eternity ran into. In a recent paper,504 I used Bergson’s idea of “durées of 
different tensions” to make sense of the hotly contested notion of “atemporal duration” 
proposed in Stump and Kretzmann’s seminal paper from 1981.505 The argument ran roughly as 
follows: la durée admits of different “tensions” — sometimes our “specious present” is wider 
than at other times. The number of individual events we can distinguish in it also depends on 
our particular physical constitution (e.g., we cannot notice the individual movements of a 
hummingbird’s wing, but we can see the moving hand of a clock). I, therefore, proposed that 
 
499 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 200. 
500 Shanley, 201. 
501 de Finance, ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 36–37. 
502 de Finance, 37. 
503 Wolter, ‘Scotus’ Paris Lectures on God’s Knowledge of Future Events’, 288. 
504 Moravec, ‘A Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration’. 
505 Stump and Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’. 
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eternity should be considered as a highly “contracted” durée506 — this would enable eternity to 
coexist with all durées developing in the temporal realm at different tensions and yet give it all 
the features that Stump and Kretzmann require (perfect simultaneity, indivisibility and “life”). 
However, already there my argument had to be limited to a mere analogy pointing to the 
inaccessible phenomenology of divine omniscience. Thinking of our durée and the divine 
eternal durée as infinitely contracted may have clarified the phenomenology of omniscience, 
but failed to generate a satisfactory ontology. The shortcomings of using Bergson’s earlier-
quoted passage about durées at different tensions (see p. 79) for ontological purposes falls flat 
for obvious reasons: la durée is constantly developing (i.e., it does have an extended “present”), 
whereas eternity is a super-extended “present” that coexists with all of such developing 
presents. So what is actually present? We run into Scotus’ objection again. 
4.2. Causal Knowledge 
In an engagement with Stump and Kretzmann on the topic of divine knowledge and human 
freedom, Brian Shanley takes up the conundrum of the discussion from above and demonstrates 
that what is needed in the debate about the presence of things to God is a certain repositioning 
or rephrasing of the problems, since one of the discussion’s most crucial and most overlooked 
elements consists of the fact that all temporal things depend for their existence on God the 
Creator.507 Shanley argues that without this repositioning, it is indeed difficult to see how things 
existing in time can be related to an eternal God. 
 The central metaphysical presupposition of the entirety of Aquinas’ theological system 
is the claim that all things are dependent for God on their being. Aquinas explicitly argues that 
things need to be kept in being by God: 
The second [way things are kept in existence] is a per se and direct way of 
preserving a thing in existence, insofar, namely, as the thing preserved is so 
dependent that without the preserver it could not exist. This is the way that all 
creatures need God to keep them in existence. For the esse of all creaturely beings 
so depends upon God that they could not continue to exist even for a moment, 
 
506 See for example MM 207-8/233. 
507 de Finance: “The problem of the relations between time and eternity requires an ontological solution, one 
formulated in terms of being. It is only an aspect of a more general problem of the virtual inclusion of all 
participated being in the Ipsum Esse subsistens.” (“Le problème des rapports du temps à l’éternité n’est susceptible 
que d’une solution ontologique, d’une solution formulée en termes d’être. Il n’est qu’un aspect du problème plus 
général de l’inclusion virtuelle de tout être participé dans l’Ipsum Esse subsistens.” (de Finance, ‘La Présence Des 
Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’, 62, my translation.)) 
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but would fall away into nothingness unless they were sustained in existence by 
his power, … .508 
God, according to Aquinas, must not be thought of as relating to things external to Him and 
observing them or manipulating them. Rather, without God’s sustained preservation, the things 
would not be at all: 
For other [i.e., non-divine] agents act as existing externally: since they do not act 
except by moving and altering a thing qualitatively in some way with respect to 
its exterior, they work from without. But God acts in all things from within, 
because he acts by creating. Now to create is to give existence (esse) to the thing 
created. So since esse is innermost in each thing, God, who by acting gives esse 
acts in things from within.509 
This crucial insight, Shanley argues, is absent from all analytic discussions of the relation 
between the world and the way God knows it. Too much emphasis on God “seeing things” 
(e.g., in the Boethian mountain metaphor from above510) perpetuates the picture of God as a 
“big viewer”511 who first created the realm of being after which it unfolded without His constant 
intervention, and is then reduced to simply observing what happens within it — all theological 
problems are thereby reduced to explaining how God can know all of these external happenings 
infallibly, including His knowledge of the future. This way of looking at the foreknowledge 
problem is also criticised by Geach: 
I am not denying that God is omniscient about the future; I think God knows the 
future by controlling it. God’s knowledge of the future is like man’s knowledge 
of his own intentional actions, not like that of an ideal spectator.512 
 
508 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1975, 14. Divine Government (Ia2ae.103-9):IaQ104a1; see also Goris, Free 
Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 293; for the most 
recent articulation of this position, see Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual 
Sources Account. 
509 Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 1, Lecture 5, no. 133. 
510 See for example Leftow, Time and Eternity, 159–62. 
511 For a discussion of the ‘arch-perceiver,’ see Khamara, ‘Eternity and Omniscience’, 213–14; Geach, ‘The 
Future’, 215. 
512 Geach, Providence and Evil, 57, first italics original, second mine; see also Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of 
the Temporal in Aquinas’, 204. 
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Shanley argues that the image of God as a spectator not only illegitimately separates God’s 
creative action in the world and His knowledge of it,513 but also generates all the innumerable 
problems that the Scotist-flavoured critiques point out. 
 When observing the analytic appropriations of Aquinas’ thought, one sees this implicit 
presupposition resurface again and again. For example, Craig argues that “God … does not 
experience events successively as past, present, and future, as we do; rather the whole time 
line, … , is stretched out before Him.”514 — implying that the relation of God to His creation is 
similar to that of our own experience of looking at external reality stretched out in space before 
us. This way of analysing the God-world relation is also latently encoded in Stump and 
Kretzmann’s ET-Simultaneity515 and the talk of God “observing” from one dimension things 
that independently happen in another one.516 “To start with time and eternity,” Shanley says, 
“as two distinct realms or reference frames … which must then somehow be brought together 
and coordinated is to misconstrue the issue from the start.”517 Finally, the project of relating 
two independently existing realms (God and things) also forms part and parcel of all the various 
conceptions of tying together eternity and time,518 especially those that conceive of the 
relationship along the lines of different “frames of reference”519 or simply as a “fifth dimension” 
in which things exist.520 Endeavours to conceive God’s knowledge as “immediate,” i.e., not 
depending on time-lagging causal signals,521 further perpetuates the picture of independently 
existing things that God must somehow figure out a way of knowing as best as He can. 
 When reading Aquinas’ two metaphors, we must be very cautious. First, Aquinas’ 
choice of the circle metaphor does not rely so much on construing the relationship between the 
drawn circle and its centre as two independent objects that must somehow be related, but rather 
 
513 Shanley: “There is no mental process whereby God first speculatively considers the various possibilities, … 
then practically decides to execute one plan … and finally contemplates the finished product.” (Shanley, ‘Eternal 
Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 217.) 
514 Craig, ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’, 478. 
515 See Stump and Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’. 
516 For a critique of the notion of ‘observing’ in Stump and Kretzmann’s ET-simultaneity, see especially Lewis, 
‘Eternity Again: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’. 
517 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 223. 
518 See for example Mellor, ‘History Without the Flow of Time’, 73–75; Chase, ‘Time and Eternity from Plotinus 
and Boethius to Einstein’, 100–104; Padgett, ‘The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness 
Reconsidered’, 120–23; Goris, ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom’, 106–
8. 
519 Leftow, ‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’, 390–93. 
520 See Rogers, ‘Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension’; Rogers, ‘Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a 
Timeless God’; for a discussion of Rogers’ position, see Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 127–55; for a 
different reading of Anselm and eternity as another dimension, see Leftow, Time and Eternity, 213-214;227-234. 
521 See for example Leftow, Time and Eternity, 169. 
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of the centre of the circle as a source to which, through an appropriate setting of a distance, all 
the points on the circumference owe their existence. It should not surprise us that a metaphor 
— in particular a metaphor for the relationship between things and their Creator —, while 
useful in one domain, creates inconsistencies in another: in this instance the picture of the 
centre and the circumference as two coexisting entities. The same should be said of the 
mountain metaphor, particularly considering the fact that whereas Boethius’ motivation behind 
its usage is primarily epistemological (i.e., to explain how God knows things), Aquinas’ usage 
of it is set within the context of an ontological relation between God and things.522 
 To keep together the idea that God is the source of being for all things and the 
consequent idea that God knows everything He creates, Shanley argues for what he calls God’s 
“causal knowledge.”523 God acts in the temporal realm not purely as a formal and efficient 
cause; His primary causation is the causation of esse.524 Shanley believes that this is the key to 
resolving the conundrum about how God might know the future which, according to Aquinas, 
does not yet exist: 
God’s eternal knowledge of the future is as its creative cause. The creative-causal 
activity of God is the hidden key and metaphysical presupposition for all that 
Aquinas says about how God knows the future.525 
[The divine intellect’s relation to the world] is the obverse of our own: whereas 
our knowledge passively presupposes the existence of its object and is measured 
by it, God’s causal knowledge actively precedes and measures what it knows. … 
God does not know things because they are, but rather things are because they are 
creatively known by him.526 
Although Aquinas does occasionally speak of God’s knowledge of the world in terms of divine 
vision,527 he holds God’s scientia visionis528 as inseparable from “scientia approbationis:” 
 
522 For an excellent discussion, see Khamara, ‘Eternity and Omniscience’, 204–10. 
523 See for example Shanley, ‘Aquinas on God’s Causal Knowledge: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’. 
524 Shanley, ‘Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas’, 104–5. 
525 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 199–200. 
526 Shanley, 213; see also Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and 
Irresistible Will, 65; Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual Sources Account, 148. 
527 See for example Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, Q2a12, Q2a13. 
528 For a further distinction between ‘scientia visionis’ and ‘scientia simplicis intelligentiae’ (which extends to 
things that God does not will, but that He could possibly will), see Aquinas, Q2a9, ad 2, 3. 
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God’s knowledge is causal and practical by virtue of an act of the divine will 
(voluntate adjuncta) bringing into being what is known. Aquinas calls this causal-
willing knowledge scientia approbationis. God knows the world through the 
divine essence by knowing what he wills to exist; God’s knowledge about any 
contingent fact is a kind of self-knowledge about his will (and his causality) with 
regard to any contingent fact.529 
Furthermore, Aquinas proposes two different and seemingly independent approaches to the 
problem of future contingents. Shanley suspects that these two ways of dealing with the 
problem have been obscured, conflated or separated due to various historical disputes between 
Aquinas’ commentators (especially concerning, but not limited to, the De Auxiliis 
controversy530) as well as the fact that Aquinas’ position and importance accorded to these two 
ways of dealing with the problems shifts from the Commentary on the Sentences531 to his later 
works. The first of these is based on the Boethian idea of the presence of all things to God, 
modelled on our “vision” and illustrated by the circle metaphor from above. The second, 
however, which Shanley argues gets neglected, is based on the causal account of God’s 
knowledge: “[A]quinas’s approach to how God knows future contingents requires both that 
God be eternal and that God be the cause of what he knows: God knows future contingents 
precisely as their eternal cause.”532 Or, more generally, God knows the future, because He is its 
creative cause. Scientia Dei est causa rerum:533 “where God causes esse, there his knowledge 
extends:”534 
From this it follows that the coexistence and presence of time to eternity does not 
mean that all temporal things exist at the same time as each other or at the same 
time as God. It is rather that only when considered precisely as the effect of God’s 
creative activity and thus taken up into the measure of divine eternity, do all 
temporal beings become present to and coexist with God.535 
 
529 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 215–16. 
530 Shanley, ‘Aquinas on God’s Causal Knowledge: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’, 450–51. 
531 See Shanley, 452. 
532 Shanley, 451. 
533 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 205; Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, 
Q2a14; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1964, 4. Knowledge in God (Ia.14-18):IaQ14a8. 
534 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 211; see also Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s 
Universal Causality. The Dual Sources Account, 15–33. 
535 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 219. 
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This type of causation of esse is, of course, unique to God. Norman Kretzmann provides a 
helpful illustration: 
When you make a salad, you are the (efficient) cause of the salad. And since 
without you that particular salad would not have been, it might seem right, if a 
little stilted, to say that you are for that salad the cause of being. But putting it 
that way exaggerates your role, which might be described more accurately as your 
being for that salad a cause of being. … You’ve given certain natural things a 
new inessential (accidental) form: … But neither you nor any other ordinary 
individual agent is for lettuce the cause of being. All ordinary artificial production 
can be analysed along the same lines, in terms of altering and moving pre-existing 
stuff that is ultimately natural.536 
Instead of both the metaphor of the mountain-top and that of the circle and its circumference, 
a more appropriate model to think of the knowledge that the Creator has of the temporal realm, 
a model which overcomes the overly representationalist picture of divine knowledge,537 is the 
relationship between the artist and the knowledge they have of their own work,538 with the 
important clarification that the artist merely knows the form of the artwork they create, but not 
its matter539 since “divine art produces not only the form but also the matter, it contains not 
only the likeness of form but also that of matter. Consequently, God knows things in regard to 
both their matter and their form; … .”540 
 
Before turning to the next section, one last matter needs to be addressed. The difficulty may be 
formulated as follows: If all things are present to God (not least in virtue of their being created 
by Him), then He Himself must be present to all things.541 This brings us directly into the heart 
of the problem of divine omnipresence. Regardless of what Aquinas’ original position on this 
topic was (see footnote 481), can the talk of divine causal knowledge of things deal with the 
relationship between the cause (God) and the things caused? 
 
536 Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II, 72. 
537 Shanley, ‘Aquinas on God’s Causal Knowledge: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’, 455. 
538 For a discussion, see Moravec, ‘Aquinas and Kripke on the Genealogy of Essential Properties’. 
539 Aquinas, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 1:Id38Q1a3, ad1. 
540 Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, Q2a5. Divine knowledge of individuated matter is also the reason 
why God knows the particular and not only the universal, as Aquinas argued against Avicenna. 
541 This view is explicitly stated by Scotus in his critique of Aquinas. For Aquinas’ own formulation of this 
inference, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1964, 4. Knowledge in God (Ia.14-18):IaQ14a13; Aquinas, The 
Disputed Questions on Truth, Q2a12; Aquinas, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 1:Id38a5. 
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 Analytic literature offers at least three ways in which divine presence to things may be 
fleshed out. The first, which Wierenga ascribes to the views that Anselm puts forward in 
Chapters 20-22 of the Monologion, explains divine omnipresence in terms of knowledge. God 
is present at every place, but not contained at every place, Anselm says.542 God is mainly 
present everywhere because He can sense what is happening in all places.543 As Wierenga 
suggests, “God exists in a place or is present in a place just in case he has immediate knowledge 
of what is happening in that place. Omnipresence, then, consists in having immediate 
knowledge of what is happening everywhere.”544 
 The second option is to think of divine presence to things in terms of power. Wierenga 
identifies this as part of the set of views on omnipresence put forward by Aquinas, who argued 
that God’s presence must be understood “in terms of God’s power, knowledge, and essence.”545 
Aquinas argues that  
God exists in everything by power inasmuch as everything is subject to his power, 
by presence inasmuch as everything is naked and open to his gaze, and by 
substance inasmuch as he exists in everything causing their existence, as we said 
earlier.546 
 The third option is that of thinking of the relationship between God and the world along 
the analogy of our relationship to our own body. The first variant of this may be found in 
Hartshorne who argued that God’s knowledge of the world is similar to the type of immediate 
knowledge we have of our thoughts and feelings and His power is similar to the one we have 
over our actions.547 This is not completely different from Swinburne’s “limited embodiment.” 
On Swinburne’s view “restricted embodiment means both that God is able to move directly 
any object (capable of motion) without the intermediaries and that he knows directly (again 
without causal intermediaries) the qualities exemplified in any region at any time.”548 
Furthermore, according to Swinburne, “God can move any part of the universe directly, as a 
basic action.”549 
 
542 Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2010, 258. 
543 Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2007, 282. 
544 Wierenga, ‘Anselm on Omnipresence’, 30–41; See also Hudson, ‘Omnipresence’, 200–201. 
545 Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2007, 258; see also Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2010, 282–83. 
546 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1964, 2. Existence and the Nature of God (Ia.2-11):IaQ8a4. 
547 For a discussion see Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2010, 260; Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2007, 283–84. 
548 Hudson, ‘Omnipresence’, 203. 
549 Wierenga, ‘Omnipresence’, 2010, 260; For a recent formulation of Swinburne’s views, see Swinburne, The 
Coherence of Theism, 99–128. 
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 The fourth and most recent account is offered by Hudson. Although Hudson’s proposal 
is highly complex, it is based on the ordinary, everyday “literal” physical presence of things to 
each other. Using this basic and familiar notion he arrives at a sophisticated account of “being 
present at” as a relation of “entension,” which is a “non-derivative literal location relation”550 
capturing the fact that an object may be wholly located at a particular region of space and, at 
the same time, be wholly located at every subregion of that region.551 Space does not permit me 
to provide details of Hudon’s account; it suffices to say that basing divine omnipresence on 
literal presence in space is problematic, since, due to the connection between space and time 
postulated by relativity, it seems inconsistent with divine timelessness from the start. 
 One may already begin to see that none of these options takes seriously enough 
Shanley’s dictum of primarily considering the relationship between God and things through 
the lens of creation. The relation of “being present to” methodologically presumes that any two 
things thus related may exist independently, which is inappropriate in the case of God and 
things. In each of the options above, the formulation of the question begins by positing God 
and things and then working out how the former might know the latter. What is most stupefying 
is how little attention in these discussions is paid to the third type of divine presence that 
Aquinas emphasises in the quotation above that is appealed to by Wierenga; God is present not 
only as someone who has power over things and who knows them but primarily as one who is 
the cause of their being. The fact that in the case of God the three are coextensive means, on 
the one hand, that it is incredibly difficult for us to find analogies to create a satisfactory 
account of the presence of things to the divine mind (although here the “artist” metaphor is as 
important as the “circle” or “mountain” one), but, on the other hand, that the analytic problem 
of omnipresence is perhaps a badly formulated one from the start since it does not take into 
account the fundamental dependence of being on God. 
4.3. Problems 
Now that we have seen the inexorable role that divine creative activity must play in the 
construction of a temporal ontology, a list of questions immediately arises: How does the 
dependence of things on God square with the Bergsonian idealist ontology proposed in the 
previous chapter? Have I not argued there that the existence of objects in time should be 
 
550 Hudson, ‘Omnipresence’, 212. 
551 See Hudson, 206. 
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relativized to a human observer whose mind is la durée? Does that not contradict the orthodox 
claim that things existing in time owe their existence to God? 
 The rest of this chapter will take up the claim about the ontological dependence of 
things on God discussed above and fuse it with the Bergsonian idealist ontology proposed in 
Chapter 3. How can these bits of the puzzle be put together? There are two key observations 
about Bergson’s durée and Aquinas’ thought on time that will point us in the right direction. 
 First, we have seen that one of the reasons that have pushed Bergson to move to Stage 2 
and ascribe la durée to things in the world was the inexplicable mystery of what exactly it is 
that la durée synthesises: 
Hence we must not say that external things endure, but rather that there is in them 
some inexpressible reason [quelque inexprimable raison] in virtue of which we 
cannot examine them at successive moments of our own duration without 
observing that they have changed.552 
Take the pendulum example that Bergson uses in TFW.553 Bergson argues that the individual 
positions may only be considered as forming a single movement due to their being retained or 
synthesised by la durée. But what exactly is it that la durée is synthesising? In Stages 2 and 3, 
the answer will consist of our contracting the moments of external events’ independently-
existing durées at different degrees of tension, but how do we answer this at Stage 1? What is 
this “inexpressible reason,” in virtue of which we synthesise whatever it is that comes to be 
recognised as the individual positions of the pendulum, once the movement of the pendulum 
becomes memory? 
 The second point consists of an observation about the ontological status that Aquinas 
himself ascribes to time. Wippel argues that Aquinas’ ontology utilises, among other things, 
a distinction between three types of objects: 
One type enjoys complete and total being outside the mind; that is, independently 
from the mind’s consideration. In illustration Thomas cites complete entities such 
as human beings or stones. A second type enjoys no reality in itself independently 
from the mind, for instance, dreams or chimeras. A third kind has a foundation in 
extramental reality, but depends upon the intellect’s operation for its complete 
realization. As illustrations Thomas cites universals and time. Each of these 
 
552 TFW 227/171. 
553 TFW 108/80-81. 
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enjoys some foundation in extramental reality; but that which makes time to be 
time, or a universal to be universal, depends upon an intellectual operation.554 
Let us apply this classification to the foregoing discussion. So far we have seen two main views 
about the ontological status of time. The first is exemplified by the predominant analytic 
approach, which requires a satisfactory description of time to be mind-independent. On the 
other hand, we have also observed that McTaggart’s argument concludes in an idealism about 
time, that is, McTaggart treats time as entirely dependent on the human mind and not part of 
(Absolute) Reality. Where do Aquinas and Bergson stand on this typology? It might seem, 
prima facie, that they both occupy some sort of middle ground — on Aquinas’ terms, time has 
a foundation in extramental movement (i.e., it is not completely a product of the human mind, 
as McTaggart would have it), but, on the other hand, following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that 
for time to be time, it needs the human mind for its completion. We could say a similar thing 
 
554 Wippel, ‘Truth in Thomas Aquinas’, 296; for a summary of Aquinas’ thought on truth, see Moravec, ‘Aquinas 
and Kripke on the Genealogy of Essential Properties’. The view that time is dependent on the human mind seems 
contradicted by what Leftow observes about Aquinas’ writings in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Leftow, 
‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’, 388.), where Aquinas argues that the passage of time is part of extramental reality 
since it depends on the motion of the heavenly spheres, which revolve independently of the human mind. In 
no. 573, Aquinas explicitly states that time’s flow cannot be “consequent upon the motion of the soul.” (Aquinas, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, IV.17, §573.) On the other hand, in his Commentary on the Sentences he 
describes the third type of thing as follows: “[These things] possess a foundation in a thing outside of the soul, 
but that which completes their definition from a formal point of view is an operation of the soul, as we can see in 
the case of the universal. Humanity, [for example], is something in reality, but it is not there where it has a ratio of 
a universal, because there does not exist outside of the soul a humanity common to a plurality of individuals; but 
according to the way that it is received in the intellect, an intention is added to it by an operation of the intellect 
in virtue of which it is called a species; and the same is the case for time, which has a foundation in movement, 
namely that it is the before and after of movement, but as regards that which is formal concerning time, namely 
the fact of counting it, it is accomplished by an operation of the intellect which counts.” (“Quaedam autem sunt 
quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, 
est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem 
universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in 
intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species: et similiter est de 
tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus; sed quantum ad id quod est 
formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis.” (Aquinas, In Quatuor 
Libros Sententiarum, 1:Id19Q5a1, my translation.)) The two texts, however, do not stand in tension, since Aquinas 
distinguishes between movement and time (as the number of movement). That is why he, like Aristotle, 
distinguishes movement as being a part of mind-independent extramental reality and depending on substance, and 
(counted) time (as the number of “before and after”), which, although it depends on this very movement, requires 
the human mind for its completion. This distinction runs throughout §572-581 of the Commentary on the Physics, 
just to give one more example: “[T]ime is nothing else than the number of motion in respect to before and after. 
For we perceive time, as was said, when we number the before and after in motion. Therefore, it is clear that time 
is not motion, but is consequent upon motion insofar as it is numbered. Hence time is the number of motion.” 
(Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, IV.1, §580.) For Bergson’s treatment of this question in Aristotle, 
see IT 58-9. 
 
 127  
about Bergson’s “time” of Stage 1 — on the one hand, it is not completely mind-independent 
(as is the case from Stage 2 onwards), but, on the other hand, it has some sort of quasi-temporal 
“stuff” “coming in” from the external world: for instance, the individual disconnected positions 
of the pendulum are not themselves “produced” by the human mind. Whereas this “middle 
ground” reading may work for Aquinas, it is much more complicated for Bergson — not only 
because of the distinction the previous chapter has made between OIT and EIT but also because 
“Bergson’s time” is equivocal: Is this “middle ground” between analytic philosophy and 
McTaggart occupied by objective time or by la durée? Or both? 
 Before further questions start arising, let us introduce a key distinction absent from the 
discussions in Chapter 3. I concluded that the “existence of temporally extended objects is 
human-observer-relative.” (p. 103) Even when we refine this conclusion with the observation 
about time’s having foundation in extramental reality — to avoid sliding into outright idealism 
where the mind “produces” objects or where the representations of these objects are all there 
is — to the more nuanced claim that the “existence of temporally extended objects is partially 
observer-relative,” we still face an ambiguity between which of the following this conclusion 
means: 
I. Temporally extended objects depend for their existence on the mind of an observer. 
II. Objects qua temporally extended depend for their existence on the mind of an 
observer.555 
 The first claim states that any object existing in time is dependent for its existence on 
the human mind. This is ontological idealism simpliciter: since all objects (excluding numbers, 
universals and the like) exist in time, on this view, all objects are “produced” by the human 
mind. This view would be rejected both by Aquinas and by Bergson, including Bergson of 
Stage 1, and I will not defend it here, partially because idealism simpliciter has historically 
come to be regarded with suspicion by Bergsonians, analytic philosophers, and Thomists, all 
of whom this chapter is trying to bring together. 
 The second claim is equivalent to: “Those aspects of the constitution of an object which 
are inherently temporal depend for their existence on the human mind.” It is this position that 
 
555 A helpful analogy to illustrate the difference between the two statements would be the following: What I have 
been arguing for so far is as ambiguous as a theory denoted by the phrase “idealism about coloured objects.” Is it 
idealism about colour (i.e., an idealism about a property) or idealism about objects which are coloured (i.e., an 
idealism about objects by virtue of those objects having that property)?  
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is equivalent to the ontological idealism about time (OIT) argued for in the previous chapter 
and that I will defend. Recall the definition of OIT: 
By ontological idealism about time (OIT), I understand the claim that la durée is the 
ultimate ontological foundation of time (however understood), or perhaps even exhaustive 
of time (however understood).556 
Let us apply this definition to a particular four-dimensional object in spacetime, for example, 
an apple lying on my desk. As time passes, the apple displays several features: colour, mass, 
smell, taste, chemical composition, origin, etc. It also has spatial extension (shape, spatial 
coordinates) and temporal extension (it lies on the table from 14:00 until 14:30, when I eat it). 
What OIT claims is that the event’s temporal extension, which partially constitutes the event 
qua event, depends for its existence on la durée; the “apple lying on the table in front of me” 
requires the human mind to exist as a unified event, as opposed to existing as an infinite number 
of disconnected series of positions in space, neither of which is that event. Of course, one could 
object that these positions conjointly make up the event, but it is precisely the conjunction that 
ontologically depends on the human mind. The same may be said of Bergson’s example of the 
pendulum. Consider the event of the pendulum swinging from “A” to “B.” Certain features of 
this event have foundation in extramental reality: the existence of the pendulum itself, its shape, 
size, weight, chemical composition. Its individual disconnected positions in spacetime are also 
mind-independent. Nevertheless, a synthesising durée of an observer is required in order for 
these individual positions to be joined together into a single event of “the movement of the 
pendulum from A to B.” The movement of the pendulum is a “compound” of retrospectively-
identified individual positions in B-structural spacetime557 and la durée as a “temporal glue” 
that holds all of these together. 
 
556 A helpful analogy may here, once again, be provided by the example of colours. “Colours” stand halfway 
between being purely products of the human mind (e.g., as dreams or hallucinations) and being objective 
properties of objects, such as mass or chemical composition. The best way to think about them is to say that 
colours have a foundation in extramental reality (namely in the way that the surfaces of objects reflect light), but 
that they require (properly functioning) human perception for their completion. For more on this, see McGinn, 
The Subjective View. Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts; Adams, ‘Idealism Vindicated’. This colour 
example is, of course, merely an analogy, since colours do not form a necessary feature of objects. If we suddenly 
removed colour from the universe, the erstwhile coloured objects would still be objects. 
557 As will be emphasised below, it is important to remember that these individual positions may only be identified 
retrospectively, since, as Bergson argues (see Chapters 1 and 2), the current perception of an event is always 
indivisible, the successive spatial positions may only be identified once the event has become part of our memory. 
 
 129  
 But a further qualification is required. Recall that Bergson insists that the individual 
positions may only be identified retrospectively on the trace of la durée (see section 1.2) since 
any currently-perceived object is always indivisible. So if the currently-perceived object is a 
compound of la durée and a “something” (which is later represented as a series of successive 
positions in B-structural spacetime), what is this “something”? And where does it come from? 
When we subtract the mind-dependent temporal extension from the currently-perceived object, 
what are we left with? 
4.4. Composition of Temporally-Extended Objects 
These questions may be answered by an appeal to the notion of the timeless God as the source 
of being for things in the temporal realm. I argue that temporal objects should be considered 
as a “compound” of the temporal glue provided by la durée, which is indexed to individual 
human observers, and of “everything else” that comes from God as the source of being. To put 
it in other words, in order for the event of “the movement of the pendulum from A to B” to 
exist, two things need to come together: (i) the creative activity of God that timelessly provides 
the presently-synthesised and retrospectively-identified positions of the pendulum, which may 
(post-synthesis) be understood timelessly using the B-structure558 and (ii) la durée which 
synthesises this timeless being. It is in conformity to the human mind that the event of the 
“movement of the pendulum” is born. And likewise for all other temporal objects. 
 The first three chapters of this study have explained how la durée synthesises “stuff” 
coming in from the external world — “stuff” that is later, when remembered, analysed using 
the medium of objective time — to produce temporal continuity. La durée, as the fundamental 
temporal continuity partially constituting the synthesised compound, has been described in 
much detail. However, how should we describe the “other” part of the compound, the “stuff” 
that comes from God? 
 One may respond to this question in a Kantian tone. Perhaps we are quite ignorant about 
what it exactly is that God creates — perhaps la durée that holds this “stuff” together is so 
fundamental to our access to reality that we cannot imagine what the world would look like 
without it. We might not be able “see through” the temporal lens into the quasi-Ding-an-sich 
“stuff” that is provided by God and then later synthesised by la durée. Similarly to the way that 
 
558 For example, Aquinas says that God’s eternal causation should be understood as the divine will that its effects 
should exist “at some time, whenever the divine wisdom has determined.” (Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on 
Truth, Q2a4 ad 5.)  This “at some time” may be understood using the B-structure. 
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we cannot even begin to imagine the way that God “knows” things,559 we perhaps have no 
access to what it is that God creates before this gets “glued” together by la durée and then 
retrospectively analysed using the B-structure. One could perhaps argue that the role of this 
mysterious foundation in McTaggart is played by the C-series; no matter how hard we try, we 
cannot escape the “illusion” of time in order to see Absolute Reality as it really is. On my 
reading, the methodological role that the C-series plays in McTaggart would simply be replaced 
by God. God is the timeless ontological foundation of everything temporal in reality — our 
access to everything He creates is so inescapably temporal that there is very little we can say 
about the creative activity itself;560 we are merely left with having to affirm that, once the divine 
creative activity has happened, we recognise that it has taken place (i.e., we realise that our 
durée has synthesised non-temporal esse to form a temporally extended object that is now 
retained in our memory) and that we may analyse it using objective time (i.e., we can remember 
that we looked at the apple for 10 seconds when the clock stroke). 
 Nevertheless, there are some things we can say about the machinery of divine creation 
and its relation to la durée. We may describe the situation as follows: For every particular event 
in spacetime, which is retrospectively (i.e., once it has come to form part of our past) indexed 
to the B-structure, God is recognised as having been the source of its existence; every 
individual point of spacetime can retrospectively be recognised as having depended on God.561 
 
559 See for example Geach, Providence and Evil, 42–44. 
560 Something that comes very close to this position is defended in Pieper and Wieck, ‘On the “Negative” Element 
in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas’. 
561 By way of limitation, I leave aside the question pertaining to the problem of “empty times” and “empty spaces,” 
that is, the question whether it is possible for a time or space without anything in it to exist. Aquinas argued that 
since time is connected to movement and movement must be created by the First Mover, time (as well as space) 
is only possible where some sort of creation (i.e., giving esse) has already taken place. For example: “[O]utside 
the entire universe of creatures, there is no time, time having been produced simultaneously with that universe; 
hence, we do not have to look for the reason why it was produced now and not before, so as to be led to concede 
the infinity of time; … .” (Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II.35.6.) This, of course, brings us back to the dispute 
about “absolute time” and the Leibniz-Clarke debate, neither of which I have space to discuss here. However, 
I am inclined to agree with Alexander who, in his introduction to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, points out 
that due to the inseparable connection between matter/energy and spacetime, a connection postulated by the 
General Theory of Relativity (i.e., the observation that the geometry of spacetime itself is dependent on the “stuff” 
that fills it), Einstein’s theory seems to put some rather paradoxical implications on the Leibniz-Clarke dispute 
itself (Alexander, ‘Introduction’, lv.). This view is shared by Pannenberg: “[T]he insight into the interrelatedness 
of space and time with masses and energies will remain a lasting contribution to the understanding of the 
conditions of finite reality even in the discourse of philosophers and theologians. God created time and space as 
dimensions of the existence of finite entities.” (Pannenberg, ‘Eternity, Time and Space’, 105.) The potential 
existence of “empty spaces” would, of course, be a problem for divine omnipresence. Wierenga argues that 
Aquinas’ insistence that “God fills all places by giving existence to everything occupying those places” (“immo 
per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent omnia loca” (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 
1964, 2. Existence and the Nature of God (Ia.2-11):IaQ8a2; Wierenga, ‘Anselm on Omnipresence’, 39–40.) 
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This would be true even if there were no human minds. However, for a set of these points to 
exist as a temporally extended object (as opposed to a set of disconnected positions562), it needs 
to have previously been synthesised by la durée. We do not perceive instants of time, only God 
can do this since His creative and sustaining activity extends even to subatomic particles. 
Furthermore, these individual “instantaneous segments” of a temporal object can only be 
identified retrospectively as “having depended” for their being on God.563 It is in this respect 
that “time,” understood either as la durée (confined to the present) or “objective time” (based 
on the past trace of la durée) depends on extramental reality (provided by God), but requires 
the human mind (la durée) for its completion. 
 We have seen that the question about the existence of a temporal object x must be 
reformulated as “Whom does x exist for?” In the first instance, the answer to “Does x exist for 
God?” is affirmative for all x, since He is the source of being of every single thing that occupies 
even the infinitesimally small regions of spacetime. Thus, for example, a single movement of 
a hummingbird’s wing exists for God, but not for us: all we get is the object of the 
hummingbird’s wing’s movement. In the second instance, the answer to “Does x exist for S?” 
(where “S” refers to a human observer) depends on the particular parameters of that observer’s 
durée, for instance, the durée’s location in spacetime, its “degree of tension” etc. And finally, 
as Chapter 3 demonstrated, “Does x exist (simpliciter)?” is not a well-formulated question. 
 The model of the way that la durée and divine creation come together to form 
temporally extended objects has one rather surprising consequence that merits our attention. 
This can be summed up by saying that “Divine creation always happens in a present.” This 
 
implies that “if there are empty places, on this account, God does not exist in them.” (Wierenga, 40.) 
Unfortunately, space does not permit me to discuss this problem here, but two things should be mentioned in 
passing: the first is that the problem may simply be dealt with by stipulating that even an empty place has “being 
of some sort” and must, therefore, have been created by God. The second is that the matter cannot be resolved 
without a full discussion of the difference between “place” and “space” in Aquinas’ usage; the notion of “space” 
(locus) which Aquinas takes over from Aristotle does not map directly onto “(a bit of) space” as analytic 
philosophy understands it. For a discussion, see Bergson’s own short Latin thesis on this topic (Bergson, ‘L’Idée 
de lieu chez Aristote’; See also Pannenberg, ‘Eternity, Time and Space’.). 
562 Bergson: “How could a link, a relation between two terms, exist otherwise than in a mind? I understand that A 
exists by itself, that B exists by itself, but a mind is required to establish the relation between A and B.” (“[U]ne 
relation, un rapport entre deux termes, comment pourrait-il exister autrement que dans un esprit ? Je conçois que 
A existe par lui-même, que B existe par lui-même, mais la relation de A à B, il faut un esprit qui l’établisse.” 
(EPL 332, my translation.)) 
563 In Chapter 2, I argued that every existing thing implies logically the presence of la durée. In my earlier paper 
(Moravec, ‘A Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration’.), I argued that divine eternity, and the 
way through which it observes the world, may be considered as a limit-case of la durée, which is 
phenomenologically inaccessible to us. This phenomenological inaccessibility is here strengthened by the fact 
that the divine durée is the source of being, unlike ours, which merely synthesises esse that depends on God. 
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may sound trivial, but a few clarifications are required: the first is that the statement is not 
equivalent to claiming that “Divine creation always happens in the present,” since my model 
dispenses with an objective present. The “presentness” of anything always has to be relativized 
to a particular durée. As Bergson insists, la durée is always tied inextricably to our present — 
its past is merely an instance of spatialised time that allows of geometrical division into distinct 
events. La durée is metaphysically “located” in our present; it is in our present where God 
provides or creates “stuff” that our durée synthesises. Once this has happened, the individual 
temporal objects are retained in memory and their temporal extension can be analysed by the 
B-structure.564 This is why throughout the preceding text I have been so careful to say that the 
individual instants or moments of time proceeding from divine eternity are only retrospectively 
identified as being “instants” or “moments.” When our durée is synthesising them, they cannot 
be understood using objective time. The vaguely-outlined present of a particular durée is the 
point of contact between divine being-giving activity and its perfection in our mind; or in other 
words, God’s durée and ours are always “present” to each other, regardless of where in 
spacetime we are located. This also explains why God cannot change “the past:” if the divine 
creative activity is located in a present, the past is always relative to a particular present durée 
and merely captures an item of memory (souvenir) of the divine creative activity. However, 
since there is no objective single region of “the past” in spacetime as a whole, the exclusion of 
divine creative activity from the region of the past does not imply the inability of God to act in 
any region of spacetime. Here, what Eleonore Stump says is exceptionally instructive: 
God cannot change the past — but it is God in particular that cannot change the 
past. … An omnipotent, omniscient, eternal entity can affect temporal events, but 
it can affect events only as they are actually occurring. As for a past event, the 
time at which it was actually occurring is the time at which it is present to such 
an entity; and so the Battle of Waterloo is present to God, and God can affect the 
battle. Suppose that he does so. God can bring it about that Napoleon wins, though 
we know that he does not do so, because whatever God does at Waterloo is over 
and done with as we see it. So God cannot alter the past, but he can alter the 
course of the Battle at Waterloo.565 
 
564 The notion of “a present” as the point of contact between our flowing time and eternity is one that Chase 
ascribes to the Neoplatonist tradition (see Chase, ‘Time and Eternity from Plotinus and Boethius to Einstein’, 98.). 
This similarity between my view and that discussed by Chase cannot be extended too far. The Neoplatonic picture 
still rests on the notion of an objective present in reality, which my view rejects. 
565 Stump, Aquinas, 156–57. 
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Using the same language, the Bergsonian model of divine creative activity can be reformulated 
thus: 
God cannot change what is related to a particular instance of la durée as the past 
— but it is God in particular that cannot change that. An omnipotent, omniscient, 
eternal entity can affect temporal events, but it can affect events only as they are 
part of la durée, which is always present. As for an event which is past, i.e., 
related to the always-present durée qua objective spatialised time, the point of the 
B-structural time at which it was present to our durée is the moment of objective 
time at which it is present to the durée of such an entity; and so the Battle of 
Waterloo is part of la durée of God [in which all of history is contained], and God 
can affect the battle. Etc. 
4.5. Objections 
Several objections can be raised against the model that I have proposed. 
 The first comes from the formulation of the special theory of relativity. According to 
relativity, time is not separate from space, instead, they are simply two aspects of the same 
thing,566 namely of Minkowski spacetime. In the formulation of the invariant relativistic 
interval,567 one of them converts into the other depending on the speeds involved in describing 
a particular event. Can we really separate the “temporal” and “spatial” features of every event 
as neatly as I have suggested with the apple example above? Or is the boundary between the 
object’s spatial and temporal features dependent on the specific conditions under which we are 
describing the situation, for example, if the apple is being described as we glance at it from a 
light-speed spaceship? One possible solution to this problem would be to appeal to Bergson’s 
claims from MM, where he argues for a metaphysical continuum between “time” and “space.”  
For Bergson, they are just two limit cases of la durée.568 However, as before, this solution is 
not available to us, because we have closed off Bergson’s philosophy at Stage 1. More 
importantly, as many critics have pointed out concerning Bergson’s debate with Einstein,569 
la durée and the “time” of relativity (for example, as it enters, when suitably described by one 
 
566 See for example Leftow, Time and Eternity, 36. 
567 For a succinct description, see Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time, 67–71; Mozersky, ‘Time, 
Tense and Special Relativity’, 223–30; Dainton, Time and Space, 322–23. 
568 See for example the fourth chapter of MM. 
569 For a discussion, see During, ‘Dossier critique’, 278–79, note 24. 
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of the four coordinates of Minkowski spacetime, the invariant relativistic interval) are two quite 
different things in any case.  
 The best way to respond to this problem is simply to stick with relativity itself; barring 
limit conditions (i.e., conditions that involve objects travelling at the speed of light), any event 
will always have at least a partial temporal extension; this temporal extension can be captured 
by objective time, differentiated from space and the two might be related using the interval. 
Even though the “time” discussed by relativity is not la durée, it is a particular instance of 
objective time, which — as we have seen in Chapter 2 — is inextricably connected with 
la durée. In other words, the existence of a given temporal event logically implies that such an 
event is being observed by an observer with la durée (see Chapter 3); once that event has joined 
the past of that observer, it can be analysed using objective time which, again, is in complete 
accordance with the way objective time is treated by physics; for example, it is subject to the 
relativity of simultaneity or the applicability of Lorentz transformations to translate the spatio-
(B-structural)-temporal description of the event into a different set of coordinates. 
 The second objection may be stated as follows: Does the picture advanced here not lead 
to giving humans a status of “co-creators,” thereby leaving a slightly heretical aftertaste? Does 
it mean that we participate in divine creation, that is, that God could not create any temporal 
objects without the cooperation of humans? Here the analogy with colours, discussed above, 
is helpful once again. If the perception of colours is grounded in the properties of external 
objects and yet requires the human mind for the colours to be fully realized, what does it mean 
to say that God cannot create, for instance, a red object? I discussed a similar example in an 
earlier paper by appealing to Kripke’s example of the epistemological and ontological relations 
between “molecular motion,” “heat,” and “sensation of heat.”570 Kripke asks, does God need to 
do anything additional in order for “molecular motion” to be “heat”? It seems that He does not: 
in the act of creating molecular motion, He creates heat. What He additionally needs to do is 
to arrange for “molecular motion” to be felt as “sensation of heat” by human beings. The 
situation here is rather similar — for God to create a particular object which exists in objective 
time, He merely needs to create whatever it is that may retrospectively be recognised by human 
beings as the four-dimensional space-time worm existing in the B-structure. However, for this 
to be a temporally extended object, He needs to create humans with la durée in order for them 
to recognise the object as such.571 
 
570 Moravec, ‘Aquinas and Kripke on the Genealogy of Essential Properties’. 
571 The position advocated here is one of “partial” co-operation in creating the effect: God provides the timeless 
esse, the human mind provides the temporal extension. This is different from (although not rejected by) Matthews 
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 Consider a third objection: does my model imply that it is only us who know temporal 
objects qua temporal objects? Is this not the problem in Avicenna that Aquinas criticised, 
namely the position that God only knows the particular through the universal?572 Are we not 
limiting divine omniscience by stipulating that the genuinely temporal character of reality is 
only accessible to la durée? Shanley says that temporal features of objects are only accidents 
pertaining to the particularity of individual substances and must, therefore, be known by God: 
The range of God’s causal knowledge extends to everything that has existence in 
any way, including individual entities, their accidents and their actions … 
[Aquinas] treats temporal features as equivalent to any other accidental feature.573 
There are two ways that we can respond to this. The first possibility is to concede the point; 
there are certain ways of knowing which are closed off to God;574 the immediate 
phenomenological experience of a given temporal object may be as unavailable to the timeless 
God as the experience of, for example, “what it is like to be evil.” The second option is offered 
by the phenomenological account of divine knowledge that I argued for in an earlier paper,575 
where I claimed that divine knowledge should be thought of by analogy as a perfect 
overlapping of the past trace of la durée (which operates in the medium of spatialised time) 
and la durée itself; such an experience is inaccessible to humans since we are constantly subject 
to the separation of memory and perception.576 The first of these is required for the analysis of 
 
Grant’s recently articulated argument to show that there is no contradiction in assuming that a thing be wholly 
caused both by God and by creature — what he calls a “dual sources” account (Matthews Grant, Free Will and 
God’s Universal Causality. The Dual Sources Account, 35–51.). Matthews Grant provides an analogy to show 
how both causes can contribute wholly to an effect: “Tolkien brought it about [in The Hobbit] that Smaug died by 
means of an arrow shot from Bard’s bow, but the dragon and the archer, the bow and the arrow, and everything 
else in the story are with the same immediacy dependent on Tolkien.” (Matthews Grant, 38.) My position, 
however, need not necessarily invite Matthews Grant’s objection that “God is not the cause of the forms in virtue 
of which the effect has its determinate features, [which means that] …, he is not the cause of all entities distinct 
from himself,” (Matthews Grant, 40.) which goes against the orthodox position of God being the cause of 
everything distinct from Himself. True enough, God is not the immediate cause of the temporal extension of an 
event — but since He is the cause of the human whose durée grounds this extension, He is still also the cause of 
this extension. One of the causes of the effect (la durée) is dependent on the other cause of the effect (God). 
572 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 210–11; see also Marmura, ‘Some Aspects of 
Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’. 
573 Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 214. 
574 This response is directly linked to Zagzebski’s seminal work on divine “omnisubjectivity” — for some of its 
formulations, see Zagzebski, ‘Omnisubjectivity: Why It Is a Divine Attribute’; Zagzebski, Omnisubjectivity: A 
Defense of a Divine Attribute; Zagzebski, ‘Omnisubjectivity’. 
575 Moravec, ‘A Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration’. 
576 Pannenberg makes a similar point appealing to Augustine: “[T]he experience of duration … is always coloured 
by memory and anticipation, as Augustine argued in his analysis of time in Book XI of his Confessiones, where 
the experience of duration in spite of the brokenness of temporal process is illustrated by the example of how we 
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things qua objects in spatialised time, the second for the knowledge of objects qua authentically 
temporal. In God both of these overlap in a way unimaginable to us. So God can know objects 
both qua four-dimensional worms in B-structural spacetime and qua la durée. 
 The final objection returns to a different version of a problem about representation that 
has resurfaced at various earlier stages of my argument. It consists of the affirmation that I have 
conflated the following two claims: 
La durée is required for the existence of temporally extended objects. 
La durée is required for the existence of representations of temporally extended objects. 
It might be objected, for example, that what I say about la durée and the way it relates to the 
existence of temporally extended objects boils down to a silly triviality, which says something 
like the following: the mind which uses a temporal medium for the creation of its 
representations is required for there to be representations of temporally extended objects in the 
temporal medium: 
As Dennett has insisted over and over, a representation can depict a property 
without having that property … . A representation of red need not be red. 
A representation of a banana need not be a banana.577 
In my case, the objection would go as follows: the thing which represents objects to itself as 
temporal is required for there to be representations of temporal objects. And even if we simply 
accept that my proposal leads to this self-evident claim, what is so special about time?  
 To reiterate the point made in section 2.2, the relation between the human mind and la 
durée is a biconditional: there is no mind which is not la durée and there is no durée without a 
mind. In one respect, this Bergsonian point is also deeply Kantian: any coherent philosophical 
notion of the world always “hides” la durée somewhere in the process whereby a unified 
conception of that world had been constructed. On the other hand, Bergson goes against Kant 
in that la durée is not a “medium” or a “filter” separating us from the world or from our 
fundamental self:578 it is constitutive of the self (see section 1.5). So while a representation of 
 
experience the unity of a piece of music, a melody, an experience that would not be possible in our attention 
without the help of memory and anticipation. Such an experience of duration can be a reminder of eternity, the 
simultaneous presence and possession of the wholeness of life, although in our temporal experience such duration 
is always limited and gets interrupted.” (Pannenberg, ‘Eternity, Time and Space’, 103–4.) 
577 Brook, ‘Kant and Time-Order Idealism’, 122–23. 
578 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B152-156. 
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a banana need not itself be a banana, and — contrary to what Costelloe said earlier (see p. 17) 
— a representation of change need not itself change, a representation of (any) temporal reality 
cannot exist without the fundamental temporal reality, which is la durée. It does not seem to 
me that this applies to other familiar features of the world: there is nothing prima facie 
contradictory in conceiving a world with, say, only two dimensions,579 a world without colours, 
a world where objects have no mass or a world with no space at all. However, even 
disembodied spirits still have to “endure” in a certain way580 and the one-dimensional character 
in Flatland still displays activities characteristically connected to time (he speaks, for example).  
 So there is something “special” about time. It is therefore not surprising that the 
ontological delineations between “la durée” and the objects which are a product of its synthesis 
are rather blurry. An earlier-used analogy will help to clarify this. Let us put God’s causal 
knowledge aside for the time being. If we replace all people in the universe with colour-blind 
individuals, it no longer makes sense to speak of colours “existing” in that universe at all. 
Nevertheless, the world as a whole, on that picture, would still be coherent. What would “exist” 
in that world is a “something” which, when placed in contact with a non-colour-blind human 
mind, becomes “colour.” By contrast, if we remove all minds simpliciter from the universe 
(thereby removing all instances of la durée), it no longer makes sense to speak of anything 
temporal as “existing” in that universe; the world stops being unified and disintegrates into 
disconnected slices of reality. The difference between the case of “colour” and “durée” is the 
following: the removal of the ability to perceive colours removes the “existence” of colours, 
but not the coherence of the world which contained them. A colour-blind observer is still an 
observer. A time-insensitive observer is not. 
 The objector might, however, come back and reformulate the problem as follows: What 
I am saying amounts to no more than the claim, that objects are temporal in virtue of being 
represented as temporal. Analogously to the example of colours, this is no different from 
claiming that objects have colours in virtue of being represented by the mind as having colours. 
Perhaps the characteristic “timeliness” of represented objects related to la durée is merely 
attached to timeless objects in the same way as the property of being red, for example, is 
attached to objects which, in themselves, intrinsically, do not possess any colour. 
 Here it is important to refer back to the role that the synthesis of la durée plays in the 
constitution of temporally extended objects; time is not simply a property that can be attached 
 
579 See Abbott, Flatland. A Romance of Many Dimensions. Bergson makes a similar hypothesis about creatures 
living in two-dimensional plane representing time to themselves by introducing a third dimension in DS 104/150. 
580 See Lucas, A Treatise on Time and Space, §2. 
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and removed from objects, it is fundamentally constitutive of objects as such: Objects exist in 
virtue of being represented as temporal. As Bergson’s example with the pendulum illustrated, 
without the synthesis of la durée, objects would merely be disunified fragmented slices of 
spatiality. The characteristic “timeliness” is not a mere property, it is intrinsically built into any 
given object. Asking what objects are once we eliminate their mind-dependent temporal 
dimension is much like asking what an undeveloped film “looks like:” no one has ever seen an 
undeveloped frame of film since the activity of human seeing is inseparably bound to rays of 
light, which destroy the undeveloped film. The fact that we cannot conceive of a possible 
timeless world with objects is, of course, not evidence for there not being such a world. It is 
just that when we mentally travel to its door with our garden-variety objects and let such objects 
walk in, taking off their temporal cloaks before entering, we no longer know what they are. We 
peep through the keyhole, see that something is there — Kant would say this something is a 
noumenon —, we can perhaps make out shapes of timeless objects (universals, numbers, etc.), 
whose home it is, but that’s about it.581 One should think of temporally extended reality not as 
a fence of wooden planks, each representing a particular feature of the object (chemical 
composition, origin, mass, temporal and spatial extension), but rather as a bridge with several 
bolts. In the case of the fence, one can remove individual planks at will while the structure 
remains standing. However, the fundamentality of temporal extension for the coherence of (the 
world of) objects is better captured by the bridge metaphor; some sections of the bridge (e.g., 
railings or statues on top of it) may be removed with the bridge remaining “a bridge” — 
however, there are others (such as time) which, when removed, cause the entire bridge to 
collapse.582 A colourless object is still an object; a temporally unextended object is not. 
4.6. Re-Creationism 
Before applying these findings to the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge, a few 
words need to be said about how the picture of divine creation suggested above relates to the 
theory of re-creationism or “continuous creation theory.” This theory claims, roughly speaking, 
that “it is in the end impossible to distinguish God’s bringing things to be from His sustaining 
 
581 I am grateful to Pierre Bonnier for this metaphor. 
582 I have argued that time is one of such aspects. Perhaps there are others. Kant claimed that it is both time and 
space that play this fundamental role for the unity and coherence of the world. However, there does not seem 
anything particularly incoherent in conceiving a spaceless world occupied by temporal disembodied spirits; indeed 
even the point-like character of Abbot’s flatland who occupies a zero-dimensional space (i.e., no space at all) still 
speaks in time. Bergson himself argues that one may not treat space and time equally when asking questions about 
how fundamental each is to our constitution of reality in IT 22-24. 
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them in existence,”583 or that “God is continuously remaking the universe, and this is why the 
universe remains in existence.”584 Furthermore, Kvanvig and McCann observe that calling this 
position “continuous creation” theory is rather misleading: “[G]od does not engage in one type 
of action to produce a thing and another to sustain it.”585 Moreover, “It is not … possible to 
limit the object of creation to the coming to be of the world, where this is supposed to be distinct 
from its being, for there is no such distinction.”586 
 Kvanvig and McCann argue that this is, in fact, the orthodox Christian position and 
quote a host of canonical texts in support of their view.587 Furthermore, this position seems to 
fit quite well with the picture of an immutable God: “[G]od simply creates, and creates all that 
He does create; He does not start and stop. And if this is correct the world cannot persist after 
God has ceased creating it, for He cannot cease creating it.”588 According to Kvanvig and 
McCann, things do not have a “self-sustaining” physical feature that would allow them to 
persist from one moment of time to another.589 On the recreationist picture, by contrast, reality 
consists of God re-creating every single point of time.590 
 It might indeed seem that re-creationism should be considered as the default orthodox 
option. So why not accept it? The first objection against re-creationism consists in the charge 
of occasionalism, that is “the notion that God is the only cause in the world, and that things 
that look like causes in the world are only occasions for God to produce an effect.”591 If Kvanvig 
and McCann are right, Pavelich argues, then “once a thing has been created, they are correct 
that it can itself become a cause, but if a thing is constantly created, there will never be a time 
when it can exert autonomous causal powers.”592 Furthermore, the re-creationist picture seems 
to pose problems for the identity of objects across time. “Every thing at every moment is a new 
 
583 Kvanvig and McCann, ‘Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World’, 15; see also Kretzmann, The 
Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II, 91. 
584 Pavelich, ‘On the Idea That God Is Continuously Re-Creating the Universe’, 7. Leftow observes that on 
a tensed theory of time, this position is inevitable: “If time is a transient continuum and is God’s creation, God 
must be constantly creating the new extension of that continuum if in fact that continuum continues to continue.” 
(Leftow, Time and Eternity, 193.) Bergson himself engages with Descartes’ version of the theory in IT 55-58. 
585 Kvanvig and McCann, ‘Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World’, 15. 
586 Kvanvig and McCann, 19. 
587 Kvanvig and McCann, 15. They refer to Colossians 1:17; Hebrews 1:3; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1975, 
14. Divine Government (Ia2ae.103-9):IaQ104a1; Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, 1:IV.12. 
588 Kvanvig and McCann, ‘Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the World’, 18. 
589 Kvanvig and McCann, 37–41. 
590 For a discussion of this position in Albert of Saxony, see Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671, 391–94; 
see also Cross, ‘Four-Dimensionalism and Identity Across Time: Henry of Ghent vs. Bonaventure’. 
591 Pavelich, ‘On the Idea That God Is Continuously Re-Creating the Universe’; see also Matthews Grant, Free 
Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual Sources Account, 35–51. 
592 Pavelich, ‘On the Idea That God Is Continuously Re-Creating the Universe’, 13. 
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thing, created ex nihilo by God.”593 This leads to a fragmentation of reality. The final objection 
that Pavelich raises against re-creationism consists in the observation that it very heavily relies 
on a theory of time as discrete: 
[T]he re-creationist faces a dilemma: either time is continuous or it is not. If it is 
continuous, then the re-creationist position cannot get off the ground at all since 
the world would not need re-creating — if time really exists, then there is no 
question as to why things persist through time. The re-creationist must therefore 
say that time is discontinuous but then the re-creationist’s talk of “re” creation 
makes no sense, and the re-creationist story, which purports to be an explanation 
of a temporal universe, is something else entirely: an account of a universe that 
does not contain time.594 
Neither can the re-creationist, according to Pavelich, say that God exists in a timeless “frame” 
and the world, in se is not really temporal: 
The image that emerges is one of God as a kind of filmmaker, who creates 
successive frames of a film, and does so in time, and then strings them together 
sequentially, generating time for the characters of the film.595 
However, this runs into the usual problems connected with eternal creation of the temporal — 
not only is, on this view, the universe not “genuinely temporal,”596 there is nothing that would 
prevent God from changing the past, in the same way that previous frames in a film may be 
edited at any point,597 which goes against our intuitions about what “time” is: 
While it may make sense to God that one earthly moment happened before 
another, we are working on the assumption that divine time is not ours — and 
hence it would not therefore make any earthly sense to say that there is a past or 
a future. … The conclusion to reach from these considerations is that on a re-
creationist picture, time — at least insofar as we can understand it — is not real.598 
Although a fully coherent account of re-creationism on Bergsonian terms would need to be 
spelt out in more detail, my model is in general agreement with Kvanvig and McCann. The one 
 
593 Pavelich, 14. 
594 Pavelich, 16. 
595 Pavelich, 17. 
596 Pavelich, 18. 
597 Pavelich, 18. 
598 Pavelich, 18. 
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reservation I have, based on the distinction between la durée and objective time discussed in 
Chapter 2, would be that the talk of “before” and “after” or “again” when related to God’s 
creation only applies to the trace of la durée which can be captured by the medium of B-
structural objective time.  
 However, even though the similarities between the picture of God’s “causal 
knowledge” (coming together with la durée to constitute temporally extended objects) and re-
creationism may be rather vague, the Bergsonian-idealist account of divine relation to the world 
can respond to the main objections from Pavelich. I will leave the objection from occasionalism 
until the next chapter. For the time being, let us consider the objection about re-creationism 
being tied to a particular theory of time. Here the Bergsonian division of la durée and B-
structural time allows us simply to dissolve the question; enquiries about time being continuous 
or discrete apply merely to objective time.599 The re-creative activity of God, indexed to 
individual discrete points of time, may only be retrospectively recognised because when it is 
happening (in our present constituted by la durée), it is completely indivisible. As a matter of 
fact, it does not particularly matter whether objective time is discrete or continuous, we may 
simply formulate the situation as follows: For every point of objective time, we can 
retrospectively recognise that it has been created by God. Whether there is a bijection between 
the set of these points and real numbers or natural numbers does not particularly matter. 
Furthermore, the image of God as a film-maker should be reversed: Bergson himself strongly 
argued against imagining the world with the help of the “cinematographic” metaphor.600 The 
individual images have been strung together by us, not by God; and the existence of these 
individual frames or “slices” of reality, which “constantly begin anew,”601 may only be 
recognised retrospectively, since, at the moment when they were being strung together, they 
were part of the indivisible present. Similarly, the idea of God changing “the past” is mistaken 
from Bergson’s point of view: as we have seen earlier (see p. 132), God always creates in a 
particular present of a given durée: it is not surprising that God cannot cause creative change 
somewhere where His creative activity is not located, namely, in the past. Similarly, the view 
that time is not real if there is no “future” and no “past” has already been dealt with in Chapter 2 
by the differentiation between the “real” time of la durée and the “real” objective time. 
 
599 Bergson’s talk of durée being “continuous” should not be understood in terms of discussions about there being 
or not being a third point between any two given points of time; what he means by this word is rather a fundamental 
“indivisibility,” or “un-interruption.” 
600 CM 7/9. 
601 MM 139/154. 
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 As for re-creationism entailing a fragmentation of reality that is deemed to make 
impossible the identity of objects across time, a point which is suggested not only by Pavelich’s 
claims about God always creating everything “anew”602 but also by Bergson’s repeated claims 
about the world being “reborn” at every minute, one may respond in two ways, using two 
different methods to ground the identity of objects. The first option, already mentioned in 
Chapter 2, is to appeal to Bergson’s own theory of memory to guarantee the identity of objects 
across time in la durée. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this theory would require going in extensive 
detail into the metaphysical apparatus offered by Bergson in MM. I do not have space to do 
this here, although I do not doubt that this could be done. The second and much easier option 
is, instead, to try and ground the identity of objects across time in the B-structure. The route to 
pursue here could lead through Chisholm’s writings on entia successiva, writings, it must be 
said, that are not totally disconnected from the medieval debates about divine creation and 
sustaining that have formed the core of this chapter. Chisholm, appealing to Bishop Butler, 
argues that it is only in the “loose and popular sense” that individual things persist; in the strict 
sense, the continuity across time is only granted to persons.603 The continuity of objects as entia 
successiva may be analysed using Chisholm’s definitional machinery, which is based on B-
structural objective time.604 
 
* * * 
 
The picture of the relation between God and time is now complete. Using the key elements of 
Bergson’s philosophy introduced in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 has delineated two metaphysically 
different notions of “time:” objective time and la durée, and shown how they are related. 
Chapter 3 used the metaphysical role of la durée for the constitution of temporality to sketch 
an ontology of time that takes into account key insights from the special theory of relativity. 
Chapter 4 has now demonstrated how such an ontology fits into a theistic account of the relation 
between God and the world. 
 One may, however, begin to wonder what the point of all of this is. Why Bergson? The 
work done in the past two chapters, which has mainly appealed to la durée as the “great 
synthesiser” required for temporal objects to exist, may have equally well been done with Kant, 
perhaps with the upgrade of a qualitative differentiation of the (present) perception and (past) 
 
602 Pavelich, ‘On the Idea That God Is Continuously Re-Creating the Universe’, 8. 
603 Chisholm, Person and Object. A Metaphysical Study, 92. 
604 For a full discussion, see Chisholm, 97–104. 
 
 143  
memory. We must remember that Bergson’s primary motivation for introducing la durée in 
TFW was to deal with the problem of free will. The rest of this essay will, therefore, use the 
complete ontology from this chapter to deal with the problem of divine omniscience and human 
free will. It is there that other key features of la durée, left unused since Chapter 2, will come 
into play.  
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5. La Durée, Eternity, and Foreknowledge 
The only feature of la durée that the two previous chapters have been appealing to was its 
“synthesising” function; la durée is both an ontological instantiation of temporality and a 
necessary component of temporally extended objects. We have seen that la durée is not only 
constitutive of the self but that is also cannot be disassociated from external reality.  
 Putting the question of noumena aside, la durée has played a similar role as time — the 
a priori condition of sensibility — does in Kant’s metaphysical system. However, a key 
stepping-stone of Bergson’s entire philosophical enterprise is a critique of Kant and the way 
Kantian philosophy has understood time. Bergson argues that although Kant has understood 
the functional role that the human mind plays in temporal ontology (i.e., as required for the 
synthesis that makes our experience of the timeless reality “outside” possible), he has 
misunderstood its qualitative nature.605 Chapters 3 and 4 have appealed to the mind’s role in 
temporal ontology, this final part of the project will explore the mind’s temporal nature. We 
will return to Bergson’s early writings on the relation between the qualitative nature of la durée 
and the problem of free will that were introduced at the beginning of this essay. 
 Once again, a few methodological delimitations are needed. First, I will not discuss the 
problem of moral responsibility and its connection to free will debates, since, following 
Bergson,606 I take the question about our being free to be negotiable independently of the 
question about our being morally responsible. Second, there are two distinct routes that one 
might take when dealing with the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge: (i) we can 
start by demonstrating that we have free will and then try to work out how it is that a timeless 
God can know everything; the second option is (ii) to start with the claim that God knows 
everything and then attempt to explain how we may have free will. I opt for the first of these. 
 Section 1.4 has applied Bergson’s critique to Postulates 1-3 that contemporary free will 
discussions rest on. However, dismantling the first three Postulates is not enough. Saying that 
there is a continuum between freedom and determinism (against Postulate 1), that the problem 
of free will should instead be shifted to individual acts (against Postulate 2) and that free will 
does not consist of being able to do otherwise or of there being several futures possible at the 
 
605 IT 67-9. See also Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Bergson and the Time of 
Life, 35. 
606 See Čapek, ‘Les apories de la liberté bergsonienne’, 255. For Bergson’s treatment of the topic — especially 
the difference between “liberté” and “libre arbitre” — see his texts quoted in Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 297–
98. 
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time of the decision-making (against Postulate 3), all of that is of no use if, in the abstract, free 
will might still not be possible at all. 
 This final chapter will first start by returning to van Inwagen’s consequence argument; 
it will be shown that the argument rests on Postulate 4 (i.e., the claim that mental states can be 
subsumed under causal relationships, see section 1.4) and that Bergson’s philosophy of la 
durée proves that Postulate 4 is false. Second, I will argue that all the four Postulates figure in 
free will discussions within analytic philosophy of religion, thereby extending Bergson’s 
critique to them too. However, it will be demonstrated that although Bergson can remove one 
stumbling block of the free will and foreknowledge problem in analytic thought, another one 
arises that his philosophy simply cannot deal with. In the final section, I will propose my own 
solution to this problem. 
5.1. Bergson and The Consequence Argument 
Bergson insists that a given mental state can never reappear again. As Pariente puts it, “la durée 
is the only element in which the impossibility of all repetition is guaranteed.”607 Now, Bergson 
argues that the possibility of repetition is precisely what lies at the core of utilising logical 
inferences and laws of nature in dealing with the problem of free will: “To say that the same 
inner causes will reproduce the same effects is to assume that the same cause can appear a 
second time on the stage of consciousness.”608 Bergson asserts that Kant specifically was 
mistaken to take categories applicable to the external world and apply them to la durée: 
He was thereby led to believe that the same states can recur in the depths of 
consciousness, just as the same physical phenomena are repeated in space; this at 
least is what he implicitly admitted when he ascribed to the causal relation the 
same meaning and the same function in the inner as in the outer world.609 
To see that Bergson’s critique of Kant applies equally well to the contemporary landscape, it 
is best to use the consequence argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism 
as a study-case. In its most general formulation, it says something like the following: We do 
not have control over the past and we do not control the link or the connection between the past 
 
607 “[L]a durée est l’unique élément dans lequel soit garantie l’impossibilité de toute répétition.” (Pariente, Le 
Langage et l’individuel, 19, my translation.) 
608 TFW 199/150. 
609 TFW 232/174-5. 
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and the future, therefore we do not control the future.610 The argument has been formulated in 
many different variations; for our present purposes, let us use the most canonical version 
articulated by van Inwagen: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature 
and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were 
born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the 
consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.611 
In propositional form, the argument may be reconstructed as follows: 
P1: No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. 
P2: No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail 
every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true and we have no control over whether it is 
true or not). 
C: Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.612 
Let us assume that the argument above applies to the external world. True enough, the past 
“facts” that — together with the laws of nature — entail the facts about the future are rather 
vague; one billiard ball hitting another is never composed of exactly the same number of atoms 
from one experiment to another and yet we can predict where the second one will travel when 
hit by the first. This problem may easily be evaded by saying that laws of nature613 do not range 
 
610 This formulation is based on Zagzebski, ‘Eternity and Fatalism’, 65. 
611 Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 16; for the original formulation, see Van Inwagen, ‘The Incompatibility 
of Free Will and Determinism’. 
612 This propositional reconstruction is based on McKenna and Coates, ‘Compatibilism’. 
613 I intentionally leave undecided which theory of “laws of nature” I ascribe to since the following discussion 
concerns merely their applicability to mental states — problems pertaining to physics (matter, nature, cosmology 
etc.) do not play a role here. Moreover, when observing the main theories about laws of nature, one begins to see 
that Bergson’s critique applies equally well to all those that posit the possibility of mental states being “fed into” 
their respective conceptions of laws. For example, on a regularity-type view of laws of nature (i.e., one that says 
that laws of nature consist of generalisations describing the regular conjunction of phenomena in the world, 
generalisations that supervene on stuff in the “Humean mosaic” (Lewis, Philosophical Papers, 2:ix.)), la durée 
cannot be “fed into” into such laws. Since mental states are unrepeatable tokens, there are no types (or universals) 
to generalise over: a generalisation over a single case is no generalisation at all. (The specific case of singular 
causation will be discussed below.) Of course, one might generalise over the types of mental states (and the 
resulting actions, for example, the marriage example discussed in Chapter 1), but these do not apply to la durée, 
only to the parasitic self. By contrast, on the necessitarian view (i.e., roughly speaking, one that claims that nature 
is governed by inviolable nomological necessity), it is impossible to see how such a conception of law could 
prohibit any connection between two phenomenologically accessible mental states: of course, the mental state of 
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over particular facts, events, actions or happenings, but over types thereof. While strictly 
speaking every billiard ball has a different mass and strictly speaking, it has a different shape, 
the differences between individual tokens of billiard balls are so negligible that they may be 
subsumed under a single type — “Billiard ball,” or rather “a sphere of roughly this and this 
shape and roughly this and this weight etc.” 
 Can the same be said about mental states? Recall that Postulate 4 says the following: 
Postulate 4: Laws of nature apply to mental states. This means that mental states are 
considered as facts that can be subsumed under causal relationships. 
If the above were true and laws of nature could thereby apply to mental states,614 the 
consequence argument would equally well apply to la durée: We have no power over our past 
mental states and over the fact that past mental states entail future mental states. Since mental 
states entail our actions, we would have no power over our actions. In the way that 
instantiations of certain types of movements of a billiard ball in one direction determine the 
instantiation of later types of events of another billiard ball, we could say that types of mental 
states (e.g., “anger”) determine the future mental state and the action that results therefrom 
(“hitting someone”). 
 For Bergson, however, the difference between the internal and the external multiplicity 
(see section 1.2) is central for articulating free-will questions. Whereas states of the external 
world may be considered as several tokens of the same type, mental states are always uniquely 
tokened. Once a mental state has occurred in la durée, the type is never instantiated again: “Can 
the same situation ever repeat itself, the same external situation, the same internal situation, the 
same external situation and the same state of the soul [état de l’âme]?”615 This is precisely why 
Bergson treats choice as an “exception to the law of causality.”616 He argues that the usual 
notions of causality cannot apply to states of consciousness, because they rely on the possibility 
 
“feeling peckish” is frequently (and regularly) followed by the mental state of “I should get a snack,” but nothing 
conceptually prohibits it from being followed by “the thought of a speaking pumpkin.” Of course, the discussion 
of other theories about laws of nature (e.g., antirealism, antireductionism, system-based approach) would need to 
be provided if la durée was extended to the external world (Stages 2-3), but by closing off this possibility, the 
usual problems are here closed off with it. 
614 Van Inwagen himself briefly considers the possibility of including psychological laws in his typology of “laws 
of nature” (Van Inwagen, ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’, 187.), but this need not trouble us 
here, because: (i) he merely understand these to apply to the externally observable behaviour of agents, and (ii) 
even then, he rejects them from his set of “laws of nature” anyway. 
615 “Est-ce que jamais la même situation se reproduit, la même situation extérieure, la même situation interne, la 
même situation extérieure et le même état d’âme ?” (EPL 152, my translation.) 
616 Miravalle, ‘The Trinity’s Choice: Oppy, Bergson, and God’s Decision to Create’, 154. 
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of things reappearing in the same form again and being subsumed under causal laws, something 
which cannot be the case with states of consciousness: 
The great category mistake enters in, says Bergson, when we insist on having 
causes for every conscious event. The error lies in conceiving our mental states 
as separate pieces, with some bits here and other bits there, all of which need to 
be connected with causes.617 
Mental states are not even the type of thing that can enter into logical laws. For example, the 
propositions “I am happy” and “It is not the case that I am happy” can — as anyone who has 
just had to move to a new exciting city after saying goodbye to their friends knows — both be 
true at the same time, in the way that “I am less than two metres tall” and “I am either two or 
more metres tall” cannot. The consequence argument from above should, therefore, be 
contrasted with the following one: 
P1: The facts about the past618 come in two varieties: (i) facts occurring in objective time 
(i.e., facts about the external physical world) and (ii) facts occurring in la durée (mental 
states).619 
P2: No one has power over the facts about the past. This applies both to (i) facts occurring 
in objective time and (ii) facts occurring in la durée (i.e., our past mental states are what 
they are and there is nothing we can do about them620). 
P3: Laws of nature together with facts about the past do not entail facts occurring in la 
durée. (This follows from the fact that laws of nature only apply to external facts.) 
C: Laws of nature together with facts of the past do not entail every fact about the 
future (i.e., they do not entail future facts about la durée, but only external facts 
occurring in objective time). 
 
617 Miravalle, 163. 
618 In what follows I understand “facts about the past” as “facts about events that occur at times in the past.” 
619 This follows from Hypothesis 4 in my introduction. 
620 This analysis diverges radically from the picture of memory proposed by Bergson in MM, where he argues 
that our process of recalling memories changes those memories too. The past is not as fixed for Bergson as it is 
for van Inwagen. 
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Now, although we got the result we wanted (we neutralised the second premise of van 
Inwagen’s consequence argument), we ended up with a rather bizarre picture.621 Once we have 
stipulated that no laws of nature range over la durée and once we have split the set of facts 
about the past into those that pertain to objective time and those that pertain to la durée, our 
future has become strangely bifurcated: the future states of la durée (e.g., the feeling of 
satisfaction I will experience once I finish writing this chapter) are not entailed by laws of 
nature (or any other laws), but facts about the future occurring in objective time (e.g., the event 
of me opening a can of beer as a result of the satisfaction I experience once I finish writing this 
chapter) are. What a strange conclusion! It seemed like the division of facts of the past into 
those about la durée and those about the external world was completely harmless; sure, one set 
consists of uniquely-tokened types and the other of types with potentially several tokens, but 
both subsets were still fixed, determinate, and causally unaffectable. But since the deterministic 
entailment of laws of nature applied to only one of these subsets, we have ended up with a 
future in which some facts are entailed by laws of nature (i.e., facts about the external world 
occurring in objective time) and some (i.e., facts about la durée) which are not. This is not only 
odd, but one cannot avoid smelling the rat of epiphenomenalism, which would render the 
mental incapable of causing anything physical. 
 Luckily, there is a way out of this problem. The solution proceeds in two steps. First, it 
suffices to observe that any action taking place in the future of objective time, for example, 
leaving the coffee shop, is entailed not only by facts about the past occurring in objective time 
(e.g., the location of the coffee shop and the opening times) but also facts occurring in la durée 
(e.g., our resentment towards the coffee shop owner). But note, as we have seen in section 2.3, 
 
621 This picture is similar to that adopted by Donald Davidson in Davidson, ‘Mental Events’. Davidson, following 
Kant, observes that while causes and effects are bound together by deterministic laws, there do not seem to be any 
deterministic laws linking mental states. Davidson’s solution (“anomalous monism”) is primarily linguistic: 
mental states and physical states (brain states) are  — ontologically — the same, but linguistically described in 
different ways. They are not, however, the same when it comes to laws linking mental states and physical states. 
Although a discussion of the relation between Davidson’s view and that espoused by Bergson — especially in 
MM — is beyond the scope of this work, for the present purposes it suffices to say that my position is not identical 
to that of Davidson, but they are not incompatible — perhaps even despite Bergson’s worry about linguistic 
descriptions of mental states. They share certain claims, for example, about the nomological irreducibility of the 
mental to the physical (Davidson, 216.), a rejection of the possibility of exhaustively describing mental 
phenomena in purely physical terms (Davidson, 214.), the anomalousness of mental events (Davidson, 207.), or 
the fact that, when it comes to mental states, “lawlikeness is a matter of degree.” (Davidson, 217.) However, my 
view remains undecided about the token-identity of mental and physical states — in principle, it is compatible 
both with Davidson’s anomalous monism or with what he terms “anomalous dualism.” (Davidson, 213.) In short: 
when it comes to nomology, I agree with Davidson, when it comes to ontology, I leave the question undecided. 
 
 
 150  
that facts about la durée only ever exist in the present, never in the past or future. Therefore, 
at every given point of objective time, we have only the following sets of facts:  
(a) set of past objective-time facts 
(b) set of present objective-time facts  
(c) set of present la durée-facts  
(d) set of future objective-time facts 
There are only ever present la-durée facts. The second step in the argument consists in 
eliminating the deterministic entailment of future objective-time facts. But this step is simple. 
Observe that facts about la durée in the present have a causal effect on objective-time facts 
about the future. Our feeling of longing to return to Scotland (a present fact about la durée) 
causes us to transport the set of atoms that composes our body to the set of atoms that compose 
the city of Edinburgh. So the set of future objective-time facts is causally dependent on present 
facts about la durée. 
 We should, therefore, reformulate the argument as follows: 
P1: Every external event in the future (of objective time) is causally dependent on (i) past 
and present objective-time facts, (ii) present la-durée facts, and (ii) laws of nature. 
P2: We do have power over present la-durée facts. 
C: We can have partial power over facts of the future. 
A few comments on some of what this argument entails: 
 What is this power, stipulated in P2, over the present facts of la durée? For Bergson 
this would doubtless consist of the power to descend into the fundamental self, introspect 
ourselves and deeply focus on the facts that constitute our character, letting them spring to the 
surface (see section 1.5). The “can” in the formulation of the argument points to Bergson’s 
negation of Postulates 1 and 2; our power to be free is not a given; it happens rarely and only 
at moments of intense deliberation. This is why the formulation “We can have power over 
present facts in la durée” is particularly fitting since at those rare moments when we have such 
power la durée perfectly expresses our character. 
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 The argument above entails that if I have power over x, I have partial power 
over (x & y).622 The “power” here, of course, must only be partial: If I have power over Cécile, 
but not over Danceny, it is still true that I have partial power over them as a couple. This 
“partiality” of power is precisely what is required for free will:  
If men are to act freely there must be both some determinism and some 
indeterminism in the world. As Austin Farrer argued, men would not be capable 
of free action if all their instruments and the materials they acted upon behaved 
with individual capricious ways: we should be in the predicament of Alice trying 
to play croquet with live flamingoes for mallets and live hedgehogs for balls. But 
equally we could not play croquet if the ball and mallets moved and impinged on 
one another as the stars in their courses, in a way that could be predicted 
regardless of the rules of the game or the players’ aims.623 
The conclusion of the argument above is straightforward; we have no power over some events 
or objects in the future (of our reference frame), namely, those that do not or cannot involve 
any human causal contribution either for practical reasons (an explosion on the surface of the 
sun) or for conceptual ones (events in the absolute elsewhere region of our light-cone). But we 
can have power over some — those that result from the conjunction of  
(i) our present deliberation (deciding whether to get a coffee or not) and  
(ii) facts occurring in objective time (it being three o’clock or the kettle boiling) and  
 
622 A straightforward option of making this work is to talk of “partial power over,” as I do in what follows: if I 
have power over x, then I have partial power over the conjunction of x and y. An analogy here could be the 
following: If I can ruin the icing on a cake, I can partially ruin the whole cake. Another, though much more 
complicated, route would be to provide a more detailed definition of the predicate “having power over” and then 
extend it to the whole conjunction. Let P be the predicate “to have power over,” let x and y form part of a set of 
facts x & y. Then, if P(x), then P(x & y). An analogy here would be with the predicate “to be poisonous” — if the 
lemonade is poisonous, so is the shandy made from that lemonade and beer. This is, of course, only a brief sketch, 
as further conditions would need to be added on what P can take as arguments, such as “let there be nothing in y 
that explicitly prevents x & y from being in the range of P” (to prevent cases where the beer contains antidotes 
that cancel out the poison), a condition further specifying the relation of x and y (to prevent cases where one 
millilitre of poisonous lemonade stops being poisonous if diluted in five litres of beer), or a condition clarifying 
the nature of the conjunction of x and y (to prevent cases where x is my grandmother’s china cup and y is the 
country of South Africa). In any case, the point of the discussion here is as follows: I have power over la durée. 
Some facts about the external world depend on la durée. Therefore, I have power over (some of) the facts about 
the external world. 
623 Geach, Providence and Evil, 120. 
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(iii) the laws of nature (the laws of thermodynamics that enable the boiled water to extract 
caffeine out of coffee beans). 
 It is worth noting that Bergson says that although there is no causation (let alone 
necessitation) between states of consciousness, he does propose that there still is a certain type 
of “prefiguration” or “preformation”624 (sometimes, in a particularly Plotinian idiom, 
“emanation”625) that links one state of consciousness to another. For Bergson, the future event 
is to a limited degree “contained” in the present one, but the prefiguring is imperfect and can 
always be aborted — the effect is only there in the state of a retrospectively recognisable 
possibility. Once the event has happened, there is no contradiction in linking it together within 
a network of causes and effects; but this may only happen retrospectively. For Bergson, the 
application of the term “causality” to mental states expresses merely, in an Anscombian 
fashion, “the derivativeness of an effect from its causes.”626  
 
Before returning to philosophy of religion, it is worth taking an interesting detour. It seems that 
the type of “prefiguration” Bergson talks about is simply a mental-content version of singular 
causation, i.e., causation understood as this causing that (e.g., this glass of water spilling 
causing this paper to be soaked), as opposed to causal links ranging over multiple phenomena 
(water causeing paper to disintegrate).627 Armstrong defines singular causation as “a direct 
relationship between one token state of affairs and another such.”628 This account of causality 
seems prima facie to resonate with what Bergson says about the one-off nature of the causal 
relationship linking any two (retrospectively and artificially individuated) mental states and 
with what has been argued about mental states being uniquely-tokened types. For example, in 
TFW, Bergson says that “a deep-seated inner cause produces its effect once for all and will 
never reproduce it.”629 Once we accept that every mental state is a uniquely-tokened type, these 
singular types may ex post facto be linked by relations of cause and effect, without implying 
that they are (one of many) tokens of a particular type linked with another one (of many) 
token(s) of another type. Furthermore, if every single causal link between two states of la durée 
is singular, then laws of nature qua generalisations cannot range over it.630 
 
624 IT 72-3. 
625 Bouaniche, ‘Dossier Critique’, 203, note 11. 
626 Anscombe, Causality and Determination, 7. 
627 Danks, ‘Singular Causation’, 201. 
628 Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 204. 
629 TFW 201/151. 
630 Danks, ‘Singular Causation’, 202. 
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 On the other hand, one might complain that linking singular causation and the 
“prefiguration” of la durée simply misses Bergson’s original point of using the uniqueness of 
states of la durée to ensure that human agency escapes the “meshes of [natural] necessity.”631 
The point about singular causation escaping generalisations only works on a regularities-based 
view of laws of nature and one cannot exclude the possibility of conceptualising a necessitarian 
view of singular causation in la durée (see footnote 613). Worse still, in a recent article, García-
Encinas has provided a fascinating argument to show that necessity can be built into singular 
causation too.632 She faults Hume with presuming that if something cannot be known a priori, 
then it cannot be necessary. However, as she shows, this does not mean that something cannot 
be known a posteriori and in fact, be necessary. Quite the contrary, “[o]ur philosophical 
concept of causality includes a necessary connection between the related elements.”633 
 However, interestingly, by observing García-Encinas’ argument more closely and 
probing into the type of “necessity” she has in mind, we see that her argument comes very close 
to what Bergson is trying to say about the uniqueness of links tying together two different 
stages of la durée. Not all necessities are equal. García-Encinas appeals to Kripkean semantics 
to show that the link between a cause and effect is necessary in the same sense as the link 
between Hesperus and Phosphorus, i.e., that it is an example of a posteriori necessity. By 
establishing a priori634 that a particular cause can only ever have a particular effect (the one 
that it in fact has) — just like Kripke a priori establishes that identity is necessary — she 
concludes that “causation conveys a necessary connection:”635 
[C]ausation is necessary in the sense that a given effect cannot have a different 
cause from the one it actually has, for if it had it would be another effect (which 
is contradictory); and a given cause cannot have a different effect from the one it 
actually has, for if it had, it would be another cause (which is contradictory).636 
Now, Bergson would doubtless agree with this sense of necessity — but this necessity is of a 
completely different type from the Humean version (seemingly implying determinism) that he 
was arguing against during his time. If “necessity” means nothing more than that this mental 
 
631 MM 249/280. 
632 García-Encinas, ‘A Posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument’. 
633 García-Encinas, 54. 
634 “A metaphysically necessary connection between two particulars a and b would be known a posteriori if we 
knew a posteriori that they are causally related, and if we knew a priori that causation conveys a necessary 
connection.” (García-Encinas, 49.) 
635 García-Encinas, 49. 
636 García-Encinas, ‘A Posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean Argument’. 
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state is what it is because it is causally linked to that mental state that preceded it (and that it 
can be no other), then this is not that far from what Bergson is trying to say about a mental state 
only producing its effect once. 
 Despite appearances, my intuition is that the conceptual similarity between the type of 
causation in la durée and singular causation should be regarded with caution, primarily as a 
helpful analogy, not as one of complete conceptual overlap. This is because it seems rather 
difficult to conceive of ways of linking the prefiguration of la durée with counterfactuals — 
something that does not seem altogether impossible in the case of singular causation.637 
Moreover, most analyses of singular causation focus exclusively on physical processes or 
events — more research would need to be done to show how one might conceptualise such a 
relationship when applied to purely mental phenomena; the link between singular causation 
and laws of nature is already difficult enough — the link between singular causation and mental 
states would probably be even more tricky to work out.  
 In either case, this does not need to trouble us here. I claim that causality does not apply 
to la durée. If it does, however, then it must be singular, not general, causality. If it is singular 
causality, then the type of necessity involved does not negate what Bergson says about free 
will but is deeply consonant with it. 
5.2. Bergson and Free Will in Analytic Philosophy of Religion 
Now that Postulate 4 has been discussed and the risk of the impossibility of free will has been 
averted, let us look at how Postulates 1-3 discussed at the beginning of this essay in section 1.4 
feature in discussions regarding the problem of human free will and divine foreknowledge in 
analytic philosophy of religion. Note that whereas Bergson’s dissolution of Postulate 4 may 
have warded off the consequence argument, one must still be cautious to see whether 
determinism does not return once we bring God into the picture. Recall the first three 
Postulates: 
Postulate 1: Free will and determinism are absolute. 
Postulate 2: The compatibility of free will and determinism is a general problem. 
Postulate 3: The principle of alternative possibilities. 
 
637 See Danks, ‘Singular Causation’, 204–8. 
 
 155  
 As an illustration of a formulation of the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge 
that commits itself to the first three, let us use a recent restatement of the problem by William 
Hasker.638 Hasker argues that “[t]he problem of freedom and foreknowledge arises only if we 
presuppose a particular understanding of free will — roughly, a libertarian view incorporating 
the requirement of alternative possibilities.”639 Using Alfred Freddoso’s terminology, Hasker 
points out that this leads to two types of problems: “the source question” and the “reconciliation 
question:” “The source question concerns the way in which God obtains knowledge of the 
future; the reconciliation question concerns the logical consistency of foreknowledge and free 
will.”640 Hasker then formulates the standard argument as follows: 
“(1) Suppose that God infallibly believes at t1 that Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at t3. 
(premise) 
(2) The proposition God believes at t1 that Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at t3 is 
accidentally necessary at t2. (from the principle of the necessity of the past) 
(3) If a proposition p is accidentally necessary at t and p strictly implies q, then q is 
accidentally necessary at t. (transfer of necessity principle) 
(4) God believes at t1 that Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at t3 entails Cuthbert will 
purchase an iguana at t3. (from the definition of infallibility) 
(5) Thus the proposition Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at t3 is accidentally necessary 
at t2. (2-4) 
(6) If the proposition Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at t3 is accidentally necessary at 
t2, it is true at t2 that Cuthbert cannot do otherwise than purchase an iguana at t3. (premise) 
(7) If when Cuthbert does an act he cannot do otherwise, he does not do it freely. (principle 
of alternative possibilities) 
(8) Therefore, Cuthbert does not purchase an iguana at t3 freely. (5-7).”641 
 
638 Hasker, ‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom’. 
639 Hasker, 40. 
640 Hasker, 40. 
641 Hasker, 40–41. The argument is Hasker’s adaptation of Zagzebski, ‘Foreknowledge and Human Freedom’, 
291–92. The example with Cuthbert and an iguana can be found in Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist 
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What follows is a commentary on each one of these premises with a few explanations 
concerning the key terms and a demonstration of the fact that the argument falls prey to the 
first three Postulates that Bergson’s philosophy rejects. 
 (ad 1) The notion of “accidental necessity” in premise (1) refers to, roughly speaking, 
the distinction between absolutely necessary propositions (those that are true regardless of any 
questions pertaining to temporality) and those that are necessarily true, i.e., cannot fail to be 
otherwise, in virtue of referring to events in the past: “Accidental necessity (derived from 
Ockham) represents the commonly held idea that the past is ‘necessary’ in the sense of being 
beyond anyone’s control.”642 More importantly, however, already in premise (1), we can 
identify Postulate 2, namely, that the problem of free will and determinism is a general problem 
(see section 1.4). The particular qualitative features of the action in question do not matter; this 
is precisely why we can pick any action, such as Cuthbert buying an iguana. Of course, it could 
be said that “Cuthbert buying an iguana” is simply a stand-in term for any given free action; 
but, as Bergson would say, there simply are no free actions “in general.” In the same way as 
there is no “great novel in general” — great novels are great precisely because they subvert 
what the set of previous novels had in common. Things become much more complicated when 
we use a more complex action, for example, following Bergson: “An agent S believes at t1 that 
Shakespeare will write Hamlet at t3” What is the content of S’s belief? What is the thing that S 
is attaching the word “Hamlet” to? Once again, we are running into the same problem as 
McTaggart’s “Death of Queen Anne” (see section 2.3); while saying that “We have a belief 
that there is a death of Queen Anne in the future” makes explicit the dubiousness of the entity 
being referred to (“The Death of Queen Anne”), it is precisely the vagueness of the event that 
turns the belief that Queen Anne is going to die into a purely linguistic construct. While the 
application of the term “Cuthbert” refers to a precise set of qualitative features pertaining to 
the person Cuthbert (his entire history up to the point of making a decision) — and perhaps 
“iguana” to all the iguanas S has seen in the past — the entity of “Cuthbert purchasing an 
iguana” in the future is based purely on impersonal aspects of past instances of purchasing, 
seeing Cuthbert, and iguanas all combined. There are many tokens of iguanas and purchases 
whose mutual differences are insignificant when subsumed under their respective types 
 
Account, 37. For another formulation of the argument, see Rogers, ‘Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a 
Timeless God’, 17. 
642 Hasker, ‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom’, 41. For the discussion of accidental necessity, see Hasker, 
God, Time and Knowledge, 12–13; De Florio and Frigerio, ‘In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem 
of Human Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge’, 7. 
 
 157  
(“Iguana” and “purchase”) and may, therefore, be combined into a single event of Cuthbert 
purchasing an iguana subsumable under a general type (“Cuthbert purchasing iguana”). 
This procedure immediately begins to look suspicious when applied to one-off events 
(“Shakespeare writing Hamlet”); is that really something that can be believed before it 
happened? Surely, before Hamlet is written, there is no Hamlet! (see p. 35) The obvious 
objection that there is a possible set of properties of which it may be true that they will be 
instantiated is not valid since such an instantiation in its “possible” state would already be 
Hamlet. The argument can work for simple propositions of people purchasing things — but 
these actions, Bergson says, are inextricably connected with the impersonal nature of the 
parasitic self, and are therefore closer to the “determined” end of the spectrum running from 
free will to determinism. One might already feel that something strange is happening in the 
argument above if the central action (“Cuthbert purchasing an iguana”) is replaced either with 
obviously unique and free events (“Shakespeare writing Hamlet”) or actions pertaining to us 
that require intense deliberation (“Getting married”). 
 (ad 2) Once again, the “necessity of the past” refers to the fact that at t2, propositions 
about t1 are necessary, because they are in the past and “the past appears fixed and closed, 
while the future appears open. Intuitively, we feel we cannot change our past, whereas we 
believe we can influence, at least to a certain extent, our future.”643 
 (ad 4) The “infallibility” here simply refers to the fact that an omniscient God does not 
believe things that are not true; so if He believes a certain proposition at a given time about a 
later time, the fact referred to by that proposition must occur. 
 (ad 7) This premise explicitly asserts Postulate 3, i.e., the principle of alternative 
possibilities.644 Furthermore, the seventh premise of the argument also illustrates Postulate 1, 
namely, that freedom and determinism are absolute. Cuthbert can either do otherwise and is 
free, or he cannot do otherwise and is not, tertium non datur. 
 Now, once Hasker has delineated the argument above, he provides a survey of all the 
possible options in analytic philosophy of religion that one might go to when responding to it. 
Even though I hope it is by now clear that the argument as such is dubious from a Bergsonian 
 
643 De Florio and Frigerio, ‘In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free Will and Divine 
Foreknowledge’, 7. 
644 Postulate 3 is also not specific to analytic accounts of free will — already in Aquinas we find the idea that  
“[w]e are said to be free in a decision when we can adopt one course and reject another: this is to choose. And so 
the nature of free decision has to be considered in terms of choice.” (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1970, 11. Man 
(Ia.75-83):IaQ83a3.)   
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perspective, it may still be worthwhile to look at some of the mainstream solutions to the 
problem and see one or more of the Postulates resurface again in its attempted resolutions. 
 The Ockhamist solution rests on the observation that whereas some facts about the past 
are fixed and necessary,645 others are intrinsically connected to future times and thus — despite 
being about the past — cannot be considered as fully true until their “future component” has 
come to be. For example, the fact of a particular person writing a book on the 3rd October 1857 
now seems to be necessary and something we cannot do anything about. But this is not the case 
with the related fact of that person writing the book a certain time before I finish writing this 
chapter646 — that past fact depends on when I choose to be done writing this chapter. Ockham, 
following Aquinas, argued for the category of “accidental necessity,” i.e., the necessity 
attached to propositions in virtue of being about the past.647 Hasker uses as an example of the 
proposition “Socrates is seated” — once it becomes a proposition about the past (i.e., once 
Socrates has sat down), it will attain necessity. By contrast, the proposition “The bride-to-be is 
trying on her dress” is different — it will not become true until the person trying on the dress 
has become a bride. Similarly, take the sentence “God believed at 6:00 this morning that John 
would have a cup of tea for lunch”648 — it seems that the person giving John the tea has control 
over that proposition, even though it concerns something in the past: 
What God knows about the acts of a person is relationally dependent on what the 
person who is the object of that knowledge does. Thus in this relational sense a 
person has the power to act so that the past is what it is, that is, that God truly 
believes something about the present. Consequently, there is no contradiction 
between my human freedom and divine knowledge.649 
The truths about God’s past beliefs are therefore not necessary (namely, accidentally 
necessary) and do not necessitate the truths of future-oriented propositions that they are 
about.650 Once again, without going into the technical problems with the Ockhamist solution as 
such (e.g., the problem of “counterfactual power over the past” proposed by Plantinga651), one 
can see Postulates 1-3 reappear. Postulate 1 (“free will and determinism are absolute”) refuted 
 
645 This distinction is usually articulated using the notion of “hard” and “soft” facts. For a discussion, see Fischer, 
Our Fate. Essays on God and Free Will, 12–14. 
646 See for example Leftow, Time and Eternity, 249. 
647 For a full discussion, see Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, 75–95. 
648 Hasker, 78. 
649 Hasker, 79. 
650 Hasker, ‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom’, 44–45. 
651 Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, 96–113. 
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by Bergson’s insistence of placing the extent to which an act is free and to which it is 
determined on a continuum, is present in this solution. Events consisting of free acts can change 
the truth of God’s beliefs; determined events (“The sun rose at 6:32 in the morning”) do not. 
But how about acts where the two are mixed? Recall that the interpenetration of the parasitic 
and the fundamental selves (see section 1.5) is crucial for appreciating the extent to which an 
act is free or not. Furthermore, the tendency to provide a “general” response to the problem of 
free will and determinism captured by Postulate 2 is clearly at play here; any future-oriented 
act can be subsumed under God’s past knowledge, regardless of its content. The same is the 
case with Postulate 3: God’s past beliefs are propositions about future-oriented acts that can be 
otherwise. 
 According to the Molinist response — if indeed it is a response, and not just a model of 
divine providence —,652 what God knows are “counterfactuals of freedom,” statements of the 
form “If a particular person were in such and such circumstances, they would freely do such 
and such acts.” God then merely providentially arranges for us to be in those circumstances 
and — surprise! — we do precisely as He expected: 
He knows by middle knowledge what each possible creature would do if placed 
in any possible situation; then he decides which possible creatures to make actual, 
and which situations they shall be placed in; and, in virtue of his having decided 
this, his middle knowledge again informs him concerning what the actual free 
creatures will in fact do.653 
The vast majority of critiques of Molinism focus on the various problems connected to these 
“counterfactuals of freedom.”654 What accounts for their truth-status?655 Can they even take on 
truth-values?656 Do they really count as counterfactuals of freedom?657 More importantly for our 
present purposes, the “counterfactual of freedom” embodies the problems deriving from 
Postulate 4; a counterfactual of freedom presumes that our mental life can be subsumed under 
causal relations, albeit counterfactual ones. Furthermore, the idea of counterfactuals of freedom 
is simply a subjunctive reformulation of Postulate 3 (the principle of alternative possibilities) 
 
652 See Fischer, ‘Putting Molinism in Its Place’. 
653 Hasker, God, Time and Knowledge, 16. 
654 For a full discussion, see Hasker, 18–52. 
655 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 74. 
656 Goris, 74–75. 
657 Hasker, ‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom’, 50; Hasker, ‘The (Non-)Existence of Molinist 
Counterfactuals’. For recent discussions, see Perszyk, ‘Recent Work on Molinism’. 
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— the “ability to do otherwise” is transposed from the realm of the actual world to the nearest 
possible world, but, conceptually, still relies on the preceding availability of two courses of 
action. 
 Before moving onto the canonical Boethian solution relying more explicitly on the 
notion of divine timelessness, it is, of course, also possible to simply evade the problem by 
denying some of the presuppositions that this essay is based on and that were outlined in the 
Introduction (Hypotheses 1 and 2); i.e., denying infallible foreknowledge, immutability and 
timelessness by, for example, opting for open theism.658 
 
Traditionally, theists have appealed to the fact that God exists in eternity to solve the problem 
of free will. This project has from the outset stipulated divine timelessness, so the Boethian 
solution, which appeals to God’s existing in eternity, seems to be the most appropriate route to 
take. The literature on this is quite vast,659 but the gist can be summarised as follows: 
God’s beliefs are not in the past; rather, God and his beliefs are outside of time. 
So, technically, God does not foreknow anything, as there is nothing for him to 
foreknow. All the objects of God’s knowledge are eternally existing, tenselessly 
true propositions, and so are not true at any time, but are true simpliciter. … He 
can know them by observing all events in time as eternally present to himself.660 
As Rota puts it: “So, you freely choose to answer the phone at 9 am tomorrow. Because you 
choose this then, God knows that you choose this then.”661 
 This solution seems particularly useful for our purposes since it simply presumes that 
we are free and then tries to make this fact compatible with divine omniscience; once the 
possibility has been articulated, the importance of making free will (analytic, Bergsonian, or 
otherwise) compatible with divine omniscience is secondary. The two exist independently; 
analytic philosophy has generally tended to buy any analytic account of free will available on 
 
658 Hasker, ‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom’, 51–52; for key discussions, see Pinnock et al., The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God; Rhoda, ‘The Philosophical Case 
for Open Theism’. 
659 For a recent treatment, see Diekemper, ‘Eternity, Knowledge and Freedom’; Rogers, ‘Anselmian Eternalism: 
The Presence of a Timeless God’; Rota, ‘The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine 
Foreknowledge’; De Florio and Frigerio, ‘In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free 
Will and Divine Foreknowledge’; Rogers, ‘The Necessity of the Present and Anselm’s Eternalist Response to the 
Problem of Theological Fatalism’. 
660 Diekemper, ‘Eternity, Knowledge and Freedom’, 49. 
661 Rota, ‘The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge’, 166. 
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the market (e.g., the fusion of compatibilism and Molinism) and then adjusting omniscience 
accordingly. This is also further attested by Johnson’s recent demonstration that the problem 
of theological determinism reduces to logical fatalism. It has generally been assumed that 
although the argument for logical fatalism is insufficient, it gains its force from the introduction 
of an omniscient timeless God.662 However, Johnson demonstrates (i) that theological 
incompatibilism (i.e., the belief that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will) reduces 
to logical incompatibilism663 and (ii) theological determinism reduces to logical fatalism. The 
culprit in the free will and omniscience problem lies entirely in the temporal domain of free 
will.664 Johnson argues that 
[I]t is not God’s foreknowledge that makes you unfree — it is not God’s 
foreknowledge that causes your future performance of an action X to already 
exist. What is responsible for your non-freedom is the mere fact that your future 
action already has — before you perform it — existence. If one could establish 
this without reference to God’s foreknowledge [as Johnson does], one would not 
even need God’s foreknowledge to produce the fatalist conclusion.665 
The intricacies of Johnson’s argument are not particularly important for our present purposes 
(since a large segment of his argument appeals to absolute existence666 in time that Chapters 3 
and 4 have rejected), but the moral here is that it seems one can simply affirm Bergsonian 
freedom that had been defended against accounts denying free will in analytic philosophy in 
Chapter 1, and plug it into the existing timelessness solutions; what then remains is to explain 
omniscience. Or in other words, if Johnson is right, and it is only eternalism that threatens free 
will, and we have done away with eternalism, we can simply take Bergson’s picture of free 
will and stick to the orthodox timelessness solutions. 
 
662 “Logical fatalism” claims that our free will is threatened by the fact that we cannot control the truths of 
propositions (or the existence of future truth-makers for those truths); “theological fatalism” by the fact that we 
cannot control beliefs that God held at a point in the past; “causal fatalism” by the fact that we cannot control the 
state of the world at a time before our birth and laws of nature (all defined in Zagzebski, ‘Eternity and 
Fatalism’, 66.). 
663 Johnson, ‘God, Fatalism, and Temporal Ontology’, 443–45. 
664 Johnson, 436. 
665 Johnson, 442. 
666 “[S]ince it is an existing future and not God’s foreknowledge that hinders our free will … the [timelessness] 
solution will fail. For example, suggesting that God is timeless — that God sits outside and views the entire 
timeline as a whole — does not solve the problem; the timeline must exist as a whole — past, present, and future 
— if God is viewing its entirety and sitting outside of it. The timelessness solution reinforces the problem (the 
fact that the future exists); it does not solve it.” (Johnson, 442.) 
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5.3. The Problem of Divine Causation 
It would be tempting to say that the problem of theological determinism reduces to the non-
theological one, as Johnson shows, and that non-theological determinism is neutralised by 
Bergson’s dissolution of the four postulates and the relativization of existence. Sadly, things 
are not so easy due to the intrinsic connection between divine knowledge and divine causation 
that was affirmed in Chapter 4. 
 A good way to illustrate this problem is to appeal to Goris’ distinction between two 
separate issues pertaining to the problem of free will as it is discussed in Aquinas. Goris 
distinguishes between “temporal fatalism” and “causal determinism:”667 “[O]ne problem has to 
do with the diachronic relation of foreknowledge and future contingents, and the other with the 
synchronic relation of a necessary cause and its effect.”668 Goris also points out669 that whereas 
in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences the two topics are treated conjointly,670  later, they 
become two distinct problems. 
 “Temporal fatalism” concerns the relation between the temporal present and the future 
truth of propositions: 
[T]he immutability of God’s eternal foreknowledge, signified in human language 
by a past tense, seems to lead to fatalism. For it implies the temporally antecedent 
truth (“fore-truth”) of propositions about contingent future events and thus a 
necessary outcome of these events. Genuine freedom and contingency have to be 
denied if one holds to divine foreknowledge: … .671 
Or in other words, temporal fatalism is caused by the link between the past and the future and 
the role that the future plays in divine knowledge — Goris argues that this would be a problem 
even if God was not the cause of being672 since the problem is entailed merely by God’s 
knowledge of the future, not His causation of it. It is precisely this problem that Bergson’s 
analysis of free will discussed in the previous section applies to. As we have seen, according 
to the temporal ontology proposed in Chapter 3, there is no absolutely and independently 
 
667 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 54. 
668 Goris, ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom’, 100. 
669 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 53–
56. 
670 Aquinas, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 1:Id38Q1a5. 
671 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 61. 
672 Goris, 62. 
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existing future to which the truth of propositions could attach, and the problem thus does not 
get off the ground. 
 By contrast, the problem of “causal determinism” concerns the divine causation of 
being. God’s will in causing esse is always necessary: it never fails. How then can there be 
contingencies at all?673 Goris says: 
Causal determinism, … , has to do with the irresistibility of the causal influence 
of God’s creative activity. … The problem of causal determinism does not lie in 
the diachronic relation of present to future as regards God’s fore-acting (that is 
the problem of temporal fatalism), but in the synchronic relation of cause to effect 
as regards God’s fore-acting.674 
The same problem is also observed in Stump and Kretzmann’s engagement with Shanley’s 
earlier-discussed “causal knowledge:” “If God causes human acts,” Stump and Kretzmann ask, 
“then in what sense is it possible for any human being to act otherwise than she does?”675 Or in 
other words: 
On Shanley’s view, if a human will is in state A, God knows that it is, and his 
knowing it causes the will to be in state A. And it is very hard to see how God’s 
causing the will to be in state A doesn’t constitute coercing the will to be in 
state A.676 
Once again, this problem is, from God’s perspective, purely synchronic, since “the relation of 
divine knowledge to anything whatsoever is like that of present to present.”677 This is also 
theologically problematic when it comes to the divine causation of sinful actions.678 In the end, 
Shanley is forced to press the divine mystery button and affirm that “Aquinas’s silence about 
exactly how it all works is not an oversight or a failure of nerve, but rather an acknowledgement 
of the limitations of human thought in the face of divine transcendence.”679 Note that this 
problem is particularly pertinent to the theory of divine relation to time affirmed in the previous 
chapters and is not resolved immediately by appealing to Bergson’s analysis of free will 
 
673 Goris, 55. 
674 Goris, 62, italics original; see also Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual 
Sources Account, 1–10. 
675 Stump and Kretzmann, ‘Eternity and God’s Knowledge: A Reply to Shanley’, 441, footnote 8. 
676 Stump and Kretzmann, 442, footnote 11. 
677 Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth, Q2a12. 
678 Stump and Kretzmann, ‘God’s Knowledge and Its Causal Efficacy’, 95. 
679 Shanley, ‘Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas’, 116. 
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because such an analysis applies only to the diachronic problem of temporal fatalism. 
Bergson’s lack of a ready-made temporal ontology makes things even worse; since we 
supplanted this lack with a combination of ontological idealism on the diachronic side and 
divine causation of being on the synchronic side, the latter inevitably ushers in the problem of 
Goris’ “causal determinism.” 
5.4. Divine Causality and Bergsonian Free Will 
This section will aim to resolve the problems from above by bringing together everything that 
has been said in the previous chapters. F. C. T. Moore says that whereas the main aim of 
Bergson’s TFW was to destroy an old structure of thought, the aim of MM was to rebuild it.680 
Recall that TFW corresponds to Stage 1 and MM to Stage 2, where we decided to leave 
Bergson’s thought and limit la durée to the human mind. We, therefore, cannot use MM to 
rebuild what was destroyed by TFW. Since the ontology based on OIT (see Chapter 3) and 
divine causation of being (see Chapter 4) was imposed onto the conclusions reached by 
Bergson in TFW, it is precisely OIT and divine causation of esse that must be used to resolve 
the problem of causal determinism. This section will relate all of the claims from above to the 
two axes that characterise the relation between ontology, divine omniscience, and human free 
will. 
 
The Diachronic Axis: Free Will and Temporal Ontology. In his 1904-1905 lectures at the 
Collège de France, Bergson talks of organisms as “contingency machines,”681 analogously to 
speaking of living beings in MM as being “zones of indetermination.”682 In what follows this 
observation will be limited to human beings, unlike Bergson who extends such an observation 
to the entirety of the organic universe.683 If Bergson is right about this, it turns out that there is 
indeed something special about the human frame of reference after all. This does not imply, of 
course, in the way that Bergson imagined,684 that our human frame of reference should be used 
as a basis for extending a single time throughout the universe. The uniqueness consists of 
 
680 Moore, Bergson: Thinking Backwards, 5. 
681 “L’organisme c’est … une machine à contingence.” (EPL 115.) 
682 MM 39/36. 
683 We are not actually diverging from Bergson that much after all; he does affirm that there is something special 
about human free will: “Freedom as it exists in man is a completely different thing from pure contingency that 
can exist in things in general, it is a double contingency of reason, of reflection.” (“[L]a liberté telle qu’elle existe 
chez l’homme est tout autre chose que la pure contingence telle qu’elle peut exister dans les êtres en général, c’est 
une contingence double de raison, de réflexion.” (EPL 118, my translation.)) 
684 DS 19/25-26. 
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something else; ours is the only one that contains memory, which, as has been shown above, 
plays a key role in conscious agency on the future. Memory and durée are not required simply 
for us to function correctly in the world — akin to the B-theoretical affirmation that tense is 
not part of reality but required for successful human agency685 — but also to make a difference 
to the world. 
 The usual picture painted by analytic philosophers of time consists of a single space-
time block to which our immediate perception is related as the perception of colour is to a 
particular object. On the picture advocated here, by contrast, free will brings in our own 
causation which directly impacts what exists in the space-time block itself. A better analogy 
than one of us travelling through worldlines in the way that Aquinas’ and Boethius’ travellers 
journey on the path seen by God from the top of the mountain (see section 4.1), is one of us 
building a house to get to its top floor; it is us who determine how tall the building is going to 
be, which stairs lead to the top, and how we use the bricks on the floors below to access it. 
 On the ontological view sketched out in Chapters 3 and 4, the universe is deeply 
anthropocentric; it stipulates the human world as the unique instantiation of creatures with 
memory (putting questions about extra-terrestrial conscious beings in brackets), which is 
required for free conscious acts.686 There may not be a unique {future} and a unique {present} 
in terms of objective time (and space) stipulated by Relativity, but there is only one unique 
{future affectable by conscious acts}, namely, that part of the space-time block related to the 
present in which human beings exist. 
 On this picture, it does not particularly matter whether the laws of nature describing the 
future are deterministic (as Bergson thought) or probabilistic687 — what matters is that we can 
make difference to the future; either in the sense of “making an absolute difference to what 
would otherwise obtain without us” or in the sense of “making a difference to the probabilities 
of future events” through our conscious memory-dependent activity. As Geach observers: 
The existence of statistical patterns of contingency does not exclude voluntary 
control of the course of events by God or man. The phonemes I utter, the letters 
I write down, conform to all sorts of statistical regularities; my freedom of speech 
 
685 Bardon, ‘Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant’, 61. 
686 MM 151-2/168-9. 
687 For a brief discussion, see Kane, ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates’, 5–8. 
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simply rides upon these regularities, for they nowise suffice to determine what 
I say — truth or falsehood, sense or nonsense.688 
It is generally presumed that the contingency of the future is required for there to be human 
freedom — on the Bergsonian picture, it is human free will that is the basis for the contingency 
of the future; future will be what it will be because we will shape it so. If the existence of 
objects in the future is relative to the human mind (see section 4.4) qua la durée and if la durée 
is intrinsically connected with free will, its development can be used to ground the direction of 
time (instead of attempting to locate the arrow of time in purely material causality). In simple 
terms: 
P1: Future is that realm of the space-time block which can be affected by conscious beings. 
P2: In the space-time block humans are the only conscious beings, who are also agents. 
C: There is only one future, i.e., that part of the space-time block consciously 
affectable by human beings.689 
This is deeply consonant with Richard Swinburne’s claim that  
[T]he past is that realm of the logically contingent which it is not logically 
possible that any agent can now affect, and the future is that realm of the logically 
contingent which it is logically possible that an agent can now affect.690 
If agency in time is limited to beings with memory, as Bergson suggests, then there is only one 
frame of reference in which agents exist — and, consequently, only one future. 
 This deeply anthropocentric picture of reality also explains why, once more, “there is 
something special about time.” (see section 4.5) For Bergson, free will is the domain where 
la durée and objective time intersect.691 Whereas la durée (at Stage 1) is purely mental, it is the 
shape it takes that results in an action in the external world. Without the mind, the world, on 
 
688 Geach, Providence and Evil, 118. 
689 In principle, time could branch. Why does your future have to be my future? This objection can simply be 
warded off by clarifying that the future is relativized to presently experiencing humans: the differences between 
their reference frames are negligible and do not enter into an experience at all. To paraphrase Stump and 
Kretzmann’s comment, indexing the individual experience of every single human to a single reference frame 
“would be as inappropriate as taking an Einsteinian view of time in a discussion of historical chronology.” (Stump 
and Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’, 440.) 
690 Swinburne, ‘God and Time’, 211. 
691 I am indebted to Frédéric Worms for this observation. 
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its own, is governed by laws that may show indeterminacy or indeterminism, but not 
consciousness. The mind, however, has an effect on the particular shape the world takes. 
 This anthropocentrism about the universe also poses a question about the epistemic 
status of the future. Consider the question: “Why do we not know the future?” The first way of 
answering consists of the “Laplacian” response. For Laplace, who regarded the universe as 
deterministic (i.e., the relation between cause and effect was not probabilistic, but necessary), 
the only reason why we do not know what happens in the future is merely our lack of 
information. In a passage frequently referred to by Bergson, he says:692 
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its 
anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant 
an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is 
animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it … it would 
embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, 
as the past, would be present to its eyes. The human mind offers, in the perfection 
which it has been able to give to astronomy, a feeble idea of this intelligence. … 
All these efforts in the search for truth tend to lead it back continually to the vast 
intelligence which we have just mentioned, but from which it will always remain 
infinitely removed.693 
 By contrast, analytic temporal ontologies that operate with absolute existence give two 
possible options in answering this question: on the presentist / growing block view, we do not 
know the future, because there is nothing there to know yet.694 On the eternalist picture, we do 
not know the future because we are causally separated from it, but it is “there.” However, on 
the Bergsonian view, we do not know the future, because we do not yet know how we (humans) 
are causally going to affect it, simply because we cannot yet know what sort of character we 
are going to be by the time we get “there:” 
The reason why it is absurd to say that an action, a free action, could have been 
foreseen if we know perfectly the conditions and the character [of a person], is 
 
692 The quote is explicitly discussed by Bergson in EPL 302-3. 
693 Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 4; for a discussion, see Dorato, Time and Reality: Spacetime 
Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal Becoming, 78. 
694 Geach: “The idea of a determinate future is a dangerous piece of mythology, and it conflicts with the things 
that we really know perfectly well. It is true in a sense that the future’s not ours to see — … . The truth is that the 
future is not for anybody to see; … .” (Geach, ‘The Future’, 209.) 
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that we can never know perfectly the character, for the simple reason that it does 
not yet exist as it will [exist] at the moment when the decision will be taken, … .695 
The self we will be when we take that action will have been in the process of being created 
until the very (retrospectively identified) moment when we take a particular action: “your state 
tomorrow will include all the life you will have lived up until that moment.”696 
 The fact that the shape the future will take depends partially on us697 also explains why 
we feel so uncomfortable about the conclusion of the sea-battle paradox from Aristotle.698 Once 
again, contrary to Postulate 2 (see section 1.4), Bergson insists that the particular nature of 
every event and every action makes a difference; should Aristotle have picked an event in the 
external world over which we have no causal control (e.g., the sun rising at a particular time 
tomorrow), we would perhaps have no qualms regarding the conclusion of the argument. That 
the sun will or will not rise at a particular time tomorrow is determined and it is obvious we 
cannot do anything about it. Conversely, had he picked something which pertains to our durée 
(e.g., that tomorrow we will feel a sense of existential anguish), we would immediately say the 
argument is false; simply because the content of the proposition “I feel existential anguish (like 
Raskolnikov does in Crime and Punishment, for example)” cannot be said to be “true” or 
“false.” In the first case, the possibility of the sun rising tomorrow excludes all possibility of 
conscious causal contribution; in the second it is constituted purely by the internal development 
of la durée.699 The force of the counter-intuitiveness of the conclusion regarding the sea-battle 
consists in the intuitive feeling that “there is something we could do to stop or launch the 
battle” —  perhaps we can travel to the location of the battle and successfully convince all the 
 
695 “[L]a raison pour laquelle il est absurde de dire qu’une action pourrait être prévue, une action libre, si l’on 
connaissait parfaitement les conditions et le caractère, c’est qu’on ne peut pas connaître parfaitement le caractère, 
par la raison très simple qu’il n’existe pas encore tel qu’il sera au moment où la décision sera prise, … .” 
(EPL 119-20, my translation.) 
696 CM 8/11. 
697 Although I do not use “the future being (partially) up to us” to infer that “the laws of nature are (partially) up 
to us,” my view is fully compatible with that defended by Beebee and Mele, ‘Humean Compatibilism’. The view 
defended here is, however, different in its order of explanation: my claim is that “laws of nature” do not extend 
to la durée and it is for that reason that the future is up to us. The view advocated by Beebee and Mele, by contrast, 
is that the future can be up to us and it is for that reason that the laws of nature are too. 
698 Aristotle, The Categories. On Interpretation, IX, 135. 
699 This arrangements of the future into “layers,” which we have partial power over, also provides a novel way of 
responding to one worry about Humean compatibilism. As Bebee and Mele point out, the Humean compatibilist 
faces the troublesome inference from the claim that laws of nature are up to us simpliciter to the claim that we 
can, for example, break the speed of light (Beebee and Mele, ‘Humean Compatibilism’, 210.). Whereas Beebee 
and Mele overcome the problem by specifying the sense of “ability” over the future (Beebee and Mele, 213–16.), 
the view proposed here resolves it by restricting which layers of the future we have such ability over. 
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soldiers to grab a beer and go home. The sea-battle that is future for us stands precisely at the 
intersection of our own mental life (e.g., the moral conviction that we are obligated to stop sea-
battles) and of the external world (it is a large-scale event happening not far from us). The 
anthropocentricity of my proposed temporal ontology implies that “not all aspects of the future 
are equal.” Just like the fundamental self, the future is arranged in spheres or layers around la 
durée — at the profound self of la durée, there is complete freedom, at the furthest level 
(movements of planets and galaxies), complete determinism.700 This is, of course, intimately 
connected to the relation between the mind and time. Whereas analytic philosophy starts with 
a mind-independent spread of events in the space-time block, on the view argued for here, the 
immediate present is the ontological foundation of temporality and is involved in shaping the 
future — this theory is therefore in exact opposition to classifying temporal becoming as purely 
mind-dependent. Grünbaum says that “the transient now is mind-dependent and irrelevant to 
physical events as such,”701  but this is clearly false if the “transient now” is what grounds 
human action which dictates what shape the future will take. There is real change in the world 
because we change the world. 
  
The Synchronic Axis: Divine Omniscience and Human Actions. Since the temporal ontologies 
proposed by Bergson in Stages 2-3 are now unavailable, his philosophy has to be supplanted 
with something else. This is the divine causation of esse discussed in Chapters 3 and 4: “every 
created agent can only cause substantial or accidental being in virtue of the divine cause, which 
is the cause of being itself.”702 This does not, however, mean that God provides 
“undifferentiated” being which is then determined by individual humans.703 Rather: 
God and creature are not two causes collaborating on the same level to produce a 
joint effect. God causes on the transcendental level and He thereby constitutes the 
creatures’ causation on the categorical level.704 
 
700 The fact that there is a continuum between the two spheres is well illustrated by the climate crisis and questions 
regarding the anthropocene; what was previously regarded primarily as processes governed solely by natural laws 
(wind, rain, changing of seasons) now becomes strangely consequent upon human free decisions. One could easily 
imagine a situation with shooting rockets at distant planets to remove them from their orbits and thus letting la 
durée-based causality “leak” further and further into the purely natural. 
701 Grünbaum, ‘The Status of Temporal Becoming’, 393. 
702 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 300; 
See for example Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1975, 14. Divine Government (Ia2ae.103-9):IaQ105a5. 
703 Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and Irresistible Will, 301. 
704 Goris, 301. 
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Similarly, Shanley states: “When conceived primarily in terms of the creative causation of esse, 
the divine motion is not an exterior manipulation of created agents determining them to act one 
way or another.”705 “God does not act on the human will through intermediaries, but rather 
directly out of God’s ongoing creative causality of the esse of all things.”706 This may also be 
expressed as follows: Since God is the cause of esse, once our durée has reached a point of 
decision to take a particular act, God gives being to that very act. The earlier used example of 
us gradually contributing to the construction of the space-time block as we construct a house 
(see p. 165) is particularly instructive — “Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it 
labour in vain.” (Ps 127:1)707 
 The causation of esse combined with the free causation of la durée, which partially 
constitutes every temporal object, squares perfectly with a recent suggestion by Hugh McCann 
to extend divine causation of esse to human actions.708 McCann invites us to consider a 
particular action or decision that is free and then to imagine, that in addition to its 
characterisation, it exists, i.e., that it has real existence, not just mental existence.709 McCann 
points out that this real existence must have a source710 and goes through a list of candidates 
for this source. The first that McCann considers is mental content. Unfortunately, this does not 
work. “Causes are supposed to be concrete things. The contents of our mental states are, by 
contrast, abstracta, and abstracta are generally considered to be causally inert.”711 — The 
mental content of our action may provide an explanation, but explanation is not causation. 
Note that the same problem applies to la durée — la durée (and in this one case, it does not 
particularly matter whether limited to Stage 1 or not) cannot sustain itself in existence and 
cannot confer complete existence onto its contents; as has been argued in Chapters 3-4, the 
existence of any temporally extended object (which, of course, includes any temporal object in 
the future) owes its existence to la durée only partially; God’s causation of timeless esse is 
indispensable. Neither can the existence of one moment to the next be accounted for by 
physical laws relating events, McCann claims. Natural laws do not speak about existence:712 
 
705 Shanley, ‘Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas’, 105. 
706 Shanley, ‘Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom’, 85. 
707 Quoted from the New Revised Standard Version. 
708 McCann, ‘Free Will and the Mythology of Causation’. 
709 McCann, 235–36. 
710 McCann, 236. 
711 McCann, 236. 
712 McCann, 245. 
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If we are going to take scientific laws as descriptive of causal processes, we have 
to cease taking natural causation to be a process of the past conferring existence 
on the future.713 
Finally, McCann considers the possibility of appealing to agent causation to account for the 
existence of the action.714 But, unfortunately, this does not work either, because it leads to a 
vicious regress: if agent-causality is used to account for the existence of an action that results 
from it, then surely the same must apply to the instance of agent-causation itself. And that is 
clearly not accounted for.715 
 McCann, however, observes that there exists another, more viable, option: 
Neither agents nor events turn out to be much good at existence conferral. … But 
the issue need not be left at this. There is a third sort of causation, namely the 
primary causation ascribed in traditional theology to God as creator.716 
 On the present hypothesis, la durée is subsumed under temporal diachronic causation,717 
whereas divine causation of esse provides the existence of actions (i.e., temporally extended 
objects) that result from it. This ensures that we retain free will in the temporal realm and the 
dependence of all being on God718 and mirrors what McCann says about divine causation of 
human actions: 
[W]e need to realize that on this picture God never makes us do anything, in the 
sense in which worldly causes are said to make things occur. …  Our decisions 
and actions lose none of their spontaneity or intentionality, because God’s role as 
primary cause is to provide simply for their existence. … That my decision to 
dine at the Asian restaurant owes its being to God’s creative act does not prevent 
its being prompted by my desire for Asian food, or its teleological explanation as 
a means of fulfilling that desire. The Kantian slant on existence [not being a real 
 
713 McCann, 245. 
714 McCann, 243. 
715 McCann, 243. 
716 McCann, 247. 
717 Shanley: “Pace Stump and Kretzmann, Aquinas does not exempt human action from the range of divine causal 
knowledge.” (Shanley, ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’, 215.) 
718 I leave it open whether this should or could be discussed using primary and secondary causes and concurrence. 
Prima facie, there does not seem to be any reason why the non-temporal primary causation of esse and the 
secondary durée-based causation would not map perfectly onto the Thomistic model both of concurrence and of 
providence. For more on this, see Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual Sources 
Account, 26–33. 
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predicate] applies here also. Indeed, the entire order of the universe is just as it 
would be if, mirabile dictu, it existed only in your and my imagination and not in 
reality.719 
— all of this, of course, with the qualification that the decision to dine at an Asian restaurant 
should be analysed using Bergson’s account of free will outlined earlier. Bergson provides a 
detailed analysis of temporal human free will without God, but he cannot provide the required 
ontological substratum; this is provided by timeless divine causality. In contrast to McCann, 
however, Bergson rejects Postulate 3 that McCann’s view still relies on.720 
 Finally, since this divine causality is simultaneously causal knowledge (see section 4.2), 
one can also appeal to the Boethian picture of divine knowledge of the world: 
From my point of view, there are of course possibilities to be settled, and I alone 
decide my destiny by employing my will as I do. But I am not pre-empted in this 
by God. That he should approve, and thereby lend existence to my decisions, in 
no way undercuts my autonomy in making them, nor does it diminish my 
responsibility for every intention I form, and every action I undertake. … [S]ince 
the act of creation is eternal and comprises in its scope my entire being … there 
is from the eternal perspective no point in speaking of possibilities for decision 
and action in the wake of my creation either. Only within the temporal realm does 
talk of possibilities have application, and there they apply only to my own 
decisions and actions, not God’s.721 
In analysing various temporal ontologies, Ingthorsson criticises the growing-block theory for 
holding that the continuous addition of being to the already existing past requires creatio ex 
nihilo, which, according to him, is “as occult as magic and miracles.”722 But this is precisely 
what my theory affirms. The fact that a theory of divine foreknowledge, time, and human free 
 
719 McCann, ‘Free Will and the Mythology of Causation’, 248. Specifically, Aquinas’ text that McCann appeals 
to in the quotation from above says: “A man’s way is said not to be his when it comes to putting his choice into 
effect, for in this he can be obstructed whether he likes it or not. But the choices are ours to make, granted 
dependence on God.” (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1970, 11. Man (Ia.75-83):IaQ83a1 ad 4.) The quotation from 
above also wards off the worry about occasionalism — on the picture proposed here, the durée-based causality 
loses nothing of its own distinctiveness. 
720 McCann: “It will simplify things if we confine our attention to the act of deciding between alternative courses 
of action, since the structure of agency is somewhat clearer with strictly mental acts.” (McCann, ‘Free Will and 
the Mythology of Causation’, 234, my italics.) 
721 McCann, 250. 
722 Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox, 127. 
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will, ends up having at its heart divine creation out of nothing is, in my view, an argument for 
that theory rather than against it.723   
5.5. Diagram 
It might seem inconsistent with what has been said above about Bergson’s critique of spatial 
representations (see section 1.5) to use a diagram for explaining my picture of divine causation. 
However, when used with caution, the illustration below may be used as a pedagogical tool to 
explain the picture of the relation between divine causation and la durée that this essay has 




God (a) is posited as the timeless source of being; His causation of esse (b) is coextensive with 
His timeless knowledge of the world. A given agent whose mind is la durée (c) located at a 
particular point in spacetime synthesises the timelessly-provided esse (see section 3.4) into 
continuous temporally extended objects, which are, nevertheless, indivisible in the present 
perception; their division may only be performed on the trace of la durée in the past (d), which 
is coextensive with the B-series (see sections 1.2 and 2.3). The future (e) is constantly being 
created as the divinely-provided timeless esse is synthesised by la durée. The same applies to 
free acts, where the divine durée-based causality (c) constantly shapes the divinely provided 
esse (b). This diagram applies to every human agent with their present durée located at any set 
of points in spacetime. The qualitative difference between the past (d), present (c) and future 
 
723 In this respect, I am moving away from Bergson, who speaks about free will as “creation,” but stresses that it 
is not creation out of nothing (EPL 118.). 
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(e) relative to la durée ensures that the Bergsonian account of free will escapes Postulates 1-4 
(see section 1.4) that in the end lead to Goris’ temporal fatalism (see section 5.3) on the 
diachronic axis d-e. The synchronic axis a-c, on the other hand, ensures that we can locate a 
source for every human action, which, however, does not impede there being free will on the 
diachronic axis, as McCann argues (see section 5.4). 
 The diagram above has one limitation, one important consequence, and illustrates one 
crucial difference from the type of causality proposed by Shanley and McCann: 
 The limitation is that the diagram above illustrates only the relation between God’s 
creative causality and the synthesising mind of a particular (one) agent occupying a set of points 
in spacetime. Furthermore, the diagram only refers to the past trace of la durée and, for a given 
instance, must always be thought of as reconstructed retrospectively. One might say that this 
does include a certain level of “temporal Kantianism” — when creation is happening (i.e., in 
the present) it is inaccessible to the usual mathematical patterns of thought (divisibility, 
analogousness to a line, etc.), which can only be applied to it ex post facto. 
 The consequence of my view (illustrated by the diagram above) is that, ontologically, 
the present of la durée is crucial; it is where creation happens. The present is “pushed forward” 
by us (qua agents whose minds synthesise the timeless being) in intimate two-level cooperation 
with God (as the source of being) in a continuous development; our future, and the particular 
shape it takes, is constantly changed by our free actions. The future is constantly being created.  
 Finally, my view is different from that offered by McCann in that McCann’s account is 
missing the mind-dependent synthesis of being into temporal objects; his account also does not 
utilise the machinery of Bergsonian free will, which makes his account vulnerable to the 
consequence argument (see section 5.1) and the fatalist argument (see section 5.2). God, on 
McCann’s account, provides being, but this makes no difference to the perils involved in the 
possibility that all our actions are “fixed” by laws of nature and facts of the past. On the other 
hand, my view is different from Shanley in that Shanley’s account also does not engage with 
the relationship between the mind and time, and with the special theory of relativity. 
 
* * * 
 
This chapter has appealed to the nature of la durée to articulate a response to van Inwagen’s 
consequence argument, thus providing a critique of the final of the four Postulates introduced 
in Chapter 1. It has shown that Bergson can remove one of the main stumbling blocks of free 
 
 175  
will debates, but that — due to the lack of ontology in his philosophy — an appeal to divine 
causation is required to complete the model of God’s relation to time and our free acts. 
 The crucial consequence of the Neo-Bergsonian model proposed above is the 
following: the present is central to how we explain divine causation; the indivisible perception 
based on la durée’s relation to divinely-provided being is the “melting pot” in which our mind’s 
contact with divine creativity happens. Everything else (the breaking down of the past of la 
durée into segments, the extrapolation of our temporal sequence into the future, the establishing 
of objective time and its systematisation by science etc.) happens ex post facto. 
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Conclusion 
This study has provided a new model of God’s relation to time based on Bergson’s philosophy 
and showed that such a Neo-Bergsonian perspective is consonant with the core of the 
traditional Thomistic solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. 
The human “present” was shown to be the key intersection of the relationship between the 
human mind, time, and divine creation — such a perspective was also shown to be 
ontologically compatible with the rejection of an objective present by physics. This Neo-
Bergsonian approach can not only sidestep various problems in analytic problems of free will, 
but also further strengthen the orthodox doctrines of human freedom, eternity, and God’s 
knowledge as the cause of things. 
 The three main directions of further research into engagement with Bergson that one 
might want to take from this point are the following: 
 First, an enormous amount of work could be undertaken on modality in analytic 
philosophy, Bergson’s thought on possibility, and the way these relate to possible-world 
semantics in philosophy of religion. If Bergson’s thought on actuality being prior to possibility 
is correct, how does this reposition the frequently-iterated claim that God creates the best 
possible world or at least from among the best?  While there have been several extremely brief 
attempts at relating Bergson’s thinking to possible-world semantics,724 exploring a full 
Bergsonian account of possibility, contingency, necessity, and their relation to God would 
provide new and exciting ways of thinking about fundamental modal questions in analytic 
philosophy of religion. 
 Second, one might also go for a smaller-scale approach, use the arguments proposed in 
section 1.5 and see how alternative accounts of divine knowledge react to Bergson’s account 
of choice. Specifically, can a Molinist account of divine knowing tolerate or incorporate 
Bergson’s insistence that our objects of choice do not precede our choosing? 
 Third, one might wonder how the framework defended here could be related to 
specifically Christian theological problems. Is there a way of thinking about the Incarnation, 
petitionary prayer, the question of whether God is the cause of sin, or the problem of “time 
before creation” in Bergsonian terms? Can we provide an account of other attributes affirmed 
by classical theism (e.g., impassibility, simplicity etc.) using the “Neo-Bergsonian” 
perspective? And can Bergson’s insights from later stages of his philosophy be related to divine 
 
724 Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, 414–19; Felt, ‘Why Possible Worlds Aren’t’, 66–68. 
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omnipresence? — Indeed, one might ask what would happen if we did not limit Bergson’s 
thought to his early works (Stage 1) as was done in this project, but move to Stage 2 and run 
the whole experiment again. 
 
This essay opened with Frédéric Worms’ tongue-in-cheek remark about Bergson “inventing” 
analytic philosophy. In the very same talk,725 Worms observed an inherent tension in the 
original French title of Bergson’s seminal La Pensée et le mouvant from 1934. The title is 
enormously difficult to translate (hence probably the rather strange “Creative Mind” in 
English). There is an intentional ambiguity in the French term “pensée” between “thought” 
(i.e., the noun la pensée) and “that which has been thought” (i.e., the past participle of 
“penser”). The second of these meanings contrasts radically with “le mouvant” (the present 
participle of “mouver”). The most accurate translation of the French original would thus be 
something like “That Which Has Been Thought and That Which Is Moving.” 
 Bergson repeatedly insists that reality is always, in a sense, confined to the present, and 
thought and language to the past. Therefore, he concludes, concepts and words cannot 
adequately capture reality. Where I identified the 1910s and 1920s as crucial moments in 
analytic philosophy of time for its engagement with Bergson, one could look further into the 
1960s and 1970s as key moments in analytic philosophy of language and try and bring these 
into a dialogue with Bergsonian philosophy. One might then explore whether a fully worked-
out Bergsonian philosophy of language, or indeed, of religious language, is possible or even 
necessary. 
 
725 Worms, ‘Thinking in Bergson’s Philosophy’. 
 
 178  
Bibliography 
Abbott, Edwin. Flatland. A Romance of Many Dimensions. London: Seeley & Co., 1884. 
Adams, Robert. ‘Idealism Vindicated’. In Persons: Human and Divine, edited by Peter Van 
Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Alexander, H. G. ‘Introduction’. In The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. Together with 
Extracts from Newton’s Principia and Optiks, ix–lvi. Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1956. 
Amis, Martin. Time’s Arrow. London: Vintage, 2003. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and Determination. London: Cambridge University Press, 
1971. 
Ansell-Pearson, Keith. Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. Bergson and the Time of 
Life. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Aquinas, St Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Translated by Richard J. Blackwell, 
Richard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirkel. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. 
———. Commentary on the Gospel of John. Translated by Fabian Larcher and James 
Weisheipl. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010. 
———. Compendium of Theology. Translated by Richard J. Regan. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009. 
———. In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum. Vol. 1. Opera Omnia. Friedrich Fromann: Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt, 1980. 
———. On Evil. Translated by Richard Regan. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
———. Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by J. F. Anderson. First edition. Notre Dame and 
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. 
———. Summa Theologiae. Translated by Thomas Gornall. Vol. 4. Knowledge in God (Ia.14-
18). London: Blackfriars, 1964. 
———. Summa Theologiae. Translated by Timothy McDermott. Vol. 2. Existence and the 
Nature of God (Ia.2-11). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964. 
———. Summa Theologiae. Translated by Timothy Suttor. Vol. 11. Man (Ia.75-83). London 
and New York: Blackfriars, 1970. 
———. Summa Theologiae. Translated by T. C. O’Brien. Vol. 14. Divine Government 
(Ia2ae.103-9). London: Blackfriars, 1975. 
———. The Disputed Questions on Truth. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan. Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1952. 
Aristotle. The Categories. On Interpretation. Translated by Harold P. Cook. Loeb Classical 
Library. London and Cambridge, Massachusetts: William Heinemann and Harvard 
University Press, 1962. 
Armstrong, D. M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge, 
New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Augustine, St. The Literal Meaning of Genesis. Translated by John Hammond Taylor. Vol. 1. 
New York and Ramsey: Newmann Press, 1982. 
Bardon, Adrian. A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
———. ‘Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant’. Kant-Studien 101, no. 1 (2010): 
59–74. https://doi.org/10.1515/kant.2010.004. 
Barnard, George William. Living Consciousness. The Metaphysical Vision of Henri Bergson. 
New York: State University of New York Press, 2011. 
Başar, Erol. ‘Bergson’s Intuition Memory and Episodic Memory’. In Brain-Body-Mind in the 
Nebulous Cartesian System: A Holistic Approach by Oscillations, edited by Erol Başar, 
359–66. New York: Springer, 2011. 
 
 179  
Basinger, David. ‘Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought’. Religious Studies 22, 
no. 3/4 (1986): 407–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500018424. 
Beebee, Helen, and Alfred R. Mele. ‘Humean Compatibilism’. Mind 111, no. 442 (2002): 201–
23. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/111.442.201. 
Béguin, Albert, and Pierre Thévenaz, eds. Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages. Neuchâtel: 
Éditions de la Baconnière, 1943. 
Belot, G. ‘Une Théorie Nouvelle de La Liberté’. Revue Philosophique de La France et de 
l’étranger 30 (1890): 361–92. 
Bennett, Jonathan. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984. 
Bergson, Henri. ‘Compte Rendu de “La Genèse de l’idée de Temps de J.-M. Guyau”’. Revue 
Philosophique de La France et de l’étranger 31, no. 1 (1891): 185–90. 
———. Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
1911. 
———. Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe. Translated by Leon 
Jacobson. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999. 
———. Durée et Simultanéité. À Propos de La Théorie d’Einstein. Edited by Élie During. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009. 
———. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Edited by Arnaud Bouaniche. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. 
———. Histoire de l’idée de temps. Cours au Collège de France 1902-1903. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2016. 
———. Histoire Des Théories de La Mémoire. Cours Au Collège de France 1903-1904. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2018. 
———. La Pensée et le mouvant. Essais et conférences. Edited by Arnaud Bouaniche, Arnaud 
François, Frédéric Fruteau de Laclos, Stéphane Madelrieux, Claire Marin, and Ghislain 
Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. 
———. Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion. Edited by Ghislain Waterlot and 
Frédérick Keck. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. 
———. L’Évolution créatrice. Edited by Arnaud François. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2007. 
———. L’Évolution du problème de la liberté. Cours au Collège de France 1904-1905. Edited 
by Arnaud François. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2017. 
———. ‘L’Idée de lieu chez Aristote’. In Mélanges, edited by André Robinet, Rose-Marie 
Mossé-Bastide, Martine Robinet, and Michel Gauthier, translated by Rose-Marie 
Mossé-Bastide, 1–56. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. 
———. L’idée de temps. Cours au Collège de France 1901-1902. Edited by Gabriel Meyer-
Bisch. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2019. 
———. Matière et mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à l’esprit. Edited by Camille 
Riquier. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012. 
———. Matter and Memory. Translated by W. Scott Palmer and N. M Paul. New York: Zone 
Books, 1988. 
———. Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays. Translated by H. Wildon Carr. New York: H. 
Holt, 1920. 
———. The Creative Mind. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Dover 
Publications, 2007. 
———. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Translated by R. Ashley Audra and 
Cloudesley Brereton. London: Macmillan, 1935. 
———. Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Translated 
by F. L. Pogson. London: George Allen & Co, 1913. 
 
 180  
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Translated by S. J. Tester. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973. 
Borges, Jorge Luis. ‘On Exactitude in Science’. In A Universal History of Infamy, translated 
by Norman Thomas di Giovanni, 139–41. London: Peguin, 1973. 
———. ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’. In Labyrinths. Selected Stories and Other Writings, 
edited by D. A. Yates and J. E. Irby, 44–54. London: Penguin, 1970. 
Bouaniche, Arnaud. ‘Dossier Critique’. In Essai Sur Les Données Immédiates de La 
Conscience, by Henri Bergson, 183–322. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. 
Bouaniche, Arnaud, Anthony Feneuil, Arnaud François, Frédéric Fruteau de Laclos, Stéphane 
Madelrieux, Claire Marin, and Ghislain Waterlot. ‘Dossier critique’. In La Pensée et le 
mouvant. Essais et conférences, by Henri Bergson, 295–612. edited by Arnaud 
Bouaniche, Arnaud François, Frédéric Fruteau de Laclos, Stéphane Madelrieux, Claire 
Marin, and Ghislain Waterlot. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013. 
Boutroux, E. De la contingence des lois de la nature. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1991. 
Broad, C. D. Scientific Thought. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923. 
Brook, Andrew. ‘Kant and Time-Order Idealism’. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, 
edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, 120–34. Malden, Oxford and Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 
Butterfield, Jeremy. ‘Seeing the Present’. Mind, New Series 93, no. 370 (1984): 161–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIII.370.161. 
Canales, Jimena. The Physicist and the Philosopher. Einstein, Bergson, and the Debate That 
Changed Our Understanding of Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. 
Čapek, Jakub. ‘Les apories de la liberté bergsonienne’. In Annales bergsoniennes, edited by 
Frédéric Worms, 2:249–59. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004. 
Chase, Michael. ‘Time and Eternity from Plotinus and Boethius to Einstein’. ΣΧΟΛΗ 8, no. 1 
(2014): 67–110. 
Chisholm, Roderick M. ‘Human Freedom and the Self’. The Lindley Lecture, 1964. 
———. Person and Object. A Metaphysical Study. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976. 
Cobb, John B., and David Ray Griffin. Process Theology. An Introductory Exposition. First 
edition. Belfast: Christian Journals Ltd., 1976. 
Constant, Léonard. ‘L’idée de temps. Collège de France. - Cours de M. Bergson’. Revue de 
philosophie 2, no. 6 (1902): 828–32. 
Costelloe, Karin. ‘An Answer to Mr Bertrand Russell’s Article on the Philosophy of Bergson’. 
The Monist 24, no. 1 (1914): 145–55. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191424130. 
Cournot, A. A. Essai sur les fondements de nos connaissances. Paris: Librarie L. Hachette, 
1851. 
Craig, William Lane. ‘Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time?’ The New Scholasticism 
59, no. 4 (1985): 475–83. https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas19855946. 
Cross, Richard. ‘Four-Dimensionalism and Identity Across Time: Henry of Ghent vs. 
Bonaventure’. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37, no. 3 (1999): 393–414. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0927. 
Dainton, Barry. ‘Bergson on Temporal Experience and Durée Réelle’. In The Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience, edited by I. Phillips, 93–106. Oxford 
and New York: Routledge, 2017. 
———. Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London: 
Routledge, 2000. 
———. The Phenomenal Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
———. Time and Space. Second edition. Durham: Acumen, 2010. 
 
 181  
Danks, David. ‘Singular Causation’. In The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning, edited by 
Michael R. Waldmann, 202–16. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
Davidson, Donald. ‘Mental Events’. In Essays on Actions and Events, Second edition., 207-27. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
De Florio, C., and A. Frigerio. ‘In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human 
Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge’. International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 78, no. 1 (2015): 5–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9471-4. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Bergsonism. Translated by Hugh Tomlison and Barbara Habberjam. New 
York: Zone Books, 1991. 
———. Le bergsonisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. 
Deppe, Sonja. ‘The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri 
Bergson Would Say to B-Theorists)’. Kriterion — Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 2 
(2016): 107–24. 
Diekemper, J. ‘Eternity, Knowledge and Freedom’. Religious Studies 49, no. 1 (2013): 45–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000170. 
Dolbeault, Joël. ‘Bergson’s Panpsychism’. Continental Philosophy Review 51, no. 4 (2018): 
549–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-018-9446-8. 
Dolev, Yuval. ‘The Tenseless Theory of Time: Insights and Limitations’. The Review of 
Metaphysics 54, no. 2 (2000): 259–88. 
Dorato, Mauro. Time and Reality: Spacetime Physics and the Objectivity of Temporal 
Becoming. Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1995. 
Dummett, Michael. ‘A Defense of McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time’. The 
Philosophical Review 69, no. 4 (1960): 497–504. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183483. 
———. ‘Bringing About the Past’. The Philosophical Review 73, no. 3 (1964): 338–59. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2183661. 
Durie, Robin. ‘Introduction’. In Duration and Simultaneity. Bergson and the Einsteinian 
Universe, i–xxi. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999. 
During, Élie. ‘Dossier critique’. In Durée et simultanéité. À propos de la théorie d’Einstein, by 
Henri Bergson, 219–44. edited by Élie During. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2009. 
Eddington, Arthur. The Nature of The Physical World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1928. 
Évellin, François. Infini et quantité. Étude sur le concept de l’infini en philosophie et dans les 
sciences. Paris: Baillière, 1880. 
Falk, Arthur. ‘Perceiving Temporal Passage: An Indicator of the Nature of Consciousness’. In 
Perspectives on Consciousness, edited by Amita Chatterjee. New Delhi, 2003. 
Felt, James W. ‘Why Possible Worlds Aren’t’. The Review of Metaphysics 50, no. 1 (1996): 
63–77. 
Finance, Joseph de. ‘La Présence Des Choses à l’éternité d’après Les Scolastiques’. Archives 
de Philosophie 19, no. 2 (1956): 24–62. 
Fine, Kit. ‘Tense and Reality’. In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, 261–320. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Fischer, John Martin. ‘Compatibilism’. In Four Views on Free Will, 44–84. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007. 
———. Our Fate. Essays on God and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
———. ‘Putting Molinism in Its Place’. In Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, 208–26. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Fischer, John Martin, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Four Views on Free 
Will. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. 
 
 182  
Flint, Thomas P. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998. 
Fouillé, A. La liberté et déterminisme. Paris: Ladrange, 1872. 
Frankfurt, Harry. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. In The Importance of 
What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, 1–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. 
———. ‘Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person’. Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 
(1971): 5–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024717. 
García-Encinas, M. J. ‘A Posteriori Necessity in Singular Causation and the Humean 
Argument’. Dialectica 57, no. 1 (2003): 41–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-
8361.2003.tb00254.x. 
Garrigou-Lagrange, R. Le sens commun: la philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques. 
Paris: Nouvelle Librarie Nationale, 1922. 
Geach, Peter. Providence and Evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
———. ‘The Future’. New Blackfriars 54, no. 636 (1973): 208–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1973.tb05364.x. 
Goris, Harm. ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom’. In 
The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, edited by Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph 
Wawrykov, First edition., 99–122. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. 
———. Free Creatures of an Eternal God. Thomas Aquinas on God’s Foreknowlege and 
Irresistible Will. Leuven: Peeters, 1996. 
Grünbaum, Adolf. ‘The Status of Temporal Becoming’. Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences 138, no. 2 (1967): 374–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
6632.1967.tb54999.x. 
Guyer, Paul, and Rolf-Peter Horstmann. ‘Idealism’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/idealism/. 
Hasker, William. ‘Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom’. In The Oxford Handbook of Free 
Will, edited by Robert Kane, Second edition., 39–53. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
———. God, Time and Knowledge. London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. 
———. ‘The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals’. In Molinism, edited by Ken 
Perszyk, 25–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Heidsieck, François. Henri Bergson et la notion d’espace. Paris: Le Cercle du Livre, 1957. 
Heymans, G. ‘Les “Deux Mémoires” de M. Bergson’. L’Année psychologique 19, no. 1 (1912): 
66–74. 
Hooft, Gerard ’t. ‘Time, the Arrow of Time, and Quantum Mechanics’. Frontiers in Physics 6 
(2018): 81. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2018.00081. 
Hudson, Hud. ‘Omnipresence’. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, edited by 
Michael C. Rea and Thomas P. Flint, 199–216. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. 
Husson, M. Léon. L’intellectualisme de Bergson : genèse et développement de la notion 
bergsonienne d’intuition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. 
Huxley, Thomas. ‘On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History’. Nature 
10, no. 1 (1874): 362–66. 
Ingthorsson, Röngvaldur D. McTaggart’s Paradox. Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2016. 
Jankélévitch, Vladimir. Henri Bergson. Translated by Nils F. Schott. London and Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2015. 
 
 183  
Jeffrey, Anne, Asha Lancaster-Thomas, and Matyáš Moravec. ‘Fluctuating Maximal God’. 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, early view. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09748-w. 
Johnson, David Kyle. ‘God, Fatalism, and Temporal Ontology’. Religious Studies 45, no. 4 
(2009): 435–54. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412509990059. 
Kane, Robert. ‘Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates’. In The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane, Second edition., 1–33. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
———. ‘Libertarianism’. In Four Views on Free Will, 5–43. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Allen W. Wood and J. Paul Guyer. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
———. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as 
Science. Translated by P. G. Lucas and G. Zöller. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004. 
Khamara, E. J. ‘Eternity and Omniscience’. The Philosophical Quarterly 24, no. 96 (1974): 
204–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/2217934. 
Klein, Etienne. ‘Who Is Entitled to Talk About Time?’ University of L’Aquila, 2019. 
Kołakowski, Leszek. Bergson. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Kouba, Pavel. ‘Le Mouvement Entre Temps et Espace (Bergson Aux Prises Avec Sa 
Découverte)’. In Annales Bergsoniennes, edited by Frédéric Worms, 2:207–25. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 2004. 
Kretzmann, Norman. The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa 
Contra Gentiles II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Kvanvig, Jonathan L., and Hugh McCann. ‘Divine Conservation and the Persistence of the 
World’. In Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, edited by 
T. V. Morris, 13–49. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
Laplace, Pierre Simon de. A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. Translated by Frederick 
Wilson Truscott and Frederick Lincoln Emory. First edition. London: Chapman & Hall, 
1902. 
Le Poidevin, Robin. ‘Relationism and Temporal Ontology: Physics or Metaphysics?’ In The 
Philosophy of Time, edited by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, 149–67. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
———. ‘Relative Realities’. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28, 
no. 4 (1997): 541–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1355-2198(97)00020-8. 
———. The Images of Time. An Essay on Temporal Representation. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
Leftow, Brian. ‘Aquinas on Time and Eternity’. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
64, no. 3 (1990): 387–99. https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq199064315. 
———. ‘Presentism, Atemporality, and Time’s Way’. Faith and Philosophy 35, no. 2 (2018): 
173–94. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil2018326100. 
———. Time and Eternity. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Lévy-Leblond, Jean-Marc. ‘Le Boulet d’Einstein et les boulettes de Bergson’. In Annales 
bergsoniennes, edited by Frédéric Worms, 3:237–58. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2007. 
Lewis, David. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Lewis, Delmas. ‘Eternity Again: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’. International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 15, no. 1/2 (1984): 73–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142103. 
Libet, Benjamin. ‘The Timing of a Subjective Experience’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12, 
no. 1 (1989): 183–84. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00024912. 
 
 184  
———. ‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action’. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8, no. 4 (1985): 529–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00044903. 
Lucas, J. R. A Treatise on Time and Space. London: Methuen & Co, 1973. 
Lynds, Peter. ‘Time and Classical and Quantum Mechanics: Indeterminacy vs. Discontinuity’. 
Foundations of Physics Letters 16, no. 4 (2003): 343–55. 
Maritain, Jacques. Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007. 
Marmura, Michael. ‘Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’. 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 82 (1962): 299–312. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/597641. 
Matthews Grant, W. Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. The Dual Sources Account. 
Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion. London: Bloomsbury, 2019. 
Maudlin, Tim. Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012. 
McCann, Hugh. ‘Free Will and the Mythology of Causation’. In Alternative Concepts of God. 
Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine, edited by Andrei A. Buckareff and Yujin 
Nagasawa, 234–51. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
McGinn, Colin. The Subjective View. Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983. 
McGinnis, Jon. ‘Creation and Eternity in Medieval Philosophy’. In A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Time, edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, 73–86. Malden, 
Oxford and Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 
McKenna, Michael, and D. Justin Coates. ‘Compatibilism’. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 5 November 2019. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/compatibilism/. 
McTaggart, J. M. E. The Nature of Existence. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1927. 
———. ‘The Relation of Time and Eternity’. Mind 18, no. 71 (1909): 343–62. 
———. ‘The Unreality of Time’. Mind 17, no. 68 (1908): 457–74. 
Mele, Alfred R. Effective Intentions. The Power of Conscious Will. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
Mellor, D. H. ‘History Without the Flow of Time’. Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische 
Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 28, no. 1 (1986): 68–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/nzst.1986.28.1.68. 
———. Mind, Meaning, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
———. ‘Special Relativity and Present Truth’. Analysis 34, no. 3 (1974): 74–77. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3327488. 
———. ‘The Unreality of Tense’. In The Philosophy of Time, edited by Robin Le Poidevin 
and Murray MacBeath, 47–59. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Signes. Paris: Gallimard, 2003. 
Milet, Jean. Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal ou La raison et le temps. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1974. 
Miller, Kristie. ‘Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block’. In A Companion to the 
Philosophy of Time, edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, 345–64. Malden, 
Oxford and Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 
Miravalle, John-Mark L. ‘The Trinity’s Choice: Oppy, Bergson, and God’s Decision to 
Create’. Philosophy and Theology 27, no. 1 (2015): 153–69. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtheol20155825. 
 
 185  
Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia). Translated by Alfred 
J. Freddoso. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988. 
Moore, A.W. The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
Moore, Francis Charles Timothy. Bergson: Thinking Backwards. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Moravec, Matyáš. ‘A Perpetual Present: Henri Bergson and Atemporal Duration’. European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 3 (2019): 197–224. 
https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2629. 
———. ‘Aquinas and Kripke on the Genealogy of Essential Properties’. The Heythrop 
Journal, early view. https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.13045. 
———. ‘Bergson and McTaggart’s Argument’. In The Bergsonian Mind, edited by Mark 
Sinclair and Yaron Wolf. London: Routledge, forthcoming. 
———. ‘Eternity, Relative Realities, and Ontological Idealism About Time’. TheoLogica 5, 
no. 1 (2020). 
Moss, D. ‘Brain, Body and World Image and the Psychology of the Body’. In Existential-
Phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology. Exploring the Breadth of Human 
Experience, edited by R. S. Valle and S. Haling, 63–82. London: Plenum Press, 1989. 
Mozersky, Joshua M. ‘Time, Tense and Special Relativity’. International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science 14, no. 3 (2000): 221–36. 
Mullarkey, John. Bergson and Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. 
Mullins, Ryan T. The End of the Timeless God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Neveu, Bruno. ‘Bergson et l’Index’. Revue de métaphysique et de morale 4, no. 40 (2003): 
543–51. 
Oakeley, Hilda D. ‘The Philosophy of Time and the Timeless in McTaggart’s Nature of 
Existence’. Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 47, no. 1 (1947): 105–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/47.1.105. 
———. ‘Time and the Self in McTaggart’s System’. Mind, New Series 39, no. 154 (1930): 
175–93. 
Oaklander, Nathan. The Ontology of Time. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2004. 
Olma, Sebastian. ‘Physical Bergsonism and the Worldliness of Time’. Theory, Culture & 
Society 24, no. 6 (2007): 123–37. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407078715. 
Padgett, Alan G. ‘The Difference Creation Makes: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered’. In 
God, Eternity and Time, edited by Christian Tapp and Edmund Runggaldier, 117–24. 
Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. 
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. ‘Eternity, Time and Space’. Zygon 40, no. 1 (2005): 97–106. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2005.00647.x. 
Pariente, Jean-Claude. Le Langage et l’individuel. Paris: Armand Collin, 1973. 
Pasnau, Robert. Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
———. ‘On Existing All at Once’. In God, Time and Eternity, edited by Christian Tapp and 
Edmund Runggaldier, 11–28. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
Pavelich, Andrew. ‘On the Idea That God Is Continuously Re-Creating the Universe’. Sophia 
46, no. 1 (2007): 7–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-007-0010-y. 
Pereboom, Derk. ‘Hard Incompatibilism’. In Four Views on Free Will, 85–125. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007. 
Perszyk, Ken. ‘Recent Work on Molinism’. Philosophy Compass 8, no. 8 (2013): 755–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12057. 
Petrov, Vesselin. ‘Bertrand Russell’s Criticism of Bergson’s Views About Continuity and 
Discreteness’. Filozofia 68, no. 10 (2013): 890–904. 
 
 186  
Picavet, Emmanuel Bernard. ‘Action et Décision : Le Sens Des Interrogations de Bergson’. In 
Annales Bergsoniennes, 3:191–216. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007. 
———. Choix rationel et vie publique : Pensée formelle et raison pratique. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1996. 
Pieper, Josef, and Fred Wieck. ‘On the “Negative” Element in the Philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas’. CrossCurrents 4, no. 1 (1953): 46–56. 
Pike, Nelson. God and Timelessness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. 
Pilkington, A. E. Bergson and His Influence. A Reassessment. London, New York and 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
Pinnock, Clark, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger. The 
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. 
Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994. 
Price, Huw. ‘The Flow of Time’. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time, edited by 
Craig Callender, 276–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
———. Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
Prigogine, Ilya, and Isabelle Stengers. Order out of Chaos. London: Verso, 2017. 
Prior, Arthur N. ‘Changes in Events and Changes in Things’. In The Philosophy of Time, edited 
by Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, 35–46. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
———. ‘The Formalities Of Omniscience’. Philosophy 37, no. 140 (1962): 114–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100036780. 
Putnam, Hilary. ‘Time and Physical Geometry’. The Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 8 (1967): 
240–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024493. 
Quételet, A. Physique sociale ou Essai sur le développement des facultés de l’homme. Brussels: 
Classe des lettres. Académie royale de Belgique, 1997. 
Quinton, Anthony. ‘Spaces and Times’. Philosophy 37, no. 140 (1962): 130–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100036792. 
Rhoda, Alan. ‘The Philosophical Case for Open Theism’. Philosophia 35, no. 3–4 (2007): 301–
11. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9078-4. 
Riemann, Bernhard. ‘On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Foundations of Geometry’. In 
A Comprehensive Introduction to Differential Geometry, translated by Michael Spivak, 
II:4A/4-4A20, 1972. 
Rietdijk, C. W. ‘A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of 
Relativity’. Philosophy of Science 33, no. 4 (1966): 341–44. 
Riggio, Adam. ‘Lessons for the Relationship of Philosophy and Science From the Legacy of 
Henri Bergson’. Social Epistemology 30, no. 2 (2016): 213–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2014.971916. 
Riquier, Camille. ‘Dossier critique’. In Matière et mémoire. Essai sur la relation du corps à 
l’esprit, by Henri Bergson, 283–521. edited by Camille Riquier. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2012. 
Rogers, Katherin A. ‘Anselm on Eternity as the Fifth Dimension’. Saint Anselm Journal 3, 
no. 2 (2006): 1–8. 
———. ‘Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless God’. Faith and Philosophy 24, 
no. 1 (2007): 3–27. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil200724134. 
———. ‘Eternity Has No Duration’. Religious Studies 30, no. 1 (1994): 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S003441250002268X. 
———. ‘The Necessity of the Present and Anselm’s Eternalist Response to the Problem of 
Theological Fatalism’. Religious Studies 43, no. 1 (2007): 25–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412506008742. 
 
 187  
Rota, Michael. ‘The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine 
Foreknowledge’. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2, no. 1 (2010): 165–
86. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v2i1.359. 
Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. Second edition. London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1979. 
———. Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays. George Allen & Unwin: London, 1959. 
———. ‘The Philosophy of Bergson’. The Monist 22, no. 3 (1912): 321–47. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191222324. 
Russell, Bertrand, and H. Wildon Carr. The Philosophy of Bergson. By the Hon. Bertrand 
Russell; with a Reply by Mr. H. Wildon Carr and a Rejoinder by Mr. Russell. 
Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1914. 
Salmon, Rime. ‘L’apogée de la réception de Bergson en Angleterre’. Submitted as a thesis for 
the Master 2 de Philosophie Contemporaine, thesis supervisor: Frédéric Worms, 
Department of Philosophy, École normale supérieure, 2017. 
Schlesinger, George N. ‘How Time Flies’. Mind, New Series 91, no. 364 (1982): 501–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCI.364.501. 
———. ‘The Similarities Between Space and Time’. Mind 84, no. 334 (1975): 161–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXIV.1.161. 
Scotus, John Duns. Ordinatio I. Vol. 4. Opera Omnia. Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 
1963. 
Sen, Amartya K. ‘Rationality and Uncertainty’. In Recent Developments in the Foundations of 
Utility and Risk Theory, edited by L. Daboni, A. Montesano, and M. Lines. Dordrecht 
and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986. 
Shanley, Brian J. ‘Aquinas on God’s Causal Knowledge: A Reply to Stump and Kretzmann’. 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1998): 447–57. 
———. ‘Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created Freedom’. 
In Freedom and the Human Person, edited by Richard Velkley, 48:70–89. Studies in 
Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2007. 
———. ‘Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas’. American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 72, no. 1 (1998): 99–122. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq19987216. 
———. ‘Eternal Knowledge of the Temporal in Aquinas’. American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 71, no. 2 (1997): 197–224. https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq199771244. 
Sherman, Jacob Holsinger. ‘Who Speaks for Nature? On the Continued Importance of the 
Bergson-Einstein Debate’. Theology and Science 18, no. 1 (2020): 137–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2019.1710354. 
Sinclair, Mark. ‘Express Yourself! Bergson on Freedom’. Pembroke College, Cambridge, 
2019. 
Soulez, Philippe, and Frédéric Worms. Bergson. Biographie. Paris: Flammarion, 1997. 
Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Stump, Eleonore, and Norman Kretzmann. ‘Eternity’. The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 8 
(1981): 429–57. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026047. 
———. ‘Eternity and God’s Knowledge: A Reply to Shanley’. American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 72, no. 3 (1998): 439–45. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq199872329. 
———. ‘God’s Knowledge and Its Causal Efficacy’. In The Rationality of Belief and the 
Plurality of Faith: Essays in Honor of William P. Alston, edited by Thomas Senor, 94–
124. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995. 
 
 188  
Swinburne, Richard. ‘God and Time’. In Reasoned Faith: Essays in Honor of Norman 
Kretzmann, edited by Eleonore Stump, 204–22. Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1993. 
———. The Coherence of Theism. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Thomas, E. ‘British Idealist Monadologies and the Reality of Time: Hilda Oakeley against 
McTaggart, Leibniz and Others’. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23, no. 6 
(2015): 1150–68. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1059314. 
Todd, Patrick. ‘Geachianism’. In Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge, edited by Patrick 
Todd and John Martin Fischer, 247–75. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Tooley, Michael. Time, Tense and Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. 
———. ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’. Philosophical Studies 27, no. 3 
(1975): 185–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01624156. 
Vrahimis, Andreas. ‘Russell’s Critique of Bergson and the Divide Between “Analytic” and 
“Continental” Philosophy’. Balkan Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2011): 123. 
Wierenga, Edward. ‘Anselm on Omnipresence’. New Scholasticism 62, no. 1 (1988): 30–41. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas198862133. 
———. ‘Omnipresence’. In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by 
Chad Meister and Paul Copan, 281–86. Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
———. ‘Omnipresence’. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Philip L. 
Quinn, Charles Taliaferro, and Paul Draper, Second edition., 258–62. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010. 
Williams, Clifford. ‘A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-Time’. Philosophy 73, no. 285 
(1998): 379–93. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819198000059. 
———. ‘The Metaphysics of A- and B-Time’. The Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 184 
(1996): 371–81. https://doi.org/10.2307/2956448. 
Williams, Donald C. ‘The Myth of Passage’. The Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 15 (1951): 
457–72. https://doi.org/10.2307/2021694. 
Winkler, Rafael. ‘Husserl and Bergson on Time and Consciousness’. In Logos of 
Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Three, edited by Anna-Teresa 
Tymieniecka, 90:93–115. Analecta Husserliana. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 
2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3718-X_6. 
Wippel, John F. ‘Truth in Thomas Aquinas’. The Review of Metaphysics 43, no. 2 (1989): 295–
326. 
Wolf, Susan. Freedom Within Reason. Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Wolff, Edgar. ‘La Théorie de la mémoire chez Bergson’. Archives de Philosophie 20, no. 1 
(1957): 42–77. 
Wolff, Robert Paul. ‘A Reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction’. In Kant: 
A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Robert Paul Wolff. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1968. 
Wolter, Allan B. ‘Scotus’ Paris Lectures on God’s Knowledge of Future Events’. In The 
Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, edited by Marilyn McCord Adams, 285–
333. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
Worms, Frédéric. ‘Bergson entre Russell et Husserl: Un troisième terme?’ Rue Descartes, no. 
29 (2000): 79–96. 
———. ‘Les trois dimensions de la question de l’espace dans l’œuvre de Bergson’. Épokhè 94, 
no. 4 (1994): 89–116. 
———. ‘Présentation’. In Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, by Henri 
Bergson, 7–13. edited by Arnaud Bouaniche. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
2013. 
 
 189  
———. ‘Thinking in Bergson’s Philosophy’. Pembroke College, Cambridge, 2019. 
Zagzebski, Linda. ‘Eternity and Fatalism’. In God, Eternity and Time, edited by Edmund 
Runggaldier and Christian Tapp, 65–80. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011. 
———. ‘Foreknowledge and Human Freedom’. In A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 
edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro, 291–98. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell, 1997. 
———. ‘Omnisubjectivity’. In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Jonathan 
L. Kvanvig, Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
———. Omnisubjectivity: A Defense of a Divine Attribute. Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 2013. 
———. ‘Omnisubjectivity: Why It Is a Divine Attribute’. Nova et Vetera 14, no. 2 (2016): 
435–50. https://doi.org/10.1353/nov.2016.0030. 
Zaslawsky, Denis. ‘Bergson, le finalisme et la philosophie analytique’. Revue de théologie et 
de philosophie 14, no. 6 (1964): 335–47. 
 
